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I was dreaming when I wrote this, forgive me if it goes astray.1 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Does money influence politics?  Based on popular rhetoric, it would certainly appear so. 
In the 2016 US presidential elections, one of the most common topics brought up by candidates 
across the political spectrum was the role of corporate money in politics. Perhaps most famously, 
Democratic Primary runner-up Bernie Sanders’ campaign platform promoted reforming 
campaign finance laws: 
“If we do not get a handle on money in politics and the degree to which big money 
controls the political process in this country, nobody is going to bring about the changes 
that is needed for the middle class and working families”  
 - Bernie Sanders, February 4, 2016 (emphasis added) 
 
Sanders was not alone in criticizing the role of big money in politics. Other big-name Democrats, 
including Senator Elizabeth Warren (MA), have been outspoken about these issues. Even the 
Democratic Party Nominee and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was often 
criticized for taking large donations from corporate America, has gone on the record about the 
negative impact of big money in politics: 
“There’s no question that we need to make Washington work much better than it does 
today. And that means, in particular, getting unaccountable money out of our politics. 
That’s why I’m so passionate about this issue, and I will fight hard to end the 
stranglehold that the wealthy and special interests have on so much of our 
government.” 
- Hillary Clinton, June 22, 2016 (emphasis added) 
 
However, it was not just Democrats who brought his up. Even Donald Trump, Republican Party 
Nominee and now 45th President of the United States, has suggested corporate money is a 
problem in US politics. Reflecting on his time as a businessman before entering politics, he said: 
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“I will tell you that our system is broken. I gave to many people before this. Before two 
months ago I was a businessman. I give to everybody. When they call, I give. And you 
know what? When I need something from them two years later, three years later, I call 
them. They are there for me. That's a broken system.” 
  - Donald Trump, August 4, 2016 (emphasis added) 
The fact that three very different candidates have all gone on the record to critique the 
relationship between big money and political behavior suggests that this is a problem. But is it? 
Are corporate campaign donations a problem? Does money influence politicians’ behavior? If 
so, how? I argue that, despite the intuitive theoretical relationship, we actually do not know. We 
do not know if corporate money influences politicians for two reasons. First, different theoretical 
paradigms about the political process and the state can lead us to different understandings of the 
relationship between money and politics. Second, the evidence linking campaign donations to 
political behavior is actually very mixed, and there is no clear consensus on this relationship. 
In this project, I address both the theoretical and empirical gaps in the political sociology 
and political science literature by examining how corporate elite campaign donations influence 
legislative effort and political outcomes. Specifically, I ask the following questions: Do corporate 
elite donations encourage anti-labor legislative effort? Is the relationship between elite capital 
investment and legislative effort strategic? Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor 
legislative outcomes? Finally, do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes 
by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?  
To answer these questions, I compiled a unique and comprehensive dataset combining 
information on all collective bargaining bills proposed in 2012, information on all state-level 
legislators in 2012, and information on those legislators’ most recent campaign donations to 
examine how corporate elite donations are associated with bill proposal and passage. Although 
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previous work has examined if and how campaign donations contribute to voting patterns among 
legislators, this is the first study to my knowledge that examines legislative effort measured by 
bill proposals. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 covers the relevant theoretical and 
empirical research to date. Because this work is grounded in elite class dominance theory, I pay 
special attention to research in this area.  Chapter 3 describes my data and methods in detail. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the bills analyzed in this dissertation. Chapter 5 address the 
question of whether elite capital investment encourages anti-labor legislative effort. Specifically, 
I examine how different measures of campaign donations are associated with legislators’ 
proposals of pro-labor and anti-labor bills. Chapter 6 address the question of whether the 
relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort is strategic. Specifically, I test 
whether a state’s political climate towards labor moderates the effect of corporate elite campaign 
donations on legislative effort. Finally, Chapter 7 address the questions of whether elite capital 
investment shapes anti-labor legislative outcomes, and, if so, does elite capital investment shape 
anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort. To answer these 
questions I first test if corporate elite campaign donations are associated with bill passage. I then 
test if the effect of corporate elite campaign donations on bill passage is mediated by increased 
legislative effort. Chapter 8 provides a discussion of my findings and a conclusion of the 
dissertation.    
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 THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
 
Theories of the State 
Because the relationship between money and political action is embedded within a set of 
institutional relations set by the state, the nature of the state is central to any analysis concerning 
money and politics. Thus, it is important that we begin with an overview of the main theoretical 
traditions concerning state and its relation to society. There are three theories of the state that 
dominate political sociology that might help explain this relationship: pluralism, institutionalism 
(sometimes separated into state-centered and historical institutionalism), and elite class 
dominance (sometimes called power structure research). Each theory has its own theoretical 
paradigm, unit of analysis, and understanding of the nature of the state, power relations, and 
policy outcomes. Drawing from Alford and Friedland (1985) and Campbell and Skocpol (1994), 
Table 2.1 summarizes the key aspects of each theory. In the following sections, I review the key 
elements and formative sociological research that supports each of these theories. It should be 
noted that these theoretical traditions are not entirely mutually exclusive; some works may fit 
into multiple categories. 
Pluralism 
Plurlaism stresses the importance of a variety of collective social actors in shaping policy 
(Hicks and Lechner 2005). It is based on the idea that society is pluralist in respect to values, 
interests, and function (Campbell and Skocpol 1994). Based on a functionalist understanding of 
politics and society, it argues that society is divided into groups based on ideology, interests, and 
identities, and distributes power according to these divisions. The level of analysis of pluralist   
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Table 2.1: Key Aspects of Theoretical Traditions 
 
Pluralism Institutionalism 
Elite Class  
Dominance 
Theoretical paradigms / 
assumptions 
Functionalist: Individuals 
take action and join groups, 
which work together to 
form societal consensus 
Weberian: State actors 
work within a bureaucracy; 
the organization has 
institutional constraints   
Elite Theory: The power 
elite (capitalist class) has 
gained control of the state, 
maintains hegemonic 
societal dominance 
Key aspect of the state Democratic Bureaucratic  Dominated by capitalist 
class 
Level of Analysis Individual Organizational Societal 
Who or what determines 
state action 
Citizens/groups organized 
through political parties, 
interest groups, and 
lobbyists 
Political elites (elected 
officials) who operate 
within the political 
institutional constraints 
The “power elite” that 
represent the ruling class 
interests 
 
Responses to class struggle 
What is the content of state 
policy 
Reflects the relative balance 
of groups that compete for 
power in / attention from 
state 
Reflects the balance of 
power of political parties 
 
Shaped by previous 
legislation (path 
dependency) and 
institutional constraints 
Policy favors interests of 
the ruling class 
 
Reproduces capitalist class 
relations 
Sources of conflict Conflict between organized 
interest groups 
 
Strain 
 
Conflicts between political 
parties / factions 
 
Conflicts between state 
actors and citizens 
Conflicts between social 
classes 
 
Conflicts between factions 
within social classes 
State autonomy No: State is an arena that 
exists in which groups 
compete for power 
Potentially: Depending on 
institutional structure and 
state capacity, state can be 
autonomous with its own 
agenda 
No: State is an instrument 
of the elite class 
State bias State is neutral, policy 
favors strongest interest 
groups 
State is biased toward its 
own interests; state policies 
favor previous policies 
State is biased to favor the 
interests of the capitalist 
class 
Role of money in politics Donations serve as political 
participation, helps with 
campaigns. 
 
Money grants access for 
interest groups equally 
State actors are interested in 
maintaining the state. 
Money aids in re-election of 
state actors. 
 
If money matters in politics, 
it should matter most where 
it has historically been 
influential 
Money creates and 
maintains social 
relationships between 
capitalist class and state 
actors. 
 
Large donations leave state 
actors beholden unto their 
benefactors 
6 
 
theory is the individual level (Alford and Friedland 1985). That is, the main focus is on 
individuals who join together into interest groups, and political organizations respond to 
aggregates of organized individuals. Alford and Friedland (1985:4) note that pluralism is based 
on “the realm of ‘normal politics’ in which individual actions in concrete situations can be 
observed. When widespread political participation and group competition are possible… pluralist 
concepts are appropriate.” Thus, the key aspect of the state for pluralism is that it is democratic 
above all else. The state is not autonomous, and is considered unbiased under pluralist theory: it 
simply serves as a neutral arena where opposing interests groups compete for power and 
influence. 
One of the most famous pluralists is Robert Dahl (1961), whose book (Who Governs?) 
solidified pluralist theory among political scholars. Dahl’s pluralist theory had four major 
concepts (see also McFarland 2007): (1) power as causation (A’s ability to change the behavior 
of B to A’s interests), (2) the political process model (that actors representing groups will pursue 
their own interests), (3) separate domains of political processes (that power as causation and the 
political process model can vary in different domains), and (4) reliance on actors’ definition of 
their own interests (that a group’s interests should be defined by the group not the researcher). 
As citizens organize in local functional organizations, they compete with other interest groups 
and organizations for power and influence over the state and its policies. State policy, then, is a 
result of the relative balance of interest groups and political parties (Nash 2009).  Conflict arises 
from competition between interest groups, but the overlapping interests of the competing groups 
ameliorate inter-group conflict and create stability in society (Campbell and Skocpol 1994).  
Pluralism explains the development of laws by examining the needs of constituents, 
assuming legislators represent and vote based on those needs (or perceived needs). Mayhew’s 
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(1974) seminal book (Congress: The Electoral Connection) argues that all actions by lawmakers 
can be traced back to their desire to be re-elected. That is, re-election is the primary motivator for 
politicians. Further, on any given policy, any interest group can gain the attention of their 
lawmaker, given they form a powerful coalition. For this reason, lawmakers want to act in ways 
that favor the strongest coalitions and represent the interests of their constituents. Thus, we 
would expect the characteristics of constituents to affect legislators’ interests and opinions, 
which, according to pluralism, will ultimately affect most elections and policy. For example, in 
states with higher union density (where unions presumably have a stronger voice in state 
politics), policy should be more favorable to labor than states with little union presence.  
In sum, pluralist views of policy formation put most emphasis on the influence of 
constituents’ interests. Because politicians want to be re-elected, they should create policy that is 
in the best interest of those who vote (Mayhew 1974). Pluralism also stresses the importance of 
coalitions between groups to get legislation passed, so it is possible that organized business 
might try to make temporary coalitions with another group that has a shared interest in 
weakening labor legislation.  
Institutionalist Theories 
Another theory, or really group of theories, dominant in political sociology is 
institutionalism. Institutionalist theories generally argue that state institutions have their own 
agendas to shape how the political process works (Amenta 2005). Institutionalism can be further 
divided into state-centered institutionalism and historical institutionalism, but both focus 
primarily on the state as an agent. According to institutionalist theories of politics, elites and 
politicians determine state action, but they do so within the constraints imposed by the political 
institutions of the state (Campbell and Skocpol 1994). Institutionalist approaches are loosely 
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derived from Weberian social theory in the following ways: (1) states are viewed as autonomous 
(or potentially autonomous) bureaucracies with their own goals, (2) policy needs to be 
considered in its institutional context in relation to bureaucratization, where the timing of 
democratization and bureaucratization matters, and (3) past policy shapes which how future 
policy is framed and debated, known as path dependency (Orloff 1993). Focused on the 
organizational unit of analysis (Alford and Friedman 1985), state policy reflects the balance of 
power among parties, politicians, and elites existing within the state, as well as previous 
legislative history. Unlike the other two theories discussed here, the state is not simply a passive 
apparatus that interest groups use to achieve their goals; rather, the state is autonomous, with its 
own agenda, and “a major force in shaping the directions of social legislation” (Quadagno 1987).  
Theda Skocpol’s (Skocpol 1992; Skocpol and Ikenberry 1983; Skocpol and Amenta 
1985) work on the development of New Deal policies is perhaps the most famous example of the 
state-centered approach. Skocpol and Amenta (1985:573) argue that other scholars exaggerate 
the power of business interests to shape legislation, and that viewing the state as simply an arena 
for interests to compete for power fails to explain the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 
1935, “for which Congressional liberals took the initiative in the face of the Roosevelt 
administration’s reluctance to support pro-union legislation.”  
An important part of institutionalist approaches is the focus on the historical trajectories 
of states. Current policy debates are informed by the way that existing policies influence “the 
political understanding of problems, the framing of political interests, and the institutional 
capacities for further action” (Orloff 1993:89). Instead of seeing policy as something that comes 
from tension among groups or from elites in civil society, most institutionalists argue that policy-
making is a naturally historical process in which all actors build on, or counter against, previous 
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government institutions (Orloff 1993). For example, old-age pensions were also modeled after 
previous pension policies, suggesting a path-dependent process (Skocpol 1992:526): “Earlier 
experiences with Civil War benefits and maternalist policies… influenced the Social Security 
Act and subsequent U.S. social policymaking.” Thus, state-centered theorists consider the ways 
in which past and current policies direct future policy.  
Another important part of this theory is how the institutional structures of the state, such 
as legislative rules, can affect legislative decisions. Agenda setting abilities (Anzia and Jackman 
2014; Cox and McCubbins 2005) have consistently been found to be associated with the fate of 
bills. A majority party has agenda setting abilities when it is able to control the legislative 
calendar (and decide the order in which bills are heard), or when it has other rights, such as not 
being required to report on all proposed bills. Cox and McCubbins’ (2005) research finds that 
when a majority party has the ability to set the legislative agenda, they can better control policy 
outcomes by blocking unfavorable bills from being voted on. Similarly, Anzia and Jackman 
(2013) find that in state legislatures where a majority agenda setting abilities (such as the power 
to control the legislative calendar), majority roll rates are significantly lower than in legislatures 
where the agenda setting ability is weaker. Thus, controlling for the outside influence of 
constituents, elites, and corporate campaign finance, institutions themselves can sometimes 
affect the ease with which bills may be passed or blocked.  
In sum, state-centered institutionalism is more concerned with how historical trajectories 
and institutional structures and rules shape policy than how elites or coalitions influence politics. 
The effect of campaign donations on legislative behavior should be negligible at best, and any 
significant relationships should disappear once controlling for institutional factors.  
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Elite Class Dominance 
This dissertation is based in elite class dominance theory. Elite class dominance, or 
power structure theories, are a group of related theories based on the idea that political and 
economic elites, often working together, determine state action and policy. This theory is derived 
from an instrumentalist Marxist viewpoint—the elite capitalist class controls the behavior of 
political actors. The instrumentalist Marxist view regards the state as a state in a capitalist 
society, a phrase drawn from Miliband’s (1969) book (see also Hay 1999; Jessop 2004). 
Miliband (1969:23) argued that “the ‘ruling class’ of capitalist society is that class which owns 
and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus 
conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.” The state 
functions for the elite by serving elite interests (Campbell and Skocpol 1994; Mills 1956). 
Whereas the key aspect of the state is democratic for pluralist theory, and bureaucratic for state-
centered institutionalist theory, the key aspect of the state here is that it is controlled by the 
capitalist class. As long as it is dominated by this class, the state will continue to function 
reproduce capitalist relations.  
An important part of elite class dominance theory is that the power elite are more than 
just extremely rich: they have both structural and social power. Structurally, the elite control 
companies with billions of dollars in assets, they employ millions of workers, and they own the 
land which is rented to people and small businesses, all of which makes the elite important in 
terms of contributing to the tax base of the government and the overall health of the economy. 
However, they also have social power—for example, the elite are members of the same exclusive 
clubs (Domhoff 1974, 1975; Hunter 1953; Kahn 2012; Mills 1956), they go to the same 
exclusive boarding schools and universities (Domhoff 2014; Kahn 2011; Karabel 2005; Mills 
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1956), they marry into each other’s families (Baltzell 1987, 1989; Domhoff 2014), and perhaps 
most importantly, they sit on each other’s corporate boards of directors where they transmit and 
receive information (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2014; Useem 1984). This social power makes the 
elite theoretically distinct from other business interests. Domhoff (2014: xiii) writes:  
This combination of economic power, policy expertise, and continuing political access 
makes the corporate rich a dominant class, not in the sense of complete and absolute 
power, but in the sense that they have the power to shape the economic and political 
frameworks within which other groups and classes must operate, right down to changing 
the rules that govern elections and who can vote in them. They therefore win far more 
often than they lose on the issues of concern to them. 
 
Similarly, other research finds that big business and the capitalist class are connected in a tight 
social network, advising state actors on policy planning (e.g., Baran and Sweezy 1966; Useem 
1984).  
In sum, elite class dominance focuses on the ways in which the capitalist class gain and 
maintain control over state actors. The dimension of power is economic-relational: through elite 
network ties, members of the capitalist class have historically been able to shape policy in a way 
they find favorable (e.g., Baran and Sweezy 1966; Carroll 2010; Carroll and Sapinski 2010; 
Domhoff 1990, 1996; Domhoff and Webber 2014; Kahn 2012; Mills 1956; Murray 2014, 
forthcoming; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Useem 1984; Van Appeldoorn 2015).   
Historical Context of the Power Elite in the US 
Domhoff and Webber (2011:10) note that “class domination is not inevitable but highly 
dependent on many historical factors.” Indeed, the relationship between the power elite and 
politicians has evolved over time. In this section, I place elite class dominance theory in 
historical perspective. I begin with the period spanning the Gilded Age, then I focus on the Great 
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Depression and the New Deal, followed by the postwar era. I then move to the rise of 
neoliberalism and globalization in the 1970’s and end with the current era of politics. 
The Gilded Age: The Rise of an Interlocked Elite 
 
There are several historical factors that gave rise to the development of a strong and 
cohesive elite in the United States that is in many ways unique, explained in detail by Domhoff 
and Webber (2011:11). First, the United States never had feudal elites based in an agrarian 
economic system. A lack of feudal elites that lorded over peasants meant that the capitalist class 
in the US had no economic rivals. Second, the federalist system of government in the US, with 
an emphasis on local and state power, allowed local and regional elites to easily dominate the 
federal government. Third, the lack of political threats at the US borders, and the ongoing 
protection of the British military, led the US to have a relatively underdeveloped military until 
the Second World War. This meant that economic elites historically have not had to compete 
with the military for power. Finally, the US has never had an official religion, meaning that the 
capitalist class has not had a theological and ideological rival for power. 
The corporate community in the US dates back to at least the turn of the nineteenth 
century when 80 wealthy textile owners in New England would join together to invest in other 
companies (Domhoff 2014). Known as “the Boston Associates,” these men controlled 31 
companies that accounted for 20 percent of the US textile industry. Over a dozen of these men 
served as directors of Boston banks that controlled 40 percent of the city’s banking capital, 20 
were on the boards of six prominent insurance companies, and 11 sat on the boards of five 
railroad companies (Dalzell 1987; Domhoff 2014). Similar city-wide networks of corporate elites 
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continued through most of the nineteenth century.2 The late nineteenth century, however, was 
marked by a period of rapid economic expansion alongside a shift into an industrial economy in 
the US. Mass production quickly increased, and along with it, big business and corporate finance 
(Laughlin 2012; Roy 1983). This changing economy required a restructuring of business in the 
US: what is now known as the merger movement saw vast horizontal integration, as one more 
successful businesses acquired, or merged with, their less successful competitors, turning 
themselves into large conglomerate companies (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Seavoy 2006). 
By acquiring their competitors, these conglomerates were better able to control prices and output 
over the entire market, as a monopoly would (Cashman 1984; Chandler 1977; Laughlin 2012; 
Roy 1983; Seavoy 2006).  
Investment banker J.P. Morgan was one of the essential brokers of the merger movement. 
In an effort to stop what he called “destructive competition” (race-to-the-bottom price wars 
between competing businesses), he first bought up Carnegie Steel in 1901 (Seavoy 2006). He 
then used Carnegie Steel “as the nucleus” to organize multiple mergers with a large number of 
other steel mills, manufacturers, and mines (Seavoy 2006:250). In addition to making 
investments in all major industrial firms, Morgan then placed himself and his banker associates 
on the boards of directors of these corporation (Mizruchi 1981; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Roy 
1983), thus creating an interlocking network of corporate elites (Bunting 1983; Roy 1983, 1997). 
During this time, corporate interlocks of directors grew rapidly, and “the wealthy became 
the corporate rich, with their fortunes in all business sectors, from agriculture to real estate, 
protected by their incorporated fortresses” (Domhoff 2014:19). Roy’s (1983) research traces this 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bunting’s (1983) research on nineteenth century interlocks in New York 
City, and Isaac’s (2002) research on corporate elites in Gilded Age Cleveland. 
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development of the corporate network in the US during the Gilded Age. Of the 374 non-financial 
and non-banking companies across 20 years that he sampled, Roy found that between 1886 and 
1892, 126 directors formed 149 interlocks during the pre-depression years (1886-1892). During 
the depression of 1893-1897, 145 people formed 206 interlocks. This number increased 
drastically during the post-depression years, where he found that 380 people held 649 interlocks 
between 1898 and 1905. Further, he found that finance capitalists played an increasingly 
integrative role during this time: “In the first period, 23% (20 of 88) of finance capitalists held 
more than one directorship in the nonfinancial industries. This figure rose to 35% in 1898-1905. 
… On the other hand, during this same period only 8.2% of those without banking affiliations 
were interlockers” (Roy 1983: 156-157). 
The power and wealth of the corporate elite in America continued to grow into the early 
twentieth century.  The corporate elite also became more diverse during this “era of good 
feelings” (Domhoff and Webber 2011:33). In the context of the merger movement, the 
increasing violence directed at the labor movement (see Lipold and Isaac 2009), as well as a 
return to prosperity after a three-year depression, a moderate faction among the corporate elite 
emerged (Domhoff and Webber 2011). These “corporate moderates” differed from their 
“ultraconservative” elite counterparts in that they expressed a willingness to work with the labor 
movement in an effort to reduce industrial tensions. The corporate moderates began to enter into 
collective bargaining agreements with the burgeoning labor movement, but they limited the 
terms to small concessions (such as wages and working hours) in an effort to avoid a larger 
critique of capitalist relations (Domhoff 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011; Ramirez 1978). 
One particularly important development during this time was the National Civic 
Federation (NCF), an organization funded in 1900 and comprised of both executives from large 
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corporations as well as leaders from trade unions (Cyphers 2002; Domhoff and Webber 2011; 
Green 1956). The NCF was the first national policy planning group formed by the corporate 
elite, and its aim was to improve industrial relations through the means of collective bargaining. 
Although this sounds rather progressive, the NCF was made up of the above-mentioned 
corporate moderates, and as Domhoff and Webber (2011:37) note, “the unionism the NCF 
leaders were willing to support was a narrow one such as was represented by the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), focused almost exclusively on skilled or craft workers, to the 
exclusion of the unskilled industrial unions in mass production industries.” That being said, the 
NCF was relatively moderate in its attitude toward labor, especially in comparison with the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the “core organization for the ultraconservatives 
in the corporate community” (Domhoff and Webber 2011:38), focused on the destruction of the 
closed shop. 
Although the NCF was successful for a short time in proposing agreements between 
capital and labor, it eventually declined in importance after World War I. This decline was due to 
several factors: it fulfilled some of its milder reformist goals, it deemphasized collective 
bargaining (which made organized labor less interested in membership), and as the labor 
movement grew stronger, corporate business members were no longer willing to be in an 
organization with union leaders (Domhoff and Webber 2011). The NCF was replaced by several 
new organizations, including the US Chamber of Commerce (COC, founded in 1912) and other 
policy-planning groups. The US COC was mostly funded by philanthropic foundations started by 
wealthy elites such as the Carnegies and the Rockefellers (Domhoff and Webber 2011). 
Other policy-planning groups and think tanks began to emerge at the same time, most of 
which has multiple ties to the corporate elite. For example, the National Bureau of Economic 
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Research was founded in 1919, and had direct ties to Ivy League economists and business school 
professor as well as top business leaders (Domhoff and Webber 2011). In addition, the Institute 
of Government Research (founded in 1916 with ties to wealthy businessman Robert Brookings 
and the Carnegie Corporation), the Institute of Economic research (founded in 1922 with ties to 
Carnegie Corporation), and the Brookings Graduate School of Economics (founded in 1923 with 
ties to Brookings and Carnegie Corporation) merged together in 1927 to form the Brookings 
Institution (Domhoff 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011). Although the Brookings Institution is 
considered liberal in its leanings by some, Domhoff (2010:89-90) asserts that “this is a 
misperception … the Brookings Institution always has been in the mainstream or on the right 
wing. Although some of its economists were important advisors to the Democrats in the 1960s, 
they were also among the most important advisors to the corporate moderates in the Committee 
for Economic Development as well.” 
Finally, the influence of John D. Rockefeller Jr. and his family during this time should 
not be understated. Through his foundations, the Rockefeller family supported a large number of 
think tanks and policy discussion groups, including the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC), founded in 1923, which was “an important source of policy expertise” during this time 
(Domhoff and Webber 2011:49). Over 90 percent of the SSRC’s funding came from foundations 
directly connected to Rockefeller in its first 10 years, and top advisors from the SSRC went on to 
play large roles in the development of many New Deal policies (Domhoff and Webber 2011). 
Rockefeller also hired researchers and advisors to study best practices for improved industrial 
relations, forming the Industrial Relations Council (IRC), which included three leaders of 
powerful corporations, two Rockefeller Foundation employees, and the president of Dartmouth.  
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In sum, the period leading up to the Great Depression was marked by rapidly increasing 
class conflict, power, and profits among a growing network of corporate elites. As the merger 
movement continued, a small number of wealthy individuals concentrated their power, and most 
of them shared interlocking connections by sitting on each other’s board of directors. The 
corporate moderate faction of the elites also began to emerge during the “era of good feelings,” 
creating a division among the ownership class. Finally, this era marked the beginning of the 
policy-planning network, as the wealthy elite created foundations that funded think tanks and 
policy discussion groups. 
The Great Depression and the New Deal  
 
The power and wealth of the corporate elites continued to accumulate in the US through 
the 1920’s. For example, in 1928, the top one percent of earners made nearly 20 percent of all 
wage and salary income, and the top 0.5 percent made over 55 percent of all capital income in 
the US (Picketty and Saez 2003). When the Great Depression struck in 1929, panic spread, and a 
great deal of animosity was directed at reckless Wall Street stock brokers and bankers. Facing an 
increasingly agitated working class, President Roosevelt was able to propose and pass several 
policies as part of his New Deal package. These policies are generally considered to be liberal or 
left-leaning in nature, which has led some researchers to question the relevance of power 
structure theory (e.g., Skocpol and Amenta 1985). However, Domhoff’s (1990,1996, 2014; 
Domhoff and Webber 2011) work has demonstrated that the corporate elite were heavily 
involved in many of these progressive policies3. These members of the corporate elite often 
                                                 
3 For a thorough account of how corporate moderates, ultraconservatives, and the agricultural 
capitalists played a hand in the development of New Deal policies, see especially Domhoff and 
Webber (2011), Class and Power in the New Deal. 
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worked through the increasingly important policy-planning network to influence politicians and 
legislation. 
For example, after World War I, the farming industry in the US began to slow down: 
Europeans started farming their own food again, and American farmers found themselves with a 
difficult to absorb surplus. The farming industry began to collapse at a time when nearly a third 
of all US workers were employed in farming. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 
aimed to fix this problem by encouraging farmers to plant fewer crops and kill excess livestock 
in exchange for subsidies, which reduced surplus and increased the value of the crops and 
livestock (Gilbert and Howe 1991). The developers of this plan came straight from the corporate 
policy-planning network, including Beardsley Ruml, president of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial Fund (Domhoff and Webber 2011). Ruml was in turn connected to other members of 
the corporate elite through the SSRC and the US COC. In the final version of the bill that was 
signed into law, it is clear that this bill was a win for the elite: those involved were mostly 
concerned with big agriculture rather than small farmers, and the subsidies generally favored 
only large farms (Gilbert and Howe 1991). In fact, even President Wilson “shared the 
mainstream agricultural economists’ general view that small farmers would have to leave 
farming for some other work” (Domhoff and Webber 2011:97). Therefore, while the idea of 
subsidies seems progressive on the surface, it was actually a bill favoring the agrarian capitalist 
class. 
Similarly, Domhoff’s (1996; Domhoff and Webber 2011) analysis of the passage of the 
1935 Social Security Act demonstrates how the Rockefeller Network was the biggest player in 
pushing for the legislation. He illustrates how the financial interests of the Rockefellers were 
directly tied to both the SSRC and the Industrial Relations Counselors Inc. (IRC) — two 
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organizations widely considered to be the most prominent in the development of Social Security. 
After the disastrous Ludlow Massacre, whereby 13 people—mostly family members of striking 
miners—died at the hands of strike breakers and private militia, Rockefeller was the target of 
increasingly negative press coverage and had to face a presidential commission on industrial 
relations and an investigation into his involvement. Rockefeller’s next step was to hire a public 
relations expert and a labor relations expert, whom urged Rockefeller to develop company 
unions, giving workers representation within the company, rather than outside organizing 
(Domhoff 1996). Rockefeller then helped create and fund two research centers on industrial 
labor relations—one at the University of Pennsylvania and one at Princeton. Faculty and students 
from these programs ended up being some of the most influential drafters of the Social Security 
Act (Domhoff 1996:130-132; see also Domhoff and Webber 2011). 
Finally, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or the Wagner Act, was arguably the 
most progressive piece of permanent New Deal legislation. Described in more detail below (see 
the section on “History of Collective Bargaining Legislation in the US”), the NLRA was passed 
in 1935, and was vehemently opposed by both ultraconservatives and corporate moderates 
(Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). It guaranteed private employees the right to 
join unions, engage in collective bargaining, and strike if necessary (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). 
The NLRA also permanently established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce 
its provisions and to mediate labor disputes.  
Domhoff and Webber (2011: Chapter 3) disagree with institutionalist accounts of the 
passage of NLRA that emphasize the importance of liberal Democrats gaining a majority 
because other liberal policies, such as changes to the Federal Reserve System and tax increases 
for the extremely wealthy did not pass, and the corporate elite were successful in removing the 
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most progressive aspects of public utility regulation.  Furthermore, they disagree with protest-
disruption theorists who argue that it was the strength of organized labor that allowed for the 
NLRA to pass (e.g., Goldfield 1989), since an earlier version of the NLRA was not able to pass 
at the height of the labor movement two years earlier. Instead, they argue that the NLRA passed 
because liberals intentionally excluded agricultural workers from the Act’s provisions. In doing 
so, corporate moderates and ultraconservatives lost one of their main allies, agribusiness. Thus, 
“corporate leaders did not lose power in general despite the calamity of the Depression. Instead, 
they lost on this issue because their key allies, the plantation capitalists, did not stick with them” 
(Domhoff and Webber 2011:139).  
Further support for elite class dominance theory is evidenced by the near immediate 
reversal in some of the most liberal aspects of the Wagner Act. Almost immediately after its 
passage, corporate elites began pushing for new legislation that would favor business again 
(Davis 1986; Domhoff and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). For example, the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the American Liberty League (ALL) declared the 
NLRA to be unconstitutional, and advocated that employers entirely disregard the law 
(McCammon 1990). Furthermore, once the CIO began trying to organize a racially integrated 
workforce in the South, agribusiness turned back against the NLRA, meaning that the entire 
capitalist class was again united against the NLRA, resulting in its conservative reforms 
(Domhoff and Webber 2011). Thus, despite its overall liberal leanings, the NLRA did face 
constant challenges, and the corporate community was able to limit the impact of the Wagner 
Act by narrowing legitimate conflict to “collective bargaining over wages, hours, and working 
conditions,” and was able to weaken the power of collective bargaining through “welfare 
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capitalism, human relations initiatives, judicial rulings, outright repression, and the post-1938 
limitations on the National Labor Relations Board” (Domhoff and Webber 2011:216). 
An important event that happened soon after was the Flint sit-down strike at General 
Motors that spanned from 1936 to 1937. During this industry-wide strike, a few hundred 
automobile workers were able to defeat the then-largest company in America by occupying the 
plant while on strike, thus preventing the employment of replacement workers (Murray and 
Schwartz 2015). After the strike ended, a wave of sit-down strikes emerged across the US for the 
next two years. These strikes resulted in the unionization of the entire automobile industry and an 
increase in union membership among auto workers from 13.5 percent in 1936 to 23 percent by 
1941 (Murray and Schwartz 2015). In response to this pressure from organized labor, the 
corporate elite started to pressure the government to render the sit-down strike illegal (Domhoff 
2014; McCammon 1990). In 1939 the Supreme Court Ruling of NLRB vs. Fansteel 
Metallurgical ruled that sit-down strikes were illegitimate (McCammon 1990; Mizruchi 2013). 
Due to these kinds of concessions, a majority of the corporate elite held favorable opinions of 
NLRB, although they wanted to continue to reform it (Mizruchi 2013). Thus, although it was 
instituted as a means to protect workers and mediate disputes, the corporate elite was eventually 
able to use the NLRB to systematically strip labor of structural power (e.g., barring sit-down 
strikes and sympathy strikes), even though it occasionally gave favorable decisions in terms of 
non-structural gains (McCammon 1990; Mizruchi 2013). 
Other New Deal policies, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works 
Administration, and the Works Progress Administration, were indeed very liberal and perhaps 
less influenced by the corporate elite, but as Domhoff and Webber (2011:28) note, these policies 
fit with the “regulating the poor” theories (see Piven and Cloward 1971), that these policies were 
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allowed as a temporary means to satiate, or regulate, the increasingly agitated poor. Once the 
disruptive power of poor Americans subsided, these policies were ended.  
In sum, New Deal policies were passed during a time when everyone (business, labor, 
and politicians) was concerned with getting the US out of the Depression. Although on the 
surface these policies appear to both favor the working class and limit the power of the corporate 
elite, power structure researchers such as Domhoff (1996, 2014; Domhoff and Webber 2011) 
show that these policies were often shaped by the corporate elite. Corporate moderates were 
especially influential in shaping both the Social Security Act and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act through elite policy-planning networks. In the one instance where corporate moderates lost 
some power (the NLRA), many of these losses were recovered when corporate moderates and 
ultraconservatives reestablished a coalition with the Southern capitalists and big agribusiness. 
The Postwar Period  
 
Many historians and social scientists contend that after World War II and the Depression 
a “labor-management accord” existed for several decades, and tensions between the working 
class and capitalist class were low (e.g., Clawson and Clawson 1999; Mizruchi 2013; Reich 
2015; Weisskopf 1979). While this is generally accepted as true among many, and while tensions 
may have been less acute than before World War II, other scholars argue that the amicable nature 
of the accord is vastly overstated. For example, Lichenstein (2002:98) argues that “the very idea 
of such a harmonious accord is a suspect reinterpretation of the postwar industrial era.” He points 
out that phrases such as “social contract” and “labor-capital accord” were not used until the 
1980s during the Reagan Administration. While the capitalist class may have been quieter during 
the postwar era, power structure researchers have shown that they were still quite active in 
23 
 
shaping US policy, both foreign and domestic (e.g., Domhoff 2014; Mills 1956). I discuss some 
of these trends below. 
After World War II there was a fear among most that the US might fall into another 
depression, and there was an additional fear among the corporate elite that the liberal-labor 
alliance that helped some progressive New Deal policy pass might continue to be successful 
(Domhoff 2014). In response to these concerns, the business elite re-mobilized with think tanks 
and legal strategies that had both domestic and foreign focuses. On the domestic side, the 
corporate elite helped to create the Committee for Economic Development (CED) in the early 
1940s, “to help plan for a postwar world” (Domhoff 2014:99), and the National Right-to-Work 
Committee in the early 1950’s (Lichenstein 2002; Shermer 2009). While the CED could be 
considered corporate moderates during this time, the ultraconservative US COC and NAM were 
also extremely active during this period, and became increasingly formalized (Lichenstein 2002). 
In response to the progressive aspects of the NLRA, there was a concerted effort among the 
corporate elite to pass legislation limiting the power of organized labor. This effort culminated in 
the Taft-Hartley Act, which officially allowed states to implement Right-to-Work laws, and was 
passed in 1947. As Lichenstein (2002: xiii-xiv) writes: 
Right-to-Work laws became a cause célèbre in the 1940s even before Taft-Hartley and 
Section 14b opened the door for state-level Right-to-Work statutes that proscribed the 
union shop and weakened trade union power…. When the Right-to-Work Committee was 
founded in the 1950s, it was funded by the most reactionary textile, oil, and food-
processing interests. Its propaganda against the union shop was virtually 
indistinguishable from a larger anti-union, anti-Communist, states’ rights discourse that 
often evoked McCarthyite and segregationist themes. 
Thus, despite the commonplace assumption that labor and capital were in a postwar accord, 
historical accounts of the business class during this time suggest the opposite. 
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The corporate elite were also active during this time in foreign affairs. The Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) was a think tank started by “internationally oriented bankers and 
leaders in large corporations” (Domhoff 2014:94). The CFR’s main goal was to expand 
American elites’ financial interests in Europe. One example of successful policy created by CFR 
was the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), which authorized the executive branch 
negotiate trade agreements to later be voted on by Congress (Domhoff 2014; Dreiling and 
Darves 2011). As Dreiling and Darves (2011) note, the RTAA’s emphasis on executive power 
was specifically designed to protect corporate interests in trade policy, as made evident by the 
creation a system of trade committees devoted to hearing business concerns. The authors 
continue: 
Consequently, the RTAA established the politico-institutional conditions for greater 
executive autonomy (from Congress) in trade policy and created specific channels for 
corporate political engagement in both the legislature and the executive in the decades 
that followed…. These institutional changes tended to conceal corporate involvement in 
the executive branch, thus reinforcing notions of autonomous and rational state actors 
crafting trade policy, while making more visible corporate conflicts over trade policy in 
the legislature, thus reinforcing perceptions of business division over trade policy. 
(Dreiling and Darves 2011:1518) 
 
The CFR continued to influence trade policy by issuing policy statements created by “study 
groups” comprised of corporate executives, government and military officials, and academics 
who met to study specific policy “problems” and then issue a statement with “a set of policy 
recommendations” (Domhoff 2014:95). Beginning in 1939, and with funding from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the CFR’s War-Peace study groups “brought together approximately 
100 top bankers, lawyers, executives, economists, and military experts in 362 meetings over a 
five-year period” (Domhoff 2014:95). These groups were extremely influential in shaping 
international economic policy in the Post-War era.  
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Banks also continued to play an important role in the postwar period. However, as large 
nonfinancial corporations continued to grow and accumulate capital, the role of banks began to 
shift during this time (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Mizruchi 2013). In addition, the Banking Act of 
1933 (described above) required a separation of commercial and investment banks, contributing 
to the decline in their power. The role that banks played in the postwar era was a function of 
“their centrality in the social networks created by ties among the leaders of the largest American 
corporations” (Mizruchi 2013:111).  The boards of directors of banks function as meeting places 
for the corporate elite, who both exchanged and transmitted information about the economy. 
Further, some argue that during this time banks served to enforce a financial “hegemony” over 
corporations (e.g., Mintz and Schwartz 1985). Thus, during the postwar period, “banks 
contributed to the moderate, pragmatic approach adopted by the American corporate elite” 
(Mizruchi 2013:112). 
Another important event in the postwar period was the second Red Scare of the 1950’s. 
During a time when worries of a communist takeover created a public hysteria, the corporate 
elite effectively mobilized to purge socialists and communists from unions (Stephan-Norris and 
Zeitlin 2003). Generally speaking, the capitalist class strategically decided that working with 
craft-based unions in the AFL, which tended to not question the capital-labor relationship, was 
preferable to having communists in the CIO lead the labor movement, as these unions tended to 
be much stronger, more radical, and more effective (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). The 
communist-led CIO also advocated industry-wide organizing, social benefits for workers, and 
egalitarian racial and gender relations in the workplace, as opposed to simply bargaining for 
steady contract and better pay. Thus, the corporate elite worked with conservative business 
unionists in exchange for the purging of radicals from the unions. This is made evident in the fact 
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that one of the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) was that all union 
leaders were required to sign affidavits declaring that they did not support the Communist Party 
(Cochran 1979; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). 
In sum, while many historians, social scientists, and even politicians contend that the 
postwar period was marked by an “accord” between organized labor and the capitalist class, 
there is ample evidence to suggest that the corporate elite were still extremely active during this 
time. In addition, although they no longer were the only source of capital for large corporations 
during this time, banks continued to play an important role of connecting members of the 
corporate elite together in the postwar era. During this time, there was also a temporary alliance 
between conservative trade unions and the corporate elite, joining together against the radical 
communist unionists during the Red Scare. However, once the communist threat was gone by the 
end of 1960’s, the corporate elite turned on the business unionists and the labor movement as a 
whole. 
The Counter-Offensive of the 1970’s and Beyond 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons why it is easy to argue that there was a labor-capital accord in 
the postwar era is because the corporate elite’s strategy in regards to policy became much more 
overt during the following decades. Specifically, as the economy began to slump in the early 
seventies and international competition increased, “the American corporate elite began to turn 
against the forces that had constrained it during the postwar period, in particular the federal 
government and organized labor,” and an overt assault on progressive policy began (Mizruchi 
2013:140). During this time, the corporate moderates began to shift to align with 
ultraconservative ideology, resulting in a more unified elite (Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013). 
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One example of the corporate moderates’ shift rightward can be seen by examining the 
CED at the beginning and the end of the 1970s. Domhoff (2014:100) compares examples of 
policy statements issued in 1971 and 1979: 
In the first report [1971], the emphasis was on the social responsibility of corporations 
and the need for corporations to work in partnership with government on social problems. 
The report at the end of the decade [1979] stressed the need to limit the role of 
government in a market system. … This change occurred even though almost half of the 
40 members of the Research and Policy Committee in 1979 were on the committee in 
1971 and had endorsed the earlier policy statement…. This is strong evidence that the 
moderate conservatives had come to agree with ultraconservatives on many issues in the 
changing circumstances of the 1970s. 
 
Another example of the conservative shift during this time was the increased corporate 
opposition to regulatory agencies. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were first created, they did not face 
much opposition from the corporate moderates (Mizruchi 2013; Noble 1986; Vogel 2003). 
OSHA received some resistance from ultraconservatives like NAM and US COC, but it also 
“received support from some of the leading corporations” (Mizruchi 2013:143). By the end of 
the 1970’s, members of the corporate elite began to push back against what they felt to be 
excessive regulations. In response to these threatening regulations, the corporate elite “launched 
a counteroffensive that defined the politics of the 1970s and, some argue, redefined American 
politics in the decades that followed” (Mizruchi 2013:144). 
Two of the biggest players in the conservative backlash of the 1970s were the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the Heritage Foundation (Domhoff 2014; Mizuchi 2013). The 
AEI was founded in 1943 as a part of the US COC, but remained relatively underfunded until the 
1970’s (Domhoff 2014). As the corporate elite began mobilizing against regulations, the need for 
conservative think tanks grew, and consequently, more funds were directed towards the AEI. The 
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Heritage Foundation was founded in 1974 as another response to the need for more conservative 
think tanks. Both AEI and Heritage had several ties to ultraconservatives in the corporate elite, 
such as the Coors family, the Mellon family, General Electric, and GM (see Bellant 1991; 
Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013).  
In addition, ultraconservative foundations—especially the Olin Foundation, the Sarah 
Mellon Scaife Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation—began to grow during this 
time that competed with more moderate foundations such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie 
foundations (Mizruchi 2013). With funding from ultraconservative right-wing foundations, the 
corporate elite launched an effective counter-mobilization consisting of books, articles, op-eds, 
TV programming, and conservative talk radio through the seventies (Mizruchi 2013). As the 
corporate moderates began to become more conservative, the corporate elite became increasingly 
unified. 
Another important part of the policy-planning network starting in the 1970’s was the 
Business Roundtable (Burris 1992; Domhoff 2014; Gross 2010; Mizruchi 2013). The Business 
Roundtable (BRT) was made up of CEOs from the largest US corporations, and quickly “became 
an exclusive fraternity of the nation’s most powerful and prestigious business leaders” (Gross 
2010:235). The categorization of the BRT remains somewhat unclear. “Unlike the CED,” argues 
Mizruchi (2013:157) “which viewed itself as a policy-planning organization whose suggestions 
were made in the national interest, the Roundtable was a lobbying group, explicitly devoted to 
advancing the interests of business.” Alternatively, Domhoff (2014) views the BRT as more of a 
policy discussion group.  The BRT can be considered a mix between the two: it is indeed a 
discussion group, but its goal is less to generate policy for politicians than to generate policy 
positions among the corporate elite. It is also a lobbying group since it does in fact formally 
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lobby on behalf of these policy positions. Therefore, although its exact role may be slightly 
contested, the fact remains that the BRT has played an extremely important role in corporate 
dominance in the US. For example, in the seventies, the BRT formed a committee to launch a 
public information campaign in an attempt to improve the public’s opinion about business in the 
US (Gross 2010). 
During this time, the corporate policy-planning network, led by AEI, Heritage, and the 
BRT, and played important roles in defeating both organized labor and government regulation 
(Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013). The BRT, NAM, and the US COC successfully lobbied to 
defeat a labor reform bill recommended by President Carter in 1977. Together, these groups and 
the largest corporations “hired a public relations firm, placed canned editorials in newspapers, 
financed a study that suggested the likely inflationary consequences of the bill,” which was 
soundly defeated in the Senate through filibuster (Mizruchi 2013:159). The corporate elite also 
began a campaign against government regulation at this time. For example, the BRT helped to 
block both the implementation of the Consumer Protection Agency and tax reforms proposed by 
Carter (Mizruchi 2013). 
In sum, while organized capital fought directly against labor during the so-called 
“accord” years, the fight became much more aggressive since then. As the corporate elite 
continued to limit the power of both organized labor and the government’s ability to regulate the 
economy, their own power increased. Contrary to the generally accepted notion that the Reagan 
administration was responsible for the demise of labor and massive deregulation, the massive 
“undoing of the constraints on the American corporate elite had already been largely 
accomplished by the time that Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in January 1981” 
(Mizruchi 2013:180). However, the Reagan administration did continue the vast cutbacks of 
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social services and the deregulation of corporations, a trend that continued through the Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and even Obama administrations (Domhoff 2014). 
The Corporate Elite Today: Fractured or Globalized? 
 
Today the corporate elite in America appear to look and operate differently than in the 
past. For example, banks are less central in terms of elite networks and interlocks (Domhoff 
2014; Mizruchi 2013). There are two main arguments drawn from the changing landscape of the 
corporate elite. The first is that the elite are now fractured and no longer unified (e.g., Chu and 
Davis 2016; Mizruchi 2013). The second is that instead of fractured, the elite are actually just 
unified at a global, or transnational level (e.g., Carroll 2010; Murray forthcoming). 
The leading advocate for the fracturing hypothesis is Mark Mizruchi (2013), who argues 
the unity characterized the 20th century American elite is gone. Instead, because the corporate 
elite achieved their main goals of diminishing the power of both labor and the state, corporations 
no longer need to be unified, and now pursue their own short-term interests, sometimes at the 
expense of the capitalist class as a whole. Mizruchi’s evidence lies in the fact that commercial 
banks’ centrality in the corporate elite network has declined, and so has the density of the 
corporate elite network as a whole. 
Despite the provocative and popular idea that the corporate elite have fractured and are 
no longer dominant, there is a large body of research that suggests otherwise. These scholars 
argue that the corporate elite has not fractured, but rather the unity has moved from the national 
to the international level (Carroll 2010; Carroll and Sapinski 2010; Murray 2014, forthcoming; 
Robinson and Harris 2000; Sapinski 2015). For example, Carroll (2010) found that although 
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domestic corporate interlocks declined in the US since the nineties, transnational interlocks 
actually increased during this time period. 
The increasingly globalized nature of the corporate elite does not necessarily mean that 
the domestic elite is declining, however. Murray (forthcoming) studied PAC donations from the 
largest 500 companies in the world to open races for US Congress in 2006. He found that US-
only and the transnational capitalist class (measured by the G500) have a dense donation 
network, with no signs of fragmented political behavior. He also finds that when Congressional 
races are close, the corporate elite tend to converge on one candidate. Importantly, he argues that 
“the corporate elite are relatively unified transnationally, but that the unity is blended with, rather 
than in opposition to domestic business unity. Thus… transnational mechanisms function to 
facilitate political unity among the U.S. corporate elite” (Murray forthcoming: 56).  
Domhoff’s (2014) research also contradicts Muzruchi’s fracturing hypothesis. Although 
the interlocks among the 2010 Fortune 500 companies were not as dense as previous years, the 
American corporate elite still has a core, or center. It is made up of the corporations with the 
most interlocks and the ever-important policy-planning network. For example, he provides 
evidence of the continued centrality of the BRT and the Business Council in the corporate 
community. He also provides evidence of elite continuity across administrations that are 
considered in the public eye to be extremely different: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and 
Obama. All three presidents had top appointees with ties to large banks, the Wall Street 
community, and the same elite educational institutions (see also Van Apeldoorn 2015). 
In sum, there is a large body of research that finds the corporate elite are still dominant in 
the US and internationally, although Mizruchi (2013) argues otherwise. While banks may no 
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longer be as central as they used to be, that does not mean that the elite are fragmented.  In an 
increasingly globalized world, it may just be that the elite no longer need banks to provide 
connections to other members of the elite. Rather than commercial banks being the glue to avoid 
“destructive competition” as they were from when JP Morgan first put himself on other boards 
until the 1980s, now policy-planning groups and a collection of large transnationally oriented 
corporations at the center of the global interlock network serve that purpose. In other words, 
rather than a decline in elite unity, there may just be declining domestic sources of unity (Murray 
forthcoming). The elite continue to show strong unity in their campaign contributions (Burris 
2005; Domhoff 2014; Murray 2014, forthcoming). 
Theorizing Money and Politics 
Drawing from the larger theories of the state, I have developed two models that can help 
us understand the relationship between money and politics: the Donations-As-Votes model, and 
the Donations-As-Relationships model4. Table 2.2 summarizes the similarities and differences of 
these two models. 
Donations-As-Votes 
 The first model that helps illustrate how donations and legislative behavior are connected 
is what I call the Donations-As-Votes model. In this model, the primary function of campaign 
donations is to aid in the campaign of the legislator running of office. In this way, donations act 
much like a vote from a constituent.   
                                                 
4 Similarly, political scientists Grossman and Helpman (1996) argued that all rational actors 
donate for either “electoral motives” or “influence motives” (see also Magee 2002). These 
models are similar in that donations seek to either affect the electoral outcomes or influence 
behavior, but they differ some in their assumptions and theoretical traditions. 
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Table 2.2: Donations-As-Votes and Donations-As-Relationships Models 
 
Donations-As-Votes  Donations-As-Relationships 
Theoretical Traditions State Autonomy, Pluralism, 
Network Homophily 
Elite Dominance, Network Diffusion 
Legislator Concerns Maintaining power Maintaining power 
Powerful Positions  Elected positions Elected positions, High-paying 
private-sector jobs, positions of 
influence 
Source of Power in Society The state Corporate elite 
Means of Maintaining Power Win support of voters  Maintain relationships with corporate 
elite 
Source of Policy Preferences Coalitions of voters Wealthy donors 
Function of Donations Supporting candidates you 
already agree with 
Buying access, creating relationship 
between politicians and elite 
Do Donations Influence 
Behavior? 
No Yes 
Are Donations Strategic? No Yes 
 
 According to this model, legislators are primarily concerned with staying in power, which 
is achieved by being elected and re-elected (e.g., Mayhew 1974). Because legislators are 
primarily concerned with (re)election, the policy desires of their constituents ultimately drive 
their own policy actions. This fits both pluralist and state autonomy perspectives. Under a 
pluralist model, legislators will try to make the mix of interest groups in their own districts and 
states happy in order to build a winning coalition. Under a state autonomy perspective, donors 
will try to support candidates that already agree with them so that state power will reflect their 
interests.  
 In this model, donations do not change politician’s behavior. Rather, donations act as 
resources that allow a candidate to get their message out to their coalition of constituents. Given 
this, donors are more likely to treat their donation as a vote- giving to candidates that already 
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agree with them, and that they intend to vote for in the coming election (if possible). Magee 
(2002) and Grossman and Helpman (1996) call this the “electoral” motivation. The intention 
behind donating is in hopes that the candidates they agree with will be able to continue their 
campaigns and reach more voters. From a network perspective, this is network homophily: the 
donor-candidate connection is created on the basis of their shared ideology, rather than the 
connection causing the shared ideology. Consider the following relationship in Figure 2.1: 
Figure 2.1: The Donations-As-Votes Model 
 
Donor 1 (D1) and Legislator 1 (L1) both have a shared ideology, Policy Preference X (Px), while 
Donor 2 (D2) and Legislator 2 (L2) both favor Policy Preference Y (Py). According to the 
Donations-As-Votes model, Donors 1 and 2 will notice that Politicians 1 and 2 share their 
respective policy preferences (Step 1), and because of this, they will donate to the respective 
politician (Step 2).   
 In this model, donations are not strategic: given unlimited resources, an individual would 
donate the same amount to all politicians they agree with. That is, if donors give to people that 
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agree with them in order to influence the outcome of elections, they will do so consistently 
across all political environments. To summarize, in the Donations-As-Votes model, potential 
donors use their financial donations as votes for the politicians that they agree with. 
Donations-As-Relationships  
The other way of understanding the connection between donations and legislative 
behavior is the Donations-As-Relationships model. In this model, the primary function of 
donations is to maintain a relationship between the legislator and the elite. 
As in the Donations-As-Votes model, the Donations-As-Relationships model still 
assumes that a legislators’ primary concern is still staying in a position of power and privilege. 
However, elected position is not the only position of power and privilege. Rich donors may 
provide resources to get legislators elected, but they can also provide powerful, well-paying jobs 
after legislators leave office. This structural power of wealthy donors, which is the foundation of 
elite domination theory (e.g., Domhoff 2014), creates an environment where candidates that 
receive money are likely to align their policies with the interests of their donors. Thus, a 
legislator’s power is preserved by maintaining a relationship with the elite. 
Under this conception, donations from the elite represent gifts that are part of long-term 
social relationships. They also create a sense of indebtedness, which leads to reciprocation in the 
form of legislative effort. That legislative effort is then reciprocated by more donations, and 
eventually a job through the revolving door. This is also known as “influential” donation motives 
because donations are about influencing the behavior of politicians (Grossman and Helpman 
1996; Magee 2002) 
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Under this model, donations are strategic. Donors should focus their money where their 
influence matters the most. Since donations are about influencing politicians’ behavior, donors 
may seek to target their money where they will have the most influence. In an environment that 
is already friendly to the interests of the elite, elite donations will have minimal impact (as their 
interests will likely be served in any event). However, in an environment that is hostile to elite 
interests, elite donations can have the maximum impact.  From a network perspective, this is 
network diffusion: policy preferences diffuse from donor to candidate due to the relationship 
established by donations. Campaign donations buy access, and this access leads to diffusion of 
perspective on policy. Consider the relationship in Figure 2.2: 
Figure 2.2: The Donations-As-Relationships Model 
 
Here, Donor 1 (D1) and Donor 2 (D2) still have their policy preferences (Px and Py, respectively). 
However, Legislator 1 (L1) and Legislator 2 (L2) no longer have any policy preferences. 
According to the Donations-As-Relationships model, Donors 1 and 2 will first donate to 
Legislators 1 and 2 to initiate a relationship (Step 1), and because of this, shared ideology 
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diffuses from donor to candidate as part of the social relationship (Step 2).  In other words, in 
this model, campaign donations presuppose the shared ideology. 
 To summarize, in the Donations-As-Relationships model, elite donors use their financial 
donations to create and maintain relationships with political actors. These relationships are 
strategic, and are focused on securing the interests of the elite and influencing political behavior. 
Theoretical Model 
Figure 2.3 presents a conceptual model that displays the mechanisms through which the 
corporate elite exert influence on politicians. The model begins with elite capital investment, 
where the corporate elite invest money into legislators’ political campaigns. Following the 
Donations-As-Relationships model, this model creates and maintains a relationship between 
legislators and the elite, and leads to increased legislative effort, in this case, more anti-labor bill 
proposals. Legislative effort in turn leads to political outcomes, in this case, increases in anti-
labor bill proposals will lead to increases in anti-labor bills being passed and signed into law.  
 
 
There is also a moderation aspect to this conceptual model. I argue that political climate 
moderates the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort. Specifically, 
the corporate elite’s influence on legislative effort should be stronger in labor-friendly 
Figure 2.3: Theoretical Model 
Elite Capital 
Investment 
Corporate Elite 
Campaign Donations 
Legislative Effort  
Proposed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 
Political Outcomes 
Passed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 
+ + 
+ 
Political Climate 
Labor-Friendly 
Environment 
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environments, where their power is less secure. In support of the Donations-As-Relationships 
model, this suggests strategy on the part of the corporate elite. 
Previous Research: Does Money Matter? 
 Although the link seems intuitive and clean-cut, the research examining the influence of 
campaign donations on legislators is actually quite mixed. In this section I review the literature 
that specifically examines whether donations influence the attitudes or actions of legislators. I 
separate this section according to the main findings: (1) donations have no effect, (2) donations 
lead to access, and (3) donations shape legislative behavior.  
Donations Have No Effect 
 Some research finds little, if any, relationship between donations and legislative action 
(Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Austen-Smith 1995; Bronars and Lott 1997; 
Chappell 1981, 1982; Evans 1986; Grenzke 1989; Kau & Rubin 1982; Levitt 1991; Wright 1985, 
1989). Three early and influential studies that first examined the (lack of) influence of campaign 
donations are Chappell (1981), Wright (1989), and Grenzke (1989). For example, Chappell’s 
(1981) research found that the relationship between donations from maritime union PACs and 
Congressional roll call votes was “unavoidably ambiguous.” Wright (1989:411) collected data 
from five large PACs that were most active during the 97th Congress. Combining quantitative 
data on election contributions and roll call votes, as well as 14 in depth interviews, he found no 
evidence supporting a relationship between campaign donations and votes. Finally, Grenzke 
(1989) studied the effect of campaign contributions from 120 PACs on the behavior of the 154 
members of Congress who severed continuously between 1973 and 1982. Using both statistical 
39 
 
analyses and qualitative interviews, she found that PAC donations have little effect on the 
behavior of members of Congress.  
Bronars and Lott (1997) extended this earlier work by focusing on the effect of changes 
in campaign donations during a politician’s last term in office. They distinguish between a 
“sorting” theory (similar to the Donations-As-Votes model) and the “vote-buying” theory 
(similar to the Donations-As-Relationships model). They argued that the sorting theory predicts 
that politicians will not alter their behavior during their last term (because ideology remains 
relatively stable over time), whereas the vote-buying hypothesis predicts that changes in 
campaign donations should predict changes in how politicians vote. Focusing on members of 
Congress (MCs) who were in office from 1977-1990, the authors examine how changes in 
donations from labor and corporate PACs influenced changes in MCs roll call votes with respect 
to conservative and liberal issues. In general, their results support the sorting theory; that 
contributions are made to politicians who value the same policy positions as their donors (and 
the Donations-As-Votes model). Specifically, Congressional voting patterns are consistent “even 
when the threat of reelection is removed and when campaign contributions from interest groups 
decline dramatically” (Bronars and Lott 1997:319). 
More recently, Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003:117) argued that “campaign 
contributing should not be viewed as an investment, but rather as a form of consumption—or, in 
the language of politics, participation.” Individuals and corporations contribute to political 
campaigns not to try to sway the actions of legislators, but for three reasons: because they are 
interested in politics, because they are asked to, and because they have the resources necessary to 
participate civically. “Political giving,” they argue, “should be regarded as a form of 
consumption not unlike giving to charities, such as the United Way or public radio” 
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(Ansolabehere et al. 2003:118). The authors’ meta-analysis of studies that examine the influence 
of political donations on roll call votes in Congress found that PAC donations had little or no 
significant effect on roll call voting most of the time. Their own empirical analyses supported 
this, and found that “voters’ preferences using district fixed effects almost completely eliminates 
the effects of contributions on legislative voting” (Ansolabehere et al. 2003:116). 
One of the possible shortcomings of this work is the aggregating of different types of 
donations. Specifically, the research does not consider why some kinds of PACs (i.e., corporate 
elites) might have a stronger influence than other kinds (i.e., labor unions). This is because this 
research, grounded in pluralist traditions, generally assumes no intrinsic difference in the ability 
for some coalitions to exert more power than others, and certainly is not attuned to forms of class 
power. 
Donations Lead to Access 
Other research finds that campaign donations lead to increased access to legislators, but 
does not address whether this leads to changes in behavior (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; 
Fellowes & Wolf 2004; Kalla and Broockman 2015; Langhein 1986; Powell 2012; Powell and 
Grimmer 2016). For example, Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993’s (1993) study of corporate 
PAC directors finds that campaign contributions are viewed as gifts (rather than bribes), leaving 
politicians to feel indebted to their benefactors. This grants corporate PACs easy access to the 
political elite. Indeed Langbein’s (1986) study of PAC contributions and access estimated it 
would cost PACs on average over $72,000 to access a member of the 95th Congress for an hour, 
where the mean PAC contribution of $28,360 only granted about one-half hour of access time. A 
recent experiment by Kalla and Broockman (2015) found that members of Congress are three 
times as likely to meet with people who identified themselves as a major campaign donor rather 
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than just a constituent. Powell (2012) also confirmed that this relationship between money and 
access also exists in state legislatures. Although these studies do not prove anything in terms of 
policy formation, it is certainly suggestive that money helps create access to legislators.  
Donations Shape Legislative Behavior  
 Finally, some research argues that donations do exert influence on legislators in the form 
of vote-buying (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Beaulieu and Magee 2004; Magee 2002; Monardi and 
Glantz 1998; Peoples 2010; Stratmann 1991, 1995, 2002, 2005). These generally focus on 
industry-specific relationships, such as trade, tobacco, or environmental industries.  
 In particular, Clayton Peoples’ (Peoples 2008, 2010; Peoples and Gortari 2008) work has 
used a power structure approach to examine if and how campaign contributions influence 
policymaking. For example, using a sample of state legislators in Ohio, Peoples (2008) showed 
that legislators with similar donors exhibit similar patterns in voting behaviors, especially 
legislators within the same party. A later study of the federal level (Peoples 2010) examined the 
dyadic relationships of members in the 102nd through 109th US House of Representatives and 
how PAC contributions influenced roll call voting. Legislators who had similar PAC contributors 
were significantly more likely to have similar voting patterns. These patterns were particularly 
strong among incumbent Representatives, even when controlling for prior voting patterns. 
 Outside of sociology, economist Christopher Magee’s (Baldwin and Magee 2000; 
Beaulieu and Magee 2004; Magee 2002, 2007) research has also worked toward documenting 
these relationships among support for various trade and economic policies in the United States. 
For example, Magee (2007) examined defense industry business PAC donations and ideological 
anti-war PAC donations to 1996 elections for Congress. He then examined how MCs voted on 
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defense spending bills. His results found that defense industry PAC donations were “decisive in 
defeating the proposal to eliminate funding for B-2 bombers” (Magee 2007:309).  
 Beaulieu and Magee (2004) examined how campaign donations from PACs (capital and 
labor) to MCs influenced how they voted on trade policy, specifically looking at the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Business PACs gave a 20 percentage point greater fraction of their campaign donations 
to NAFTA and GATT supporters, compared to labor PACs. When predicting how MCs voted, 
they found that in particular, business PACs from industries that stood to gain from export trades 
were the specific drivers for influencing legislative decisions on NAFTA, although there were no 
industry-specific effects for GATT. 
 Economist Thomas Stratmann’s work also finds some evidence for a relationship 
between donations and legislative behavior (Stratmann 1991, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2005). He found 
that PACs donate more money not only during election cycles, but also right before important 
votes in Congress (Stratmann 1998). Analyzing PAC contributions and Congressional roll call 
votes for farm commodities in 1981 and 1985, another study (Stratmann 1995) found that 
campaign donations from agricultural PACs significantly influenced the passage of five (out of 
seven) farm bills that passed. These findings suggest that campaign donations are at least 
correlated with MCs’ voting decisions. In an attempt to capture the causal effect of donations on 
behavior, Stratmann (2002) later examined financial services legislation: the 1991 bill to repeal 
the Glass-Steagall Act, which was defeated, and the 1998 bill to do the same, which passed. 
Banking interests favored repeal of Glass-Steagall and insurance and securities industries 
opposed it. Stratmann (2002) estimated the change in an MC’s votes from 1991 to 1998 on the 
changes in the MC’s contributions from those three groups. He found that changes in donations 
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were associated with changes in voting behavior. Specifically, an extra $10,000 in banking 
contributions increased the likelihood of a House member voting to repeal by eight percentage 
points. 
Shortcomings of Previous Work 
 The previous research testing whether campaign donations influence legislative behavior 
is mixed, but it is also limited in four major ways. First, previous research tends to theorize 
business as homogenous. Second, previous work does not differentiate between homophily and 
diffusion. Third, there is an overwhelming focus on federal-level legislation. Finally, by only 
examining bills signed into law, previous work suffers from selection bias. I detail these issues 
below. 
 Theorizing business as homogenous. The majority of work that examines whether 
business donations influence legislators tends to both theorize and measure business interests as 
homogenous. This work ignores the contributions of power structure researchers like Domhoff 
(1990, 1996, 2014), Useem (1984), and Mills (1956). Specifically, all business is not equal in 
power or motivations. When defining those in the “inner circle,” Useem (1984:1) writes: 
“Most business leaders are not part of… the inner circle. Their concerns extend little 
beyond the immediate welfare of their own firms. But those few whose positions make 
them sensitive to the welfare of a wide range of firms have come to exercise a voice on 
behalf of the entire business community.” 
 
Further, while pluralists would argue that small business is an important counterweight to the 
corporate elite, most evidence suggests this is not true.  As of 2016, there were over 28 million 
small businesses in the United States, making up over 99 percent of all businesses, and 
employing about 48 percent of all US employees (US SBA 2016). Yet Domhoff (2014:34) notes: 
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Small businesses also have an important place in the American belief system because 
they are thought to embody the independence and initiative of all Americans. Their 
advocates claim that they create the majority of new jobs, but they leave out that small 
businesses, which have a high rate of failure, also are responsible for the most job losses 
and fare no better than big businesses in terms of net jobs gained. Further, they tend to 
pay lower wages and are less likely to offer health care and pension benefits. 
 
Although small businesses certainly outweigh the corporate community in numerical power, 
recall again that elite class dominance theory argues that the corporate elite have structural and 
social power, which makes them theoretically distinct form other business interests.  
 At best, some research employs industry-specific analyses (e.g., Stratmann 1991, 2002, 
2005). This supports the idea that we might see opposing interests according to segments of 
capital. However, while business may be fragmented, power structure theory argues that the 
corporate elite are unified across industry. I address weakness in the previous research of 
theorizing business as homogenous by not only measuring all of business together and splitting 
them into industrial sectors, but also distinguishing non-elite business donations from the 
corporate elite.  
 Homophily versus diffusion. The second shortcoming of the literature on campaign 
donations is that research generally only focuses on associations and access. This is problematic 
because by only examining access, we cannot differentiate between homophily and diffusion, or 
between motivations for donations (for an exception, discussed above, see Magee 2002). In other 
words, it might be that the corporate elite are influencing legislators to behave in a certain way 
(diffusion), but it could also be that they simply donate to legislators who would already act on 
their behalf because they are ideologically similar (homophily). Focusing on access rather than 
behavior does not allow us to differentiate between these motivations. 
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 According to the Donations-As-Votes and Donations-As-Relationships models laid out in 
the section above, homophily is not strategic. If corporate donations are simply an act of 
homophily, then given unlimited resources, corporate donors would donate to all legislators they 
agree with equally, and these donations should have an equal association with behavior across all 
political environments. Alternatively, if donations are about influence, they should be strategic: 
donors should target donations where they can have more influence, and donations should be 
more strongly associated when these interests are more at stake. I address this shortcoming by 
moving beyond access and looking at behavior. This allows me to differentiate between 
homophily and diffusion. Specifically, I look at how the effect of corporate donations varies 
across political environment. Specifically, because I am focusing on labor legislation, I look at 
pro-labor and anti-labor political climates. 
 Federal-level legislation. The third major limitation of the previous work is that it 
overwhelmingly focuses on federal-level legislation. (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; 
Magee 2002, 2007; Stratmann 1998, 2002). Brady and colleagues (2013) recently called for a 
shift to examine politics at the state level. I argue that research on state-level legislation is 
important for three reasons. First, the federalist system in the United States, whereby sovereign 
states have more political power than the federal government, means that often the laws affecting 
the day-to-day lives of the public are passed on the sub-national level (Brady et al. 2013; Moller 
2008; Quadagno and Street 2005). This is particularly true in the last several decades, as Moller 
(2008:324) notes that “the ‘devolution revolution’ since the 1980s has augmented the power of 
sub-national state governments in relation to the federal government.” For example, the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, commonly 
referred to as welfare reform) shifted the responsibility of providing cash assistance to the 
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impoverished from the federal to the state level (Cancian and Danziger 2009; Zylan and Soule 
2000). Hate crime (Soule and Earl 2001) and RTW (Dixon 2010; Jacobs and Dixon 2006) laws 
also vary at the sub-national level.  
 The second reason for focusing on sub-national level is methodological. Because 
individual states in the US can be considered their own separate polities, analyzing state-level 
legislation allows for comparative research, rather than examining anecdotal federal laws (Moller 
et al. 2009). As Brady and colleagues point out, “U.S. states exhibit meaningful variation in 
institutions. … Therefore, the comparative literature could be applicable to the United States” 
(2013:873). State-level policies may have effects independent of federal policy (Moller 2008; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). This is especially true of labor legislation, as most conflicts 
between business and labor play out at the state level (Brady et al. 2013; Jacobs and Dixon 2010; 
Tope and Jacobs 2009). However, it should be noted that state-level policy still exists within a 
broader national context. For example, Right to Work laws were only made possible by the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, and although the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act (LMRDA) was a federal law, states varied on whether they expanded the Act to the public 
sector (Fine and Baktari 2001). 
 Third, most federal candidates begin their careers on the state and local level. Therefore, 
the relationship between donors and candidates typically begins before they enter the federal 
government. This might explain why some research on Congress seems to support the 
Donations-As-Votes, because the social relationship was already established and is already 
reciprocal. This study addresses these problems by moving away from federal-level legislation 
and examining bills proposed in the 99 legislative chambers at the state level. 
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 Selection bias. Finally, the overwhelming majority of the research that examines the 
effect of donations on legislative behavior, or the influence of the elite on politicians, suffers 
from selection bias because most research focuses on bills that are signed into law. This problem 
goes beyond just studies on campaign donations and is pervasive in most of the sociological 
literature on labor law. Case studies are problematic because they only focus on laws that have 
been passed, rather than proposed bills that have failed, which results in a selection bias. In other 
words, the research reviewed above fails to take into account bills that were proposed and not 
passed. By doing so, explanations of how and why policy is passed may be incomplete.  This 
may explain the continued disagreement about the correct theoretical framework that explains 
the enactment of laws (e.g., disagreements between Domhoff and Webber 2011 and Skocpol and 
Finegold 1982 on why the NLRA passed). Dixon’s work (Dixon 2006; Jacobs and Dixon 2010) 
predicting the passage of RTW laws is useful, but fails to account for states where such bills may 
have been proposed but failed to pass. 
 A small improvement to the selection bias of case studies is using roll call votes (e.g., 
Chappell 1981; Grenzke 1989; Jacobs et al. 2014; Monroe and Garland 1991; Wright 1989). Roll 
call votes enable the analyst to examine all bills that are voted upon the legislative floor. This 
allows for a greater number of bills, as well as variation between what is passed and failed, but 
analysis of roll call votes has yet to be used in studies of labor legislation. Though roll call votes 
may improve the problem of selection bias, they do not fix it because the vast majority of 
proposed bills never make it to the floor for voting. Further, once a bill makes it to the floor it is 
possible that legislators will vote along party lines rather than based on their policy preferences. 
Political science research tends to support this idea, as Hall and Wayman (1990:797) note that 
“the behavior most likely to be affected [by campaign contributions] is members’ legislative 
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involvement, not their votes.” This project goes beyond past research by compiling data that 
includes all proposed bills in a legislative session. In doing so, I provide the complete universe of 
policy, and help obtain more unbiased estimates of explaining the passage of labor law. 
A History of Collective Bargaining Legislation in the US and Relevant Research 
This dissertation focuses on labor law (specifically, collective bargaining) for several 
important reasons. First, labor legislation is the site of a long-lasting, contentious struggle for 
political power between organized capital and organized labor. The stakes are high, and there are 
very few actors who are undecided in the struggle. If we are interested in ideological struggles, 
especially those between the capitalist and working classes, labor legislation promises to be a 
useful field. Second, labor laws vary widely across states in the US, which will aid in examining 
state-level variation. Third, labor law is interesting because it is highly relevant. There has been a 
recent resurgence in regressive anti-labor legislation over the last decade. For example, Indiana 
(2012), Michigan (2012), and Wisconsin (2014) have all recently passed RTW laws. This is 
particularly interesting because these three states have a long history of strong labor movements. 
Finally, this topic is important because it matters; anti-labor law is likely connected to the 
precipitous decline in union strength in the US and the massive growth in economic inequality 
(Western and Rosenfeld 2011). Other research finds that the minimum wage is consistently 
related to the strength of labor unions (Bartels 2008).  
The majority of research on labor legislation has focused on five historical federal 
policies: (1) The Railway Labor Act of 1926, (2) The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, (3) The 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, (4) The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and 
(5) The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The NLRA and the LMRA 
have received by far the most attention. More recently, advances in labor legislation have moved 
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back to the state level, which is especially evident in the passage of Right to Work legislation. In 
this section, I provide some historical context on these laws. I pay particular attention to the 
effects of these laws on the labor movement and class relations. 
Pre-Statutory Collective Bargaining 
 
Before the passage of the first federal labor laws, individual states were responsible for 
regulation and enforcement of labor and management relations (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). 
Regulatory laws were usually developed by individual cases in state court, rather than being 
developed and passed by state legislatures (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). For example, the first 
recorded labor strike in the United States occurred in 1805 by shoemakers in Philadelphia. This 
question of the legality of the strike was taken to court in 1806 (Commonwealth v. Pullis, also 
known as the Philadelphia Cordwainer’s case), whereby the court ruled that it was illegal for 
workers to join together in an organization in which the members decided to stop work for higher 
wages (Bowman 2002; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Lloyd 1910; Tomlins 1993). This set a legal 
precedent that it was an unlawful conspiracy to form a union for the next forty years (Feldacker 
and Hayes 2014; Tomlins 1993).  
In 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Court Case Commonwealth v. Hunt found that 
forming a union was not a conspiracy and that workers had the right to organize (Commons 
1910; Feldacker and Hayes 2014; Tomlins 1993). Although this favorable ruling began to spread 
during the latter half of the 19th century, no statutory laws existed protecting workers, and courts 
often issued injunction to prevent workers from striking, while maintaining they had the right to 
strike in theory (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). As the US labor movement increased in size and 
strength and strikes became more frequent, Congress saw an increasing need to intervene and 
passed the first statutory federal labor legislation (The Railway Labor Act in 1926). 
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The Railway Labor Act 
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) of 1926 was the first federal statutory labor law in the US 
that recognized the right of employees to form unions and engage in the collective bargaining 
process (Feldacker and Hayes 2014:3). By the 1920’s, labor unions had become increasingly 
popular among the two million railroad workers, and the frequency and strength of strikes 
increased as well. After decades of contentious battles between railroad labor and management 
that restricted public transportation and shipping, a special committee of railroad management 
and labor representatives convened to draft a proposal for federal legislation regulating the labor-
management relationship (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990). This proposal was 
submitted to Congress, and was passed and enacted in 1926 with no substantial changes. 
Although the RLA protects the right to collectively bargain, it also “includes a strong 
policy statement, and a variety of provisions, designed to avoid or delay any interruption to 
commerce such as would be occasioned by a strike” (Paul et al. 2004: v). The RLA works to 
discourage strikes by prolonging the process of collective bargaining, and by requiring 
arbitration of disputes (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990). Striking is only permitted 
over “major” disputes where all arbitration has been exhausted. However, unlike other labor laws 
that were later enacted, the RLA places very few restrictions on tactics of strikers, such as 
secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes (Paul et al. 2004; Thomas and Dooley 1990). 
Despite its significance as the first piece of legislation to protect the right to collectively 
bargain, the RLA remains limited because it only covers railroad and airline employees  and it 
requires bargaining to be done on a craft (rather than employer-wide) basis. Perhaps most 
importantly, the RLA did not establish ways to enforce sanctions against unfair labor practices 
(Thomas and Dooley 1990). 
51 
 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
Prior to 1932, court injunctions continued to be a common way to circumvent previous 
rulings that labor unions and strikes were legal (such as the 1842 Commonwealth v. Hunt 
decision). Instead of filing criminal charges against strikers, employers would file for a civil 
injunction providing a temporary restraining order against striking workers. These injunctions 
were based on “stylized affidavits [by the employers], the truth of which often could not be 
challenged” (Gorman and Finkin 2004:2). The resulting restraining orders would effectively end 
the strike because if workers showed up to picket, they would be thrown in jail for contempt of 
court with no jury trial.   
The Norris LaGuardia Act (NLA) was written and sponsored by Senator George William 
Norris (Nebraska) and Congressman Fiorello H. LaGuardia (New York), two progressive 
Republicans who saw these injunctions as unfair. The Act prohibited federal courts from issuing 
injunctions on strikes and outlawed yellow dog contracts, a process in which employers required 
employees to sign oaths promising not to join a union as a condition of employment (Feldacker 
and Hayes 2014; Gorman and Finkin 2004). 
Despite its progressive advances, the NLA still had its shortcomings. Perhaps most 
importantly, it did not expressly guarantee the rights of employees to collectively bargain. At this 
point, the right to unionize (except for railway workers) could still be decided on a case-by-case 
basis in different states (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). The NLA also had no express means to 
enforce its provisions. However, the ban on federal injunctions did successfully weaken a 
common tactic of employers and laid the foundation for the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. 
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The National Labor Relations Act 
The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), commonly known as the Wagner Act, 
is by far the policy most studied by sociologists (e.g., Cornfield 1989; Domhoff and Webber 
2011; McCammon 1993, 1994). Part of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, the NLRA is widely 
recognized to be the most progressive piece of labor legislation ever passed in the United States. 
It guarantees private employees the right to join unions, engage in collective bargaining, and 
strike if necessary (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Perhaps more importantly, it established 
procedures by which employees may choose to unionize and established the NLRB to enforce 
the provisions for the NLRA, thus “unionization and collective bargaining were transformed 
from legally-acknowledged rights into federally-protected rights” (Sefcovic and Condit 
2001:284, emphasis in original).  
Sections 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the NLRA are generally considered to be the most important 
parts. Section 7 defines protected activity of employees: “Employees shall have the right to self-
organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.151). Section 8 of 
the NLRA defines unfair labor practices. Five types of unfair labor practices are outlined: (1) 
“the domination or interference with the formation or administration” of unions (2) company 
unions, (3) discrimination against employees who join or work to form unions, (4) retaliation 
against employees who file unfair labor practice charges, and (5) employer refusal to collectively 
bargain with union representatives (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.158a). Section 9 declares that certified 
unions are “the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions 
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of employment” and establishes procedures to vote on union representation (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
Sec.159). Finally, Section 13 of the Act protects the right to strike, stating “Nothing in this Act 
… shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike” 
(NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.163). 
The main goal of the Wagner Act was to achieve industrial peace in an era of 
increasingly common labor strikes and violent repression from employers (Herrick 1946; 
Lambert 1998). The NLRB was now in existence to help mediate disputes between capital and 
labor, deciding when unions were legitimate and providing employees with means to complain 
about unfair treatment. But, as described in the above section on the New Deal, employers were 
extremely resistant to government regulation of labor relations, which only increased industrial 
tensions, and instead of decreasing the number of strikes, strike activity increased dramatically 
following the passage of the Wagner Act (Herrick 1946; McCammon 1990).  
In the years following the passage of Wagner, the US labor force did see some 
transformative changes. For example, the number of unionized workers increased fourfold 
between 1934 and 1944, from about 3.5 million to approximately 14 million workers (Peterson 
1945). Additionally, the number of unfair labor practice cases decreased dramatically between 
1936 and 1945, suggesting that employers may have become more accepting of the NLRA over 
time (Herrick 1946; NLRB 1946), although other research shows that the capitalist class was 
pushing hard for new legislation that would turn to favor business again (Davis 1986; Domhoff 
and Webber 2011; McCammon 1990). In fact, as soon as the Wagner Act passed, employer 
groups began an attack campaign against it. Specifically, NAM and ALL declared the NLRA to 
be unconstitutional, and advocated that employers entirely disregard the law (McCammon 1990). 
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The ALL took the case to the Supreme Court, and it was not until 1937 that the Court affirmed 
the constitutionality of the NLRA in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin.  
Although the NLRA formally guaranteed the right to strike, it also was able to restrict 
striking.  The Wagner Act defined the right to strike as a “commercial right—that is, as the 
liberty to engage in certain collective activities for commercial purposes” (Lambert 1998:197). 
In other words, acceptance of the Wagner Act meant an acceptance of the institutionalized 
collective bargaining procedures, the wage system, and a rejection of the idea that the worker 
was a “self-governing citizen with duties and responsibilities beyond the labor contract” 
(Lambert 1998:197). In this way, the NLRA was able to de-radicalize the labor movement in the 
1930’s (Klare 1978; Lambert 1998; McCammon 1990; Tomlins 1985). This fits power structure 
research that finds the capitalist class may make small concessions as it keeps its focus on the 
long-term goal of class domination. Because the NLRA protects the right to strike, Tomlins 
(1985) argues it weakened unions by incorporating them into the legal institutional system. The 
Supreme Court’s Jones and Laughlin decision “embraced those aims of the Act most consistent 
with the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those potential paths of development 
most threatening to the established order” (Klare 1978:265). After losing the Supreme Court 
battle, employers’ resistance to worker organization in the workplace began shift away from 
legal proceedings, and towards “lobbying efforts aimed at persuading or pressuring Congress to 
amend the Wagner Act” (McCammon 1990: 210). 
The Labor Management Relations Act 
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), commonly referred to as the Taft-
Hartley Act, was passed in 1947 as a follow-up amendment to the NLRA and led by organized 
business. After World War II, the strength of the labor movement began to increase again, with 
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25 percent of the US workforce being unionized. Due to the wave of large scale strikes 
(primarily in the automobile and steel industries) causing disruptions in commerce and the post 
war economy and alarming the nation (McCammon 1994; Millis and Brown 1950), Congress 
began to attempt to restrict the power of the strong industrial unions. As the public’s fears about 
the spread of Communism and a militant labor movement increased, McCammon (1990:212) 
notes that employers “played on these public fears with an intensified media campaign calling 
for legislation to amend Wagner, to ‘equalize’ the law… The general shift in public sentiment 
was manifested in the Congressional elections of 1946 in which the Republicans were able to 
reclaim majorities in both the House and Senate, and in 1947 the Republican-dominated 
Congress enacted Taft-Hartley.”  
The LMRA is generally considered to be the most important regressive labor legislation 
passed in the US. Whereas the NLRA protected the rights of employees, the LMRA protected 
the rights of employers (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Taft-Hartley further hindered the labor 
movement by producing a list of unfair labor practices of workers, and banned political strikes, 
solidarity strikes, jurisdictional (the right to a particular job assignment) strikes, wildcat 
(nonunion sanctioned) strikes, secondary boycotts and mass picketing, and union donations to 
federal political campaigns (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). These specific types of strikes and 
boycotts were well known as being the most effective tactics of the labor movement (Feldacker 
and Hayes 2014; McCammon 1990, 1994).  
The Act also outlawed closed shops, wherein employers only hire union members as 
employees. Banning closed shops naturally introduces the free-rider problem into unions, 
effectively weakening them. Finally, Taft-Hartley provided that individual states could pass 
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RTW laws (Section 14B). By 1955, 17 states5 passed RTW laws. The labor movement lobbied 
especially hard to get this provision removed from the LMRA, but to no avail (Domhoff and 
Webber 2011; Zieger 1986). 
Research generally agrees that the LMRA successfully reduced the power of organized 
labor. Wallace (2007) examined how the post-LMRA legal-institutional context affected strike 
activity in the US. Using a labor law index comprised of the number of pro-labor laws, NLRB 
unfair labor cases filed, use of anti-labor injunctions, labor mediation, and labor arbitration to 
measure the legal-institutional context, he finds that high values on the labor law index reduced 
strike activity between 1948 to 1980. Specifically, he argues that the legal-institutional context 
set up by Taft-Hartley delegitimized the most effective forms of labor unrest (e.g., sit-down 
strikes) by providing more conservative alternatives (e.g., mediation and arbitration, the ability to 
file complaints to the NLRB) that reduced the overall militancy of the movement. 
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin’s (2003) study of 38 CIO unions from the 1930s to the 1940s 
also demonstrates how Taft-Hartley was devastating to the labor movement. They contend that 
one of the most damaging provisions was that which prohibited known members of the 
Communist party from holding office in unions. Their book shows how Communist-led CIO 
unions were generally the most racially progressive, the most democratic, and the most effective 
in labor demonstrations. By purging Communists from leadership roles, the Taft-Hartley Act 
effectively deradicalized the strongest unions in the 1940’s and 1950’s. It would appear that the 
labor movement never fully recovered. 
                                                 
5 Those states were: Arkansas (1944), Florida (1944), Arizona (1946), Nebraska (1946), Virginia 
(1947), Tennessee (1947), North Carolina (1947), Georgia (1947), Iowa (1947), South Dakota 
(1947), Texas (1947), North Dakota (1948), Nevada (1952), Alabama (1953), Mississippi 
(1954), South Carolina (1954), and Utah (1955). 
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In sum, the Taft-Hartley Act is perhaps the most conservative and regressive labor law to 
date. While the NLRA focused on the rights of employees, the LMRA focused on the rights of 
employers. In support of elite class dominance theory, the US corporate elite worked together to 
counter the liberal Wagner Act. This concerted effort began through a judicial route by 
challenging the constitutionality of the NLRA, but soon moved to a legislative route by enacting 
the LMRA. Taft-Hartley paved the way for future regressive laws, especially RTW legislation.  
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 was created to 
regulate internal union matters; it established a Bill of Rights for union members, procedures for 
union elections, and a requirement for unions to submit annual financial reports to the 
Department of Labor (Feldacker and Hayes 2014). Similar to the LMRA, it was passed at the 
height of the second Red Scare, and the Act was in part a reaction to the increased mistrust of the 
labor movement, as well as recent exposures of racketeering and corruption within some unions. 
The stated purpose of the law was to return democracy to unions that had become increasingly 
autocratic, and to prevent union corruption (Fine and Baktari 2001; Summers 1984). Part of the 
LMDRA was a provision allowing states to expand the Act to state employees, which some 
states chose to do (Fine and Baktari 2001). 
Several scholars have explored in detail whether the LMRDA actually increased union 
democracy. Drawing from Michels’ (1911) theory of the iron law of oligarchy, Summers (1984) 
argues that the LMRDA serves to loosen the iron grip in a one-party system by dispersing power 
to local chapters, increasing transparency, and enabling the “politically helpless to use the courts 
to hold the ruling oligarch to a measure of accountability” (118). Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) 
argue that this increased transparency and democracy in turn leads to stronger labor militancy as 
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the law encourages the growth of dissident (and often more radical) factions within the union. 
Conversely, Snowbarger and Pintz (1970) found that the passage of the LMRDA was associated 
with decreases in presidential turnovers in AFL-CIO unions.  
In an attempt to systematically test whether the LMRDA in fact established more 
democratic unions, Fine and Baktari (2001) compared levels of union democracy among state-
level public sector unions that expanded the LMRDA to those that did not. They found that 
LMRDA provisions did lead to less autocratic unions, more transparency, and more union 
democracy. In addition, these provisions increased union expenses, especially legal fees. They 
conclude that “the LMRDA can enhance union democracy and encourage more open disclosure 
of those union activities that may affect its rank and file” (Fine and Baktari 2001:402).  
Right to Work Laws and the Shift to State Policy 
Right to Work laws are controversial statutes that prohibit union shop agreements in 
private sector workplaces and render mandatory union membership of all employees in a 
workplace illegal. RTW laws also often prohibit the automatic withdrawal of union dues from 
paychecks. The arguments for RTW are that (a) prohibiting mandatory union membership will 
encourage growth of business in RTW states and increase employment, and (b) requiring 
employees to join a union is a violation of an employee’s First Amendment rights. The 
arguments against RTW laws are that (a) they cripple the already weakened labor movement, (b) 
depress wages, and (c) create more job insecurity by making it easier to fire and lay off workers. 
As mentioned above, 17 states passed RTW laws after the passage of Taft-Hartley. 
Between 1958 and 2001, only five states passed RTW laws: Kansas (1958), Wyoming (1963), 
Louisiana (1976), Idaho (1985), and Oklahoma (2001). More recently, the battle for RTW has 
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again picked up momentum. Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, three heavily unionized states, 
passed RTW laws between 2012 and 2015. These are the first states to pass a RTW law in the 
industrialized, upper Midwest. Although only three bills have passed so far, most legislatures in 
non-RTW states remain busy: between January 1st 2011 and December 31st 2015 there were 211 
RTW bills proposed in 25 states (National Conference of State Legislatures 2015). Figure 2. 
provides a visual of these proposals across the US. Legislators proposed RTW laws in all but 
three non-RTW states during these five years. 
The empirical research concerning the effects of RTW laws is limited and mixed. For 
example, the enactment of RTW laws has been associated with lower union organizing rates 
(Ellwood and Fine 1987), lower union density (Davis and Huston 1995; Hogler et al. 2004; 
Warren and Strauss 1979), higher rates of free-riding (Davis and Huston 1993; Sobel 1995), 
depressed wages (Mishel 2001), and the proposal and opening of corporate chains in RTW states 
(Rao et al. 2011). Other research has found that RTW laws are unrelated to union density (Farber 
1984; Moore et al. 1986) and wages (Eren and Ozbeklik 2011), or are associated with higher 
wages (Reed 2003) and employment rates (Eren and Ozbeklik 2011). 
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Figure 2.4: Right to Work Bills Proposed, 2011-2015 
 
Davis and Huston (1995) attribute mixed findings to the fact that research on the effects 
of RTW legislation include government, agricultural, supervisory, and transportation workers in 
the analysis, although these workers are not subject to RTW.  The authors’ analysis removes 
these workers and finds that union density is in fact 11.8 percentage points higher in states 
without RTW laws. Theoretically, this makes sense:  
RTW laws can affect demand by removing the constraints on choice imposed by union 
shops which permit some employees to free ride and others to demonstrate their 
opposition to unions on principle. RTW laws can affect supply by prompting unions to 
devote organizing effort to non-RTW states where free riders cannot withhold union dues 
as readily. Thus, from demand and supply perspectives, RTW laws should reduce the 
probability of membership of employees in RTW state (Davis and Huston 1995:224). 
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Although recent work has begun to shift its attention to state-level RTW laws, there is little 
consensus on how these laws impact workers or the broader society. Further, research has yet to 
differentiate between the short term and long term effects of these laws.  
In sum, sociologists have long been interested in how the politics of labor affect workers, 
the labor movement, and society as a whole. Battles between capital and labor have resulted in 
several important federal laws that affect the current political climate today, paving the way for 
new policies, such as Right to Work, to pass at the state level. In a time when the battle between 
capital and labor is increasingly contested, the case of labor law proves to be an important case 
study to examine the way politics work in the US. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Drawing from previous research, elite class dominance theory, and the Donations-As-
Relationships model, I have developed specific research questions and hypotheses that 
correspond to each chapter of this dissertation. 
In Chapter 5, I ask the following research question: Does elite capital investment 
encourage anti-labor legislative effort? Elite class dominance theory suggests that the capitalist 
class, primarily concerned with maintaining their power, work to influence politicians to act in 
their favor. In order to exert influence over state actors, the corporate elite leverage their 
financial power and connections. Part of the way this is done is through financially investing in 
legislators, which I measure in campaign donations. By donating to legislators’ campaigns, the 
corporate elite maintain a reciprocal relationship with legislators. These donations are seen as 
gifts rather than bribes, but gifts that legislators are expected to repay through legislative action 
that supports the capitalist class and limits the power of the working class. This leads to my 
hypothesis for Chapter 5:  
62 
 
H 5.1:  Corporate elite donations will be positively associated with anti-labor bill 
proposals. 
In Chapter 6 I ask the following research question: Is the relationship between elite 
capital investment and legislative effort strategic? Under the Donations-As-Votes model, 
donations are viewed as strategic. The corporate elite should focus their donations where their 
influence matters the most. Because donations are about influencing politicians’ behavior in 
favor of the capitalist class, we would expect donors to target their interests are less secure. In an 
environment that is hostile to elite interests and friendly toward the working class, corporate 
donations can have the maximum impact. Thus, I expect corporate elite donations to have more 
influence in labor-friendly states. I also expect the corporate elite to target more of their 
donations towards legislators in labor-friendly states. This leads to my hypotheses for Chapter 6: 
H 6.1: The positive association between corporate elite donations and anti-labor bill 
proposals will be stronger in pro-labor states.  
H 6.2: Legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received money from 
corporate elite donors. 
H 6.3: Legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of corporate elite 
donors. 
H 6.4: Legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from corporate elite 
donors. 
In Chapter 7 I ask the following research questions: Does elite capital investment shape 
anti-labor legislative outcomes? If so, does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative 
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outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort? I previously hypothesized that increased 
monetary investment from the corporate elite would be associated with increased anti-labor 
legislative effort (bill proposals). I expect this relationship to extend to bill outcomes as well. In 
other words, legislators who receive corporate donations should not only be more likely to 
propose anti-labor bills on behalf of the elite, but also vote in favor of elite interests (i.e., vote 
against bills that enhance working class strength and vote for bills that restrict working class 
power). Further, the relationship between corporate elite campaign funding and the number of 
anti-labor bills passed in a state should be at least partially explained by increased anti-labor 
legislative effort, or an increase in anti-labor bills proposed in that state. This leads me to my 
hypotheses for Chapter 7: 
H 7.1:  Corporate elite donations to bill sponsors will be positively associated with the 
likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.  
H 7.2: The state average of corporate elite donations to legislators will be positively 
associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.  
H 7.3: The positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of 
anti-labor bill passage will be mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill 
proposals.  
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 DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
The empirical foundation of this study consists of several unique datasets that I created. 
This chapter outlines data collection, dataset construction, variable operationalization, missing 
data, and analytic strategy. 
Data Sources 
The data for this investigation come from five distinct sources, all of which were collected from 
publicly available secondary sources, described in this section.  
Proposed Collective Bargaining Bills 
To capture legislative effort (bill proposals) and political outcomes (bill passage), I 
collected data for every bill related to collective bargaining that was proposed in the 2012 state 
legislative sessions from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL; www.ncsl.org). 
The NCSL has collected comprehensive information on all bills proposed by state legislatures 
since 2011. Their data on labor unions and collective bargaining are available in a searchable 
database that is updated bi-weekly. Sub-topics within this database include bills relating to public 
employee unions, dues, elections, political activity, RTW, arbitration, strikes, teacher contracts, 
public safety, and public contracts. I chose to focus on collective bargaining legislation for four 
important reasons: (1) labor legislation is the center of the class-based struggle for power 
between capital and labor, (2) labor laws vary widely at the sub-national level, (3) labor law is 
currently relevant, as evident in the passage of RTW in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and 
(4) because anti-labor law is connected to the decline in union strength and the massive growth 
of economic inequality in the US.  
. 
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I decided to analyze all proposed bills in the 2012 session for three key reasons. First, this 
year had the largest number of proposed bills related to collective bargaining (N=1,143). Second, 
2012 was the session before an election year, and if legislators are motivated by reelection, we 
would expect them to be especially concerned with passing legislation during this year. Finally, 
collecting information on bills from 2011-2012 allows for enough time to pass to have complete 
data on the outcome of the bill, thus minimizing “pending” outcomes. 
With funding from the Vanderbilt College of Arts and Science Summer Research Award, 
I employed a team of four undergraduate students and one graduate student to code the bills. 
Each bill was coded for its stance toward organized labor. The possible codes were (1) anti-
labor/pro-business, (2) neutral, and (3) pro-labor/anti-business. Examples of coded bills are 
provided in Chapter 4 (“Valence by Topic”). To ensure coding reliability, two separate coders 
were randomly assigned to code each bill. Any coding discrepancies between coders (about 20% 
of the bills) were reconciled on a case-by-case basis.   
Financial Contributions to Political Candidates 
To measure elite capital investment, I collected information on state-level campaign 
donations. I gathered data on campaign donations from The National Institute on Money in State 
Politics (NIMSP, www.followthemoney.org). The NIMSP is a nonpartisan guide to financial 
influence on all state-level elections. The Institute collects data on (1) election contributions from 
disclosure agencies with which candidates must file their campaign finance reports and (2) all 
state-level candidates in the primary and general elections. I have collected data on all financial 
donations to state legislative election between 2008 and 2011, capturing the donations to every 
legislator in office during the 2012 session. For each legislator, I capture (a) the total amount of 
campaign contributions in their most recent election, (b) the amount of money donated from 
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organized labor interests, and (c) the amount of money donated from organized business 
interests. I further refined the business donations by specifying donations from sources among 
the top 25 most interlocked corporations (discussed in detail in the “Measures” section) in the 
US. I also collected data on the donations from national and state Chambers of Commerce as 
another measure of elite business influence. 
Constituent Characteristics 
To capture the characteristics of constituents and to address pluralist theoretical 
expectations, I used the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, USA (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 
2015) to collect 2010 census data on state and constituent characteristics. The IPUMS is a 
collection of more than fifty high-precision samples of the American population drawn from 
fifteen federal censuses and from the American Community Surveys of 2000-2012. For each 
state, I collected data on the following constituent characteristics: (a) poverty rates, (b) 
unemployment rates, (c) immigrant population, (d) wages for working population, (e) the racial 
composition of the state, (f) trends in employment sectors, and (g) homeownership.  
State Legislature Data 
In order to address institutionalist accounts of the political process, I collected 
information on legislative institutions. Data on state-level institutions and legislative rules were 
collected and made publicly available for replication6 by Anzia and Jackman (2013). In this case, 
NCSL data on state legislatures and data from their own 2010 email survey were combined. The 
legislative clerks or secretaries of all 99 state legislative chambers were emailed to ask about 
specific institutional rules: (a) who appoints the members and chairs of standing committees, (b) 
                                                 
6 As of June 22, 2016, these data are available at https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research/selected-publications/legislative-
organization-and-the-second-face-of-power-evidence-from-us-st 
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whether the chamber votes on committee assignments, (c) how bills are placed on chamber floor 
calendars, and (d) whether the calendar procedures have changed in the last 10 years.  
Political Context Data 
Finally, I collected data on state political context from a variety of sources, including 
state legislative websites. Political context matters because I am interested in how the effect of 
elite capital investment varies according to political environment. I collected information on laws 
regarding collective bargaining in each state as of 2010, the partisanship of each chamber in 
2011 and 2012, the party of the governor during the 2011-2012 sessions, and whether the house 
or senate swung to Republican majority in the 2010 midterm elections. I also collected data on 
unionization rates for each state in 2010.7  
Concept Operationalization 
From the above data sources, I constructed three separate datasets. In the first dataset, the 
legislator is the unit of analysis (N=7,143). The Legislator Dataset provides the empirical 
foundation for examining influences on the behavior of the state legislators. In the second 
dataset, the proposed bill is the unit of analysis (N=1,143). The Proposed Bills Dataset allows me 
to track the outcomes of the actual bills. In the third dataset, the state is the unit of analysis 
(N=50). The Aggregated Dataset allows me to conduct a test of my entire theoretical model at 
once. In this section, I describe my variables. The use of variables differs somewhat across the 
three analytic chapters. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 summarize the variables used in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7, respectively.  
  
                                                 
7 Data come from Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson’s website, http://unionstats.com 
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Table 3.1: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 5 
Variable Name Description Coding Source 
Dependent Variable   
 Anti-Labor Score  A measure of the legislator’s actions against 
organized labor (legislative effort) 
  (# of bills proposed favoring business)  
 –(# of bills proposed favoring labor) 
NCSL 2015 
Campaign Contributions   
 Labor Donations from Labor PACs and Unions Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Business (all) Donations from businesses, business PACs, 
F.I.R.E., & COC 
Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Corporate Elite  Donations from top 25 interlocked corporations Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Non-Elite Business Donations from business that were not corp. 
elite 
Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 C.O.C.  Donations from COCs Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Tech Donations from technology sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Agriculture Donations from agriculture sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Energy Donations from energy sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Finance Donations from financial and banking sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Manufacturing  Donations from manufacturing sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Service Donations from service sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Defense Donations from defense sector Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
Political Climate 
   
 Pro-Labor Environment A dummy variable that measures whether the 
political climate of the state is favorable toward 
labor  
1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's 
min. wage is > fed. min., and (c) the 
unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all else 
Political 
Context Data 
 Majority Sets Agenda  A measure of whether majority party has 
agenda setting ability 
1= majority controls calendar 0=no Anzia and 
Jackman 
 Chamber Majority A measure of the chamber's partisan majority 1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-
Part/Split 
Political 
Context Data 
 Governor Party A measure of the Governor's political party 1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part. Political 
Context Data 
 2010 Rep. Swing Indicates if the majority party of the legislator’s 
chamber swung from Democrat (or split) to 
Republican in the 2010 election  
1=yes; 0=no Political 
Context Data 
 Legislator's Party A measure of the Legislator's political party 3 dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), 
(2) Republican, (3) Ind./Nonpartisan  
NIMSP 2015 
Constituent Characteristics  
  
 % Residents Black A measure of the state’s non-Hispanic black 
pop. 
% of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Residents FB A measure of the state’s foreign-born pop. % of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % in Manuf., 1960 A measure of the size of the manuf. sector in 
1960 
% of all employed residents IPUMS, 1960 
 Δ % in Manuf.  A measure of the change in the manuf. sector, 
1960 to 2010 
 (% of employed residents in 2010) 
– (% of employed residents in 1960) 
IPUMS, 
1960, 2010 
 % in Agriculture A measure of the size of the agri. sector  % of all employed residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Unemployed A measure of state’s unemployment  % of all residents (25-55) who are in the 
labor force but not employed 
IPUMS, 2010 
 % < Poverty Line A measure of state’s poverty % of all employed residents below FPL IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Age A measure of the age of state residents  Average age IPUMS, 2010 
 % Own Homes A measure of state homeownership rates % of households owned IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Income A measure of state’s average income  Average family income, in thousands IPUMS, 2010 
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Table 3.2: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 6 
Variable Name Description Coding Source 
Dependent Variables   
 Anti-Labor Score  A measure of the legislator’s actions 
against organized labor (legislative effort) 
  (# of bills proposed favoring business)  
–(# of bills proposed favoring labor) 
NCSL 2015 
Any Corporate Elite 
Campaign Donation 
Whether the legislator received any 
donations from top 25 interlocked 
corporations 
1= legislator had corporate elite donors; 
0= no corporate donors 
NIMSP 2015 
Total Corporate Elite 
Campaign Donations 
Total amount of money from top 25 
interlocked corporations 
Logged total dollars NIMSP 2015 
Number of Corporate 
Elite Donors 
Number of corporate elite donors Summed total of corporate donors NIMSP 2015 
Campaign Contributions   
 Labor Donations from Labor PACs and Unions Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Corporate Elite  Donations from top 25 interlocked 
corporations 
Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Non-Elite Business Donations from business that were not 
corp. elite 
Logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
    
Political Climate 
  
 Pro-Labor Environment A dummy variable that measures whether 
the political climate of the state is 
favorable toward labor  
1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's 
min. wage is > fed. min., and (c) the 
unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all 
else 
Political Context 
Data 
 Majority Sets Agenda  A measure of whether majority party has 
agenda setting ability 
1= majority controls calendar 0=no Anzia and 
Jackman 
 Chamber Majority A measure of the chamber's partisan 
majority 
1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-
Part/Split 
Political Context 
Data 
 Governor’s Party A measure of the Governor's political 
party 
1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part. Political Context 
Data 
 Legislator's Party A measure of the Legislator's political 
party 
3 dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), 
(2) Republican, (3) 
Independent/Nonpartisan  
NIMSP 2015 
 Rep. Swing in 2010 Indicates if the majority party of the 
legislator’s chamber swung from 
Democrat (or split) to Republican in the 
2010 election  
1=yes; 0=no NIMSP 2015 
Constituent Characteristics  
  
 % Residents Black A measure of the state’s non-Hispanic 
black pop. 
% of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Residents FB A measure of the state’s foreign-born pop. % of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % in Manuf., 1960 A measure of the size of the manuf. sector 
in 1960 
% of all employed residents IPUMS, 1960 
 Δ % in Manuf.  A measure of the change in the manuf. 
sector, 1960 to 2010 
 (% of employed residents in 2010) 
– (% of employed residents in 1960) 
IPUMS, 1960, 
2010 
 % in Agriculture A measure of the size of the agri. sector  % of all employed residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Unemployed A measure of state’s unemployment  % of all residents (25-55) who are in 
the labor force but not employed 
IPUMS, 2010 
 % < Poverty Line A measure of state’s poverty % of all employed residents below FPL IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Age A measure of the age of state residents  Average age IPUMS, 2010 
 % Own Homes A measure of state homeownership rates % of households owned IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Income A measure of state’s average income  Average family income, in thousands IPUMS, 2010 
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Table 3.3: Descriptions of Variables Used in Chapter 7 
Variable Name Description Coding Source 
Dependent Variables 
  
 Ordinal Outcome An ordered measure of all possible 
outcomes of a bill  
(1) failed in first chamber committee, (2) 
failed on first chamber floor, (3) failed in 
second chamber committee, (4) failed on 
second chamber floor, (5) vetoed, (6) 
passed into legislation.  
NCSL (2015) 
 Trichotomous Outcome A trichotomized measure of the bill’s 
outcome 
(0) failed in committee, (1) failed on the 
floor/vetoed, (2) passed 
NCSL (2015) 
 Dichotomous Outcome A dichotomized measure of the bill’s 
outcome 
(0) failed at any stage, (1) passed NCSL (2015) 
 State Summed Total A measure of the number of anti-labor 
bills passed per state 
Sum of all anti-labor bills that passed NCSL (2015) 
Bill Characteristics 
  
 Bill Subject Set of dichotomous variables capturing the 
subject of the bill 
(1) Arbitration/Negotiation, (2) 
Elections/Politics, (3) Public Employees, 
(4) Dues and RTW, (5)Benefits /Wages, 
(6) Strikes, (7) Teachers, and (8) Misc 
(ref.) 
NCSL (2015) 
Campaign Donations  
  
 Corporate Elite A measure of the donations from Corp. 
Elite to the bill's sponsor 
logged % of total donations NIMSP 2015 
 Any Corporate Elite  
 Donor 
A measure of whether the sponsor of the 
bill received any Corporate Elite donations 
1= received any corporate elite donations 
0=no 
NIMSP 2016 
 Labor A measure of the donations from Labor to 
the bill's sponsor 
logged % of total donations NIMSP 2016 
 Total State Corporate  
 Elite Donations 
A measure of all Corp. Elite donations to 
legislators in the state 
summed USD (thousands) NIMSP 2017 
 Total State Labor  A measure of all Labor donations to 
legislators in the state 
summed USD (thousands) NIMSP 2018 
 Avg. State Corporate  
 Elite Donations 
A measure of the average Corp. Elite 
donations to legislators in the state 
mean USD (thousands) NIMSP 2019 
 Avg. State Labor  A measure of the average Labor donations 
to legislators in the state 
mean USD (thousands) NIMSP 2020 
Political Climate 
  
 Pro-Labor Environment A dummy variable that measures whether 
the political climate of the state is 
favorable toward labor  
1= if (a) state is not RTW, (b) state's min. 
wage is > fed. min., and (c) the 
unionization rate is ≥10% ; 0 for all else 
Political 
Context Data 
 Governor’s Party A measure of the Governor's party 1= Rep.; 0= Dem. or Ind. /Non-Part. Political 
Context Data 
 Chamber Majority  A measure of the chamber's partisan 
majority 
1= Rep. Maj.; 0= Dem., Ind./Non-
Part/Split 
Political 
Context Data 
 Majority Sets Agenda  A measure of whether majority party has 
agenda setting ability 
1= majority controls calendar 0=no Anzia and 
Jackman 
Constituent Characteristics  
  
 % Residents Black A measure of the non-Hispanic black 
population in the state 
% of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Residents FB A measure of the foreign-born population 
of the state 
% of all residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % in Manufacturing A measure of the size of the manuf. sector % of all employed residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % in Agriculture A measure of the size of the agri. sector  % of all employed residents IPUMS, 2010 
 % Unemployed A measure of state’s unemployment  % of all residents (25-55) who are in the 
labor force but not employed 
IPUMS, 2010 
 % < Poverty Line A measure of state’s poverty % of all employed residents below FPL IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Age A measure of the age of state residents  Average age IPUMS, 2010 
 % Own Homes A measure of state homeownership rates % of households owned IPUMS, 2010 
 Average Income A measure of state’s average income  Average family income, in thousands IPUMS, 2010 
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for Chapters 5 and is the legislator’s Anti-Labor Score (NCSL 
2015). This variable is operationalized as the number of bills proposed that favor business minus 
the number of bills proposed that favor collective bargaining. A scale of the difference between 
pro-labor bills and anti-labor bills is preferable to other measures for three reasons. First, it is not 
very skewed, and therefore does not have to be transformed. Second, it is preferable to a 
dichotomous measure (legislator proposed an anti-labor bill=1 or did not=0) because its allows 
for variation among legislators who proposed anti-labor bills. For example, Representative Shane 
Schoeller (R, Missouri) proposed one anti-labor bill in 2012, whereas Representative Neal Kurk 
(R, New Hampshire) proposed six anti-labor bills in 2012. A dichotomized variable would treat 
these two Representatives the same, which would be problematic. Third, this continuous measure 
is also preferable to a count of only the anti-labor bills proposed, because it accounts for any pro-
labor bills that were proposed. For example, Senator Joseph Robach (R, New York) proposed 
two anti-labor bills and three pro-labor bills in 2012, whereas Senator Paul McKinley (R, Iowa) 
proposed two anti-labor bills and no pro-labor bills in 2012. A count measure of all anti-labor 
bill proposals would treat these two Senators as the same, which would also be problematic. 
There are four dependent variables in Chapter 6. The first dependent variable is the 
legislator’s Anti-Labor Score, as measured in Chapter 5. The second dependent variable is a 
dichotomous measure of whether the legislator received Any Corporate Elite Campaign 
Donation. This dummy variable was coded 1 if the legislator received a donation from any of the 
top 25 interlocked corporations in their most recent election campaign. The third dependent 
variable is Total Corporate Elite Campaign Donations. This is a measure of the total amount (in 
logged USD) that the legislator received from the top 25 interlocked corporations in their most 
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recent campaign. Finally, Number of Corporate Elite Donors is a count measure of the number 
of separate elite corporations that donated to the legislator in their most recent campaign.  
The dependent variable for Chapter 7 is Labor Bill Outcome (NCSL 2015). This variable 
has four specifications: ordinal, trichotomous, dichotomous, and a summed state total. First, 
there is an ordered measure of the bill outcome.  Every bill proposed in state legislatures follows 
the same path through the legislative process. The sequence is as follows: after a bill is proposed, 
it moves to a committee in the first chamber. Once this committee modifies and approves the 
bill, it moves to a floor vote in the first chamber. If the bill passes, it is sent to a committee in the 
second chamber. Once the second committee modifies and approves the bill, it is moved to a 
floor vote in the second chamber. If the bill passes, it is sent to the governor to sign into law or 
veto. If the bill is vetoed, the chambers have the ability to override the veto (sometimes this 
requires a simple majority vote, but it usually requires a two-thirds supermajority). The ordinal 
specification is coded as having one of the following outcomes: (1) failed in first chamber 
committee, (2) failed on first chamber floor, (3) failed in second chamber committee, (4) failed 
on second chamber floor, (5) vetoed, or (6) passed into legislation. This process is depicted in 
Figure 3.1 below. The trichotomous specification is coded as (0) if the bill failed in a committee, 
(1) if the bill failed on the floor of either chamber (or by veto), and (2) if the bill passed. The 
dichotomous specification is coded as (1) if the bill is passed by both chambers of the legislature 
and then signed into law, and (0) if it failed at any prior stage. Finally, the summed specification 
coded as the total number of anti-labor bills that were passed into law for each state. This 
summed measure allows for analyses at the state level. 
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Figure 3.1: Legislative Pathways of Proposed Bills 
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Campaign Contributions 
The focal predictor variables are campaign contributions (NIMSP 2015). Business 
Contributions is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions to the 
legislator from (a) business PACs, (b) individual businesses, or (c) finance, insurance, and real 
estate sectors.  
Corporate Elite Contributions is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial 
contributions (in USD) to the legislator from the 25 most interlocked corporations in 2011. 
Information about these top 25 corporations comes from Domhoff and Staples (2013) data on 
corporate interlocks. These corporations are ranked by their Bonacich Centrality Score (BCS), a 
measure of embeddedness within corporate networks (discussed in further detail in Chapter 5). 
These corporations are: 3M, Allstate, Abbott Laboratories, IBM, Continental Airlines, Northern 
Trust Corp., Caterpillar, Deere, United Airlines, Boeing, Corning, Smurfit-Stone Container, 
FedEx, Marathon Oil, Aon, Exelon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, United 
Technologies, McDonald’s, Aetna, Illinois Tool Works, McGraw-Hill, Eli-Lilly 
Pharmaceuticals, and United Parcel Service (UPS). Detailed information on these corporations 
can be found in Chapter 5, Table 5.3. 
Non-Elite Business Contributions is a continuous measure of the logged percent of non-
elite business contributions (USD), calculated by taking the total business contributions and 
subtracting the corporate elite contributions.  
Because previous research has established that the COC was previously important in the 
formation of policy (e.g., Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013), Chamber of Commerce Contributions 
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is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the 
legislator from local, state, or national COC associations. 
Other work has examined the effect of industry-specific donations on legislative effort 
(e.g., Monardi and Glantz 1998; Stratmann 1991, 2002, 2005). To address this, I use seven 
measures to capture Competing Segments of Capital: (1) Campaign Contributions from Energy, 
(2) Campaign Contributions from Services, (3) Campaign Contributions from Finance and 
Banks, (4) Campaign Contributions from Agriculture, (5) Campaign Contributions from 
Manufacturing, (6) Campaign Contributions from Technology, and (7) Campaign Contributions 
from Defense. Each of these variables is a continuous measure of the logged percent of financial 
contributions (in USD) to the legislator from businesses in their respective industry or sector.  
Previous work has also found it important to account for contributions from labor 
interests (e.g., Beaulieu and Magee 2004). Labor Contributions is a continuous measure of the 
logged percent of financial contributions (in USD) to the legislator from (a) labor PACs and/or 
(b) labor unions.  
Political Context  
Pro-Labor Environment is a dichotomous measure of political leaning toward labor. For 
each state, I assessed whether: (a) the state had a RTW law, (b) the state used the exact federal 
minimum wage, and (c) whether the unionization rate was under 10 percent. For each item, there 
were two possible options: a (1) indicates that the condition is present, and a (0) indicates that the 
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condition is absent. A state was coded as having a pro-labor environment if all three conditions 
were absent.8  
Legislator’s Party is separated into three dummy variables: (1) Democrat (ref), (2) 
Republican, and (3) Independent/Nonpartisan. 
Chamber Majority is a measure of whether the majority party in the legislator’s chamber 
is (1) Republican (reference) or (0) Democrat or Independent/Nonpartisan. 
Republican Governor is a dummy variable measuring whether the governor was a (1) 
Republican or (0) not in the legislator’s state. 
Republican Swing is a dummy variable indicating that the majority party of the 
legislator’s chamber swung from Democrat (or split) to Republican in the 2010 midterm election. 
Constituent Characteristics 
I employ several measures that capture constituent characteristics of the legislator’s state. 
Percent Black is a measure of the proportion of state residents who identify as non-Hispanic 
black. Percent Foreign Born is a measure of the proportion of state residents who are foreign 
born (IPUMS 2010).  
To capture the decline of industrialization in many states, I control for both the Percent 
Employed in Manufacturing in 1960, as well as the Change in Percent Employed in 
Manufacturing from 1960 to 2010. Both are measures of the proportion of employed residents 
who worked in the manufacturing sector. I also control for the Percent of Residents Employed in 
                                                 
8 My analyses consistently showed that the most meaningful difference was between states where none of these 
conditions were present, but see Appendix G for analyses using a continuous measure 
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Agriculture and Percent of Residents Employed in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
(FIRE) sector. 
The Unemployment Rate is a measure of the proportion of the working-age population 
(21-55) that is unemployed and looking for work in the state. Average Income measures the 
average total family income among adult residents in the state. Percent below Poverty Line is a 
measure of the proportion of households at or below the poverty line for the state. Average Age is 
a measure of the mean age of the population in the state. Finally, Percent Home Ownership is a 
measure of the proportion of residents who own homes in the state. 
Missing Data 
Due to discrepancies in data from NIMSP, data on campaign donations from 406 
legislators were coded as missing, and these legislators (about 5% of the total population) were 
dropped from the analysis. An example of a discrepancy would be Texas Representative Aaron 
Peña, who was reported to have received a total of $28,646.76 in donations during his 2010 
campaign, but was reported to have over $29,000 in business donations alone. Legislators who 
had no campaign contributions were also dropped, as it is unlikely that they actually had no 
financial support. Appendix A provides the name, state, and reported campaign donations for all 
legislators dropped from the analysis. 
Analytic Strategy 
Subsequent analyses employ the three datasets described above. In the first dataset, the 
legislator is the unit of analysis (N=7,143). The Legislator Dataset allows me to examine the 
behavior of state legislators. In the second dataset, the proposed bill is the unit of analysis 
(N=1,143). The Proposed Bills Dataset allows me to track the outcomes of actual bills. The third 
78 
 
dataset is an aggregated version of the Proposed Bills Dataset at the state level (N=50). I detail 
the methodological strategies used in each chapter below. 
Chapter 4 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to provide a detailed introduction to coded collective 
bargaining bills. All analyses are descriptive. Table 4.1 provides the breakdown of bills by 
political party and stance toward labor. Figure 4.1 provides a visual representation of the 
numbers of bills proposed by party. Figure 4.2 shows the coded valence of bills by party. Figure 
4.3 shows the distribution of proposals by topic and party, and Figure 4.4 presents descriptive 
statistics of bill valence by topic. For each category, I provide an example of a pro-labor bill and 
an anti-labor bill. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of anti-labor legislation proposed across 
states. 
Chapter 5 
The research question being answered in Chapter 5 is, “Does elite capital investment 
encourage anti-labor legislative effort?” To answer this question, I estimate the effects of 
different measures of class interests on legislative behavior. This chapter begins by showing 
descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Means and proportions of all study variables 
are provided in Table 5.1. In Table 5.2, I present the average amount in US dollars and the 
average percent (not log-transformed) of donations by donor groups. Table 5.3 provides a 
detailed analysis of the top 25 interlocked corporations. 
I then turn to my multivariate analyses. I use standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with standard errors adjusted for clustering within chambers. When data are clustered 
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(in this case by legislative chamber), observations and standard errors will be correlated together, 
violating the OLS assumption of independent observations and error terms. Clustered standard 
errors adjust for both general heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation (Primo et al. 2007). 
Table 5.4 presents these results. In the first model, I test whether legislators’ Anti-Labor Scores 
vary according to campaign donations from business interests. In the second model, I examine 
the effects of competing segments of capital or industry-specific effects. In the third model, I 
examine the effects of donations from the Chamber of Commerce. Finally, in the fourth model, I 
divide donations from business into the corporate elite and non-elite businesses.  
Chapter 6 
The research question being answered in Chapter 6 is, “Is the relationship between elite 
capital investment and legislative effort strategic?” To answer this question, I examine how the 
association between campaign donations from the corporate elite and legislators’ proposal of 
collective bargaining bills is moderated by a labor-friendly climate. The chapter begins by 
showing descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Table 6.1 provides means and 
proportions of all study variables that are used in Chapter 6. Table 6.2 provides a detailed 
description the labor climate for each state. 
Table 6.3 compares the means and proportions of the study variables across legislators in 
pro-labor environments and anti-labor environments. I conducted t-tests and chi-squared tests of 
significance to test whether the mean or proportion is significantly different by climate. 
I then turn to my multivariate analyses in Table 6.4. As in Chapter 5, I use standard OLS 
regression while adjusting my standard errors for clustering within chambers. In the first model, I 
establish the effect of donations from the corporate elite on legislators’ Anti-Labor Scores. In the 
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second model, I include an interaction term (corporate elite donations × pro-labor environment) 
to test whether the effect of corporate elite donations is moderated by the dichotomous measure 
of labor-friendly environment. 
I then test whether the corporate elite targets labor-friendly environments by predicting 
(1) whether legislators received any corporate elite donations (Table 6.5, using logistic 
regression), (2) the amount of corporate elite donations in logged dollars (Table 6.6, using 
standard OLS regression), and (3) the number of corporate donors each legislator has (Table 6.7, 
using negative binomial regression). All three tables have two models. The first model examines 
the main effect of labor-friendly environment on the outcome, to test whether the corporate elite 
target legislators in labor-friendly states. The second model examines if the effect of labor-
friendly environments is moderated by party, to see if the corporate elite are more likely to 
donate to Democrats or Republicans in pro-labor states. 
Chapter 7 
The research questions being answered in Chapter 7 are, “Do corporate elite donations 
shape anti-labor legislative outcomes?” “Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor 
legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?” To answer these questions, I 
use the Bills Dataset to examine how campaign donations from the corporate elite influence bill 
passage. In this chapter, I only focus on anti-labor bills (N=459). The chapter begins by showing 
descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables. Table 7.1 provides means and proportions of 
all study variables that are used in Chapter 7. 
I then turn to my multivariate analyses. In this part of the chapter, I use ordered logistic 
regression for the ordinal outcome measure and the trichotomized outcome measure, and 
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standard logistic regression for the dichotomous outcomes measure. Again, I cluster standard 
errors by legislative chamber.9 Using each of the dependent variables explained above, Table 7.2 
examines how individual donations to bills’ sponsors from the corporate elite predict anti-labor 
bill passage. Table 7.3 examines how whether any donations to bills’ sponsors from the 
corporate elite predict anti-labor bill passage. Table 7.4 examines how the average corporate elite 
donations to legislators in the state predict anti-labor bill passage. Table 7.5 examines the relative 
importance of individual donations to bill sponsors and the average donations within the state. 
Finally, I aggregated the Bills Dataset up to the state level to create the Aggregated 
Dataset (N=50), to examine the relationship between corporate elite capital investment, 
legislative effort, and political outcomes. Table 7.5 provides the descriptive statistics for the third 
dataset. To test the causal relationship between corporate elite donations, bill proposals, and bill 
passage, I conducted a mediation analysis, displayed in Table 7.6. Because the dependent 
variable in this analysis (the summed state total of anti-labor bills passed) is a count variable, the 
traditional tests of mediation (i.e., Sobel and Clogg tests) cannot be used (Robins and Greenland 
1992; Pearl 2001). Instead I use a counterfactual mediation analysis developed by Robins and 
Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001), and described in detail by Vanderwheele (2015). To conduct 
the mediation analysis, I use the Stata command “paramed” established by Emsley and Liu 
(2014).  Using a negative binomial model for outcome Y (number of anti-labor bills signed into 
law), conditional on exposure A (average donations from the corporate elite), mediator M 
                                                 
9 The standard ways of testing whether the parallel odds assumptions are violated in ordinal logistic regression do 
not allow for clustered standard errors. Thus, my final models do not test for violations for this assumption. 
However, I conducted supplemental analyses (not shown) predicting ordinal and trichotomized outcomes by 
campaign donations (individual sponsor donations, state average, and state total). Results suggest these measures do 
not violate parallel odds assumptions, with the caveat that these models did not cluster standard errors by chamber. 
Further supplemental analyses used multinomial logistic regression (which does not have a parallel odds 
assumption) and the results were substantively similar.  
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(proposed anti-labor bills), and control variables C given by exp ( ), 
the controlled direct effect (CDE), the natural indirect effect (NIE), and the total effects (TE) on 
the rate ratio scale can be summarized by the following equations (Vanderhweele 2015): 
Equation 3.1: Controlled Direct Effect 
 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐷𝐸(𝑚) = exp⁡{(𝜃1 + 𝜃3𝑚)(𝑎 − 𝑎
∗)} 
 
Equation 3.2: Natural Indirect Effect 
 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝐼𝐸 = exp⁡{(𝜃2𝛽1 + 𝜃3𝛽1𝑎)(𝑎 − 𝑎
∗)} 
 
Equation 3.3: Total Effect 
 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝐸 =⁡𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐷𝐸×𝑅𝑅𝑁𝐼𝐸 = exp⁡{[{(𝜃1 + 𝜃3𝑚)(𝑎 − 𝑎
∗)}]×[(𝜃2𝛽1 + 𝜃3𝛽1𝑎)(𝑎 − 𝑎
∗)]} 
The controlled direct effect is the effect of exposure A when the mediator M is held at its 
mean. The natural indirect effect can be understood as how much outcome Y would change, on 
average, if exposure A were fixed but M changed. In other words, the NIE expresses how much 
the outcome (number of anti-labor bills passed) would change if the exposure (corporate elite 
donations) were fixed at a = 1 (one standard deviation above its mean), but the mediator were 
changed from the level it would take if a* = 0 (one standard deviation below its mean) to the 
level it would take if a = 1 (one standard deviation above its mean).  
Aside from allowing a mediation test for a non-normally distributed outcome, one of the 
main advantages of this method is that the counterfactual approach to mediation allows for the 
decomposition of results into a direct effect and an indirect effect, even when there are 
nonlinearities (Vanderwheele 2015). This method also tests for the possibility of a confounding 
exposure-mediator interaction, and controls for the confounding interaction if necessary. My 
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analyses indicated that there was no significant interaction between the exposure variable 
(average donation from the corporate elite) and the mediator (number of anti-labor bills 
proposed), therefore the confounding interaction was dropped. 
Supplemental Analysis 
Several types of sensitivity analyses were run to assess the robustness of my findings. 
Supplemental analyses focus on two issues: measurement and analysis. Specifically, I used 
several different measures of my focal predictor variables, campaign donations. The results 
presented in this dissertation use measures of the logged percent of total donations for each 
group (e.g., labor, corporate elite). I estimated three separate sets of analyses using (a) non-log 
transformed percent of total donations, (b) logged US dollars, and (c) non-log transformed US 
dollars. The results from these analyses were substantively similar across all measures. I have 
chosen to present the logged percent of total donations for two reasons. First, because a log-
linear relationship between financial contributions and legislative behavior makes theoretical 
sense: we would expect that the difference between a $500 contribution and a $1,500 
contribution to mean more than the difference between a $40,000 contribution and a $41,000 
contribution. Second, I use percent of donations because this captures the competing interests 
from other donors (that is, who is donating the most) and also helps to address the issues of 
legislators in some states (e.g., California) getting more total donations than legislators in other 
states (e.g., Idaho).  
Analytically, I also replicated my results using multi-level modeling instead of clustered 
standard errors. Multi-level modeling is another common technique used to adjust for clustering 
within level-2 variables. In the multilevel modeling technique, the observations are nested within 
the cluster variable, in this case, chamber (Cheah 2009). Multilevel modeling measures variance 
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at each level, allowing for errors to vary randomly within clusters and accounting for 
unexplained variation between clusters (Gelman 2006). Multilevel modeling works best with a 
large number of clusters (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Primo et al. 2007). However, because 
multilevel modeling heavy theory and data demands, Steenbergen and Jones (2002:234) “caution 
researchers against ‘blindly’ using these models in data analysis.” There are two main reasons 
why I use clustered standard errors rather than multilevel modeling in this dissertation. First, I 
have a relatively small number of level-2 clusters (99 chambers) compared to the large number 
of level 1 observations (7,143 legislators). Second, the clustered standard errors approach is 
simpler, and because I am less interested in measuring the direct effects of chambers as I am in 
controlling for the effects of chambers, multilevel modeling is unnecessary. All analyses using 
multi-level modeling were substantively similar to the results presented here.  
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 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED BILLS 
 
Introduction  
This dissertation is based largely on innovative data that coded all state-level bills 
proposed about collective bargaining in 2012. Because these are original data that have never 
been used before, this chapter gives a detailed account of these bills.  
Of the 1,143 bills proposed in state legislatures, 608 (53%) were sponsored by 
Democrats, 519 (45%) were sponsored by Republicans, and 16 (1.4%) were sponsored by 
Independents (see Figure 4.1). Because of the small number of Independent bills, this section 
mainly focuses on Democrat- and Republican-sponsored bills. Table 4.1 provides the breakdown 
of bills by party and stance toward labor, and Figure 4.2 graphically displays these trends. Not 
surprisingly, nearly 75 percent of Democrat-sponsored bills were pro-labor, and 76.7% of 
Republican-sponsored bills were anti-labor. 
Table 4.1: Bill Stances toward Labor, by Party 
  Anti-Labor Neutral Pro-Labor Total 
Party     
  % Democrat 13.3 12.2 74.5 100.0 
 (81) (74) (453) (608) 
     
  % Republican 76.7*** 7.9*** 15.4*** 100.0 
 (398) (41) (80) (519) 
     
  % Independent / Non-Partisan 62.5*** 6.3*** 31.3*** 100.0 
 (10) (1) (5) (16) 
     
Total 42.8 10.2 47.1 100.0 
  (489) (116) (538) (1143) 
Notes: N=1,143; asterisks indicate significant difference between party, compared to Democrats 
***p<0.001  
86 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Proposed Bills by Party 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Labor Valence of Proposed Bills by Party 
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There are also partisan differences in the topics of bills proposed (Figure 4.3). Although 
the majority of bills proposed by both parties were related to public employees (including public 
contracts, public safety officers, and public unions), Democrats focused on bills concerned with 
arbitration, strikes, and wages significantly more often than Republicans. Republicans proposed 
significantly more election legislation, RTW bills, and bills regulating dues than Democrats. 
Figure 4.3: Proposed Bills by Party and Topic 
 
Labor Valence by Topic 
Figure 4.4 below shows the coded labor valence of bills by topic. For each category, I 
provide an example of one bill coded as pro-labor and one coded as anti-labor. Bills about 
arbitration/negotiation tended to be overwhelmingly pro-labor. Bills providing for mandatory 
binding arbitration were coded as pro-labor because the process tends to even the playing field 
between labor and management and also prevents management from stalling the bargaining 
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process indefinitely.
10  An example of an anti-labor arbitration/negotiation bill is OR House Bill 
2655, “Labor Agreements Entered into by the State,” sponsored by Gilliam (R). This bill was 
coded as anti-labor because it required the approval of collective bargaining and arbitration 
agreements by the state Legislative Assembly. An example of a pro-labor bill in this area is PA 
House Bill 1660, “Public School Employees’ Collective Bargaining Rights,” proposed by 
Santarsiero (D) and seven other House Democrats, and two Republicans. This was coded as pro-
labor because it expanded collective bargaining, provided for mediation and fact-finding panels, 
set time frames for employers, and provided for strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances. 
Figure 4.4: Labor Valence of Proposed Bills by Topic 
 
Bills about elections were mostly anti-labor. An example of an anti-labor election bill 
would be Pennsylvania House Bill 602, “Secret Ballot for Employee Representation,” sponsored 
                                                 
10 Separate preliminary analyses dropping all binding arbitration bills when calculating the legislators’ Anti-Labor 
Scores found no significant or substantive difference to my results. 
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by Scott Perry and 23 other House Republicans. This bill proposed a constitutional amendment 
requiring that all union elections be held by secret ballot rather than card check. Secret ballot 
elections are generally regarded as being unfavorable to labor, as they make it easier to weaken 
the solidarity of workers, and employers may sometimes intimidate workers before elections by 
threatening to fire pro-union workers (Lafer 2007). An example of a pro-labor election bill is 
California Senate Bill 104, “Labor Representatives: Elections,” sponsored by Senator Darrell 
Steinberg (D). The bill proposed that agricultural employees could select labor representatives by 
petitioning the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, and required the use of representation cards 
rather than secret ballots. The bill also extended “existing prohibitions and penalties to 
employers who engage in specified unfair labor practices” to agricultural employees. 
Bills that focused on public employees varied greatly by topic and valence. An example 
of a common anti-labor law in this category was Georgia House Bill 416, “Labor Organizations,” 
which was sponsored by Representative Bobby Franklin (R). The bill intended to ban all public 
employees from collective bargaining. An example of a pro-labor bill in this category is New 
Jersey Assembly Bill 19, “Public Employees Right to Collective Bargaining,” sponsored by 
Wayne DeAngelo (D). The bill was a proposed Constitutional amendment that would guarantee 
all public employees in New Jersey the right to collectively bargain. However, not all bills in this 
category were specifically about collective bargaining; some focused on public employee’s 
rights. For example, California Assembly Bill 2676, titled “Agricultural Employee Safety” and 
sponsored by Ian Calderon (D), would have made it illegal “for any person who directs an 
agricultural employee to perform, or supervises such employee in the performance of, outdoor 
work without providing the employee with shade and potable water.” This bill was coded as 
being pro-labor.  
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Not surprisingly, bills that were about dues or RTW were overwhelmingly anti-collective 
bargaining. The most common anti-labor bills in this category were those proposing RTW laws, 
prohibiting closed shops and mandatory dues. An example of a common pro-labor bill in this 
category would be Vermont House Bill 239, “Fair Share Representation Fees,” proposed by 
Francis “Topper” McFaun (R), proposed that non-union employees still pay a fair share fee as 
they still receive the benefits of collective bargaining.  
Bills about political activities were also usually coded as anti-labor, as they most often 
focused on restricting the rights of unions’ political activity. An example of an anti-labor bill 
about political activities is Iowa Senate Bill 2084: “A Bill for an Act Limiting Certain Campaign 
Contributions by Labor Unions and Providing for a Penalty,” sponsored by Senate Republicans 
First Dearden, First Chelgren, and First Horn. IA SB 2084 stated “that a labor union shall not 
make a monetary or in kind contribution to a candidate or committee.” Thus, in a state with such 
a law, labor organizations would be unable to donate to political campaigns, but the wealthy elite 
and corporate PACs would still be able to. Pro-labor bills in this category generally prohibited 
employers from using public funds to try to dissuade employees from joining unions, such as 
New Jersey Assembly Bill 2054, “Prohibited Public Fund Use by Employers” (sponsored by 
DeAngelo). 
Wage and benefit bills typically focused on establishing benefits for workers. For 
example, California Assembly Bill 400, “Employment: Paid Sick Days” sponsored by 
Representative Fiona Ma (D), stated that “an employee who works in California for 7 or more 
days in a calendar year is entitled to paid sick days,” and “prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee who requests paid sick days.” An example of an anti-labor 
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bill in this category is New Jersey Senate Bill 748, “Sick Leave Injury Program,” sponsored by 
Nicholas Scutari (D), which terminated the sick leave injury program for state employees. 
Bills that were about strikes were evenly distributed across labor valence. An example of 
an anti-labor bill regarding strikes is Michigan House Bill 4465, “Prohibited Strike,” sponsored 
by Bill Rogers (R), which required that teachers who participate in unlawful strikes have a 
mandatory suspension of their teaching certificate. An example of a pro-labor bill in this 
category is New York Senate Bill 2655, “Right to Strike by Public Employees,” proposed by 
Kruger (D). The bill established the right to strike for all public employees. 
Finally, proposed bills about teachers were also mixed between pro-labor and anti-labor, 
and their subjects varied widely. Anti-labor bills about teachers sometimes prohibited teachers’ 
unions or teachers’ strikes. Others were less direct in curbing collective bargaining power. For 
example, Michigan House Bill 4214 (sponsored by Pscholka (R) and eventually signed into law 
by Governor Rick Snyder) created emergency financial managers in districts declared to be 
“failing.” These emergency managers have the authority to unilaterally cancel or amend existing 
government or school employee union collective bargaining agreements. Pro-labor bills often 
promoted stronger teachers’ unions or protected teachers in their evaluations, such as California 
Assembly Bill 1166, “Pupil Records Privacy: Test Scores and Grades,” sponsored by Solorio (D) 
and Hancock (D). This bill kept students’ test scores confidential when it came to teachers’ 
annual evaluations. 
Labor Valence by State 
Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of anti-labor legislation proposed across states. Darker 
red corresponds with higher counts of anti-labor legislation proposed in 2012. States in the upper 
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Midwest and the Northeast, in general, saw more bill proposals that opposed collective 
bargaining in 2012. Many of these states (e.g., Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York) are 
traditionally liberal states with strong unions. These patterns appear inconsistent with theories of 
path-dependency, which would predict that conservative states (with historically acrimonious 
labor relationships) would propose more regressive labor legislation. Instead, the presence of 
anti-labor proposals in liberal states suggests a strategic move of organized capital to pass anti-
labor laws in pro-labor states. 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of Anti-Labor Proposals by State 
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Bill Outcomes 
Figure 4.6 shows the breakdown of bill outcomes. Recall that all proposed bills generally 
follow the same path in the legislative process:11 (1) sent to a committee in Chamber 1, and when 
ready, are (2) voted on the floor of Chamber 1, and if the vote passes, they are (3) sent to a 
committee in Chamber 2, and when ready, are (4) voted on the floor of Chamber 2. If the bill 
passes, it can still be (5) vetoed by the governor, but if not (or if a veto is overridden), the bill is 
(6) signed into law (see figure 3.1). 
Figure 4.6: Bill Outcomes 
 
As shown in Figure 4.6, the vast majority of bills (over two-thirds) fail in Chamber 1 
committees. Another ten percent die on the floor of Chamber 1. In other words, less than one-
quarter of all bills even make it to Chamber 2 for committee assignment or voting. Nearly two-
                                                 
11 Except for in unicameral Nebraska, where all bills are coded as only going through Chamber 1. Therefore the 
codes are as follows: (1) sent to a committee, then (2) voted on the floor. If the bill passes the vote, it can still be (5) 
vetoed by the governor, but if not (or if a veto is overridden), the bill is (6) signed into law 
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thirds (66 percent) of the bills that do make it to Chamber 2 (14 percent of all proposed bills) are 
signed into law.  
Table 4.2 provides the outcome of the bills by party. The patterns in bill outcomes are 
similar across parties, except that bills proposed by Democrats were more likely to be vetoed, 
and bills proposed by Republicans passed at a slightly higher frequency (both differences 
significant at p<0.10).  
Table 4.2: Bills Outcome by Party 
Outcome Republican Democrat 
Failed Committee 1 67.3% 68.9% 
Failed Chamber 1 11.0% 10.2% 
Failed Committee 2 2.8% 4.4% 
Failed Chamber 2 2.0% 1.8% 
Vetoed 1.0% 2.3%* 
Passed 16.0% 12.4%* 
N=1,143 Asterisks indicate a significant Chi-Square tests of difference: *p<0.10 
 
Discussion 
This chapter introduced the bills that were collected and coded for this dissertation. 
Among the 1,143 bills proposed in 2012, there was great variation in topic and in stance toward 
labor. Many anti-labor bills seem to be focused in the upper Midwest, an area that has 
historically been favorable to labor. The following chapters explore the proposal and passage of 
these bills in depth. 
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 ELITE VERSUS NON-ELITE BUSINESS INTERESTS 
 
Introduction 
The question being addressed in this chapter is: Does elite capital investment encourage 
anti-labor legislative effort? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again 
below in Figure 5.1, with an emphasis on the theoretical focus of this chapter: how elite capital 
investment influences legislative effort.  
Figure 5.1: Theoretical Focus of Chapter 5 
 
I conceptualize campaign donations as investments the corporate elite dedicate to legislators. 
Rather than bribes, corporate donations can be understood as gifts (Clawson, Neustadtl, and 
Scott 1993) that work to create and maintain a relationship between political actors and the elite. 
Legislative effort is measured as anti-labor legislation proposals, as opposed to votes, as bill 
proposals can better capture influence and ideology than voting patterns. I hypothesized that 
corporate elite campaign donations would be positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals. 
Descriptive Results 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for the data used in this chapter, where the 
legislator is the unit of the analysis (N=7,143). The dependent variable, a legislator’s Anti-Labor 
Score, ranges from -23 to 8, with a mean of 0.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Study Variables, Chapter 5 
 Mean (SD) or % Range 
Dependent Variable     
 Anti-Labor Score -0.008  (0.63) -23.00 – 8.00 
     
Campaign Donations (logged %)     
 Labor 1.227  (1.24) 0.00 – 4.62 
 Business (all) 2.420  (1.08) 0.00 – 4.58 
 Corporate Elite  0.318  (0.54) 0.00 – 3.97 
 Non-Elite Business 2.430  (1.04) 0.00 – 4.62 
 Chamber of Commerce  0.148  (0.37) 0.00 – 2.76 
 Segmented Capital Sectors     
Energy 1.372   (1.02) 0.00 – 4.62 
Service 1.007   (0.80) 0.00 – 4.62 
Financial 0.864   (0.74) 0.00 – 4.62 
Agriculture 0.792   (0.83) 0.00 – 4.14 
Manufacturing 0.340   (0.51) 0.00 – 4.43 
Technology 0.081   (0.25) 0.00 – 3.03 
Defense 0.040   (0.18) 0.00 – 3.11 
     
Political Climate     
 Pro-Labor Environment 23.8% 0.00–1.00 
 Chamber Majority=Republican 61.6% 0.00–1.00 
 Governor=Republican 56.2% 0.00–1.00 
 Republican Swing in 2010 17.0% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator=Republican 52.8% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator=Democrat 46.2% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator= Ind./ Non-Partisan  1.0% 0.00–1.00 
 Agenda Setting Ability  67.0% 0.00–1.00 
     
Constituent Characteristics      
 % Residents Black 11.322  (9.83) 0.37 – 37.21 
 % Residents Foreign Born 9.627  (6.23) 1.46 – 28.17 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 23.501  (9.68) 3.64 – 39.88 
 Δ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960) -12.853  (8.44) -28.53 – 4.34 
 % in Agriculture 2.144  (1.21) 0.93 – 6.36 
 % in FIRE 4.581  (0.97) 2.30 – 6.98 
 % Unemployed 6.270  (1.29) 2.33 – 9.43 
 % < Poverty Line 33.753  (4.89) 25.34 – 45.14 
 Average Age 17.004  (3.14) 11.05 – 25.01 
 % Own Homes 37.721  (1.47) 31.83 – 40.67 
 Average Income (thousands $) 68.522  (4.05) 55.84 – 75.59 
Notes: N=7,143 
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The vast majority (92%) of legislators had a score of 0, indicating that they either proposed 0 
collective bargaining bills, or that the number of pro-labor bills proposed was the same as the 
number of anti-labor bills proposed (resulting in a score of 0)12. 
Campaign donations are presented as the logged percent of total donations from the 
legislator’s most recent election. Business donations average more than double labor donations 
to legislator campaigns. Corporate elite donations (those from the top 25 interlocked 
corporations) on average make up a very small percentage of campaign donations.  
Table 5.2: Average Donations (in Dollars and Percentage) by Donor Group 
Donations from… 
# of Legislators 
Receiving Any 
Donation 
Average 
Donation  
(in $) 
Average 
Donation  
(% of total) 
Business (all) 6,642 $27,735.98 17.51% 
Non-Elite Business 6,601 $26,827.48 15.87% 
Corporate Elite 2,767 $2,583.83 1.83% 
Chamber of Commerce 1,546 $1,571.29 1.31% 
Labor 4,698 $16,500.52 10.33% 
Energy Sector 5,801 $8,311.94 5.73% 
Service Sector 5,597 $5,346.18 2.85% 
Financial Sector 5,336 $3,975.03 2.20% 
Agriculture Sector 4,897 $4,342.36 2.38% 
Manufacturing Sector 3,330 $2,511.69 0.70% 
Technology Sector 1,056 $1,971.84 0.14% 
Defense Sector   658 $1,084.43 0.07% 
                                                 
12 Nearly all of these were legislators proposing no bills (N=6,608). There were 17 legislators who proposed one 
pro-labor bill and one anti-labor bill: Sen. Brady (IL-R), Rep. Castelli (NY-R), Rep. Comstock (VA-R), Rep. Davis 
(IL-D), Rep. Dickinson (CA-D), Rep. Durhal (MI-D), Sen. Earll (PA-R), Rep. Geiss (MI-D), Rep. Gimas (NH-D), 
Sen. Golden (NY-R), Rep. Kay (IL-R), Sen. Lavalle (NY-R), Sen. Nishihara (HI-D), Rep. Perry (PA-R), Rep. 
Pretlow (NY-D), Sen. Tokuda (HI-D), and Rep. Verschoore (IL-D). There was one legislator who proposed two pro-
labor bills and two anti-labor bills: Sen. Tarr (MA-R). No legislators proposed three or more of each. 
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Table 5.2 provides details on donations by displaying the average amount in US dollars 
and the average percent (not log-transformed) of donations by donor groups, dropping legislators 
who did not receive donations from each group.  
Most legislators (93%; N=6,642) received donations from All Business interests (elite 
and non-elite). Of those who did, the average sum of donations from All Business per legislator 
was $27,736 (17.5 percent of donations). When differentiating between the Corporate Elite and 
Non-Elite Businesses, it is clear that most legislators also received donations from non-elite 
businesses (92%; N=6,601). The average total of Non-Elite Business donations was $26,827 
(15.9 percent of donations). Over one-third of legislators (38.7%; N=2,767) received donations 
from the Corporate Elite. Of those legislators who received Corporate Elite donations, the 
average sum of donations from the corporate elite was $2,584 (1.8 percent of donations). About 
one-in-five legislators (21.6%; N=1,546) received donations from a Chambers of Commerce 
(COC). Of those legislators who received COC donations, the average sum of donations was 
$1,571 (1.3 percent of donations). 
Nearly two-thirds (63%; N=4,698) of legislators received donations from Labor interests. 
Of those legislators who received labor donations, the average sum of donations from Labor was 
$16,500 (10.3 percent of donations). 
When examining various segments of capital, Table 5.2 shows a great deal of variation in 
donations by sector. The majority of legislators (81.2%; N=5,801) received donations from the 
Energy Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Energy Sector was 
$8,3112 (5.7 percent of donations). Over three-quarters of legislators (78.4%; N=5,597) received 
donations from the Service Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the 
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Service Sector was $5,346 (2.9 percent of donations). Nearly three-quarters of legislators 
(74.7%; N=5,336) received donations from the Financial Sector. Of those who did, the average 
sum of donations from the Financial Sector was $3,975 (2.2 percent of donations). Over two-
thirds of legislators (68.6%; N=4,897) received donations from the Agriculture Sector. Of those 
who did, the average sum of donations from the Agriculture Sector was $4,342 (2.4 percent of 
donations). Almost half of legislators (46.6%; N=3,330) received donations from the 
Manufacturing Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of donations from the Manufacturing 
Sector was $2,512 (0.70 percent of donations). Less than fifteen percent of legislators (14.8%; 
N=1,056) received donations from the Technology Sector. Of those who did, the average sum of 
donations from the Technology Sector was $1,972 (0.14 percent of donations). Finally, only 658 
legislators (0.9%) received donations from corporations marked as defense. Of those who did, 
the average sum of donations from the Defense Sector was $1,084 (0.07 percent of donations). 
Table 5.3 provides a detailed analysis of the top 25 interlocked corporations, which are 
used to represent the corporate elite. These data come from Domhoff, Staples, and Schneider 
(2013). These corporations are ranked by their Bonacich Centrality Score (BCS), a measure of 
embeddedness within corporate networks. The BCS is a useful measure because it emphasizes 
how many connections a director has and how central those connections are (Bonacich 1972, 
1987). This measure is standard among researchers examining interlocking directorates (e.g., 
Banerjee and Murray 2015; Davis and Mizruchi 1999; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi and 
Bunting 1981; Schwartz 1985).   
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Table 5.3: Top 25 Interlocked Corporations and Donations to Legislators 
Corporation Industry BCS 
Donations 
Range ($) 
Avg. Donation 
(SD) 
Total 
Donations 
# of 
Donations 
1.       3M Conglomerate 6444.479 200 - 3500 $901.29 (633.58) $87,425.00 97 
2.       Allstate Insurance 5984.575 100 - 12750 
$1,105.57 
(1417.40) 
$469,865.00 425 
3.       Abbott Laboratories 
Health Care;  
Technology 
5658.831 100 - 12250 
$1,039.62 
(1186.44) 
$738,128.90 710 
4.       IBM Technology 5078.791 - - $0.00   
5.       Continental Airlines Transportation 5015.414 250 - 4500 
$1,105.68 
(1050.87) 
$48,650.00 44 
6.       Northern Trust Corp. Finance 4998.747 250 - 3000 
$1,625.00 
(1944.54) 
$3,250.00 2 
7.       Caterpillar 
Heavy equipment;  
Finance 
4578.335 500 - 45000 
$2,766.81 
(5869.67) 
$417,787.90 151 
8.       Deere Heavy equipment 4402.883 250 - 8000 
$1,500.95 
(1508.68) 
$550,850.00 367 
9.       United Airlines Transportation 4394.972 200 - 4270 
$1,098.80 
(995.90) 
$27,469.96 25 
10.    Boeing 
Aerospace; 
Defense 
4243.344 200 - 7800 
$1,045.91 
(965.14) 
$356,656.00 341 
11.    Corning 
Manufacturing; 
Technology 
3695.432 200 - 7000 
$2,293.75 
(2059.28) 
$36,700.00 16 
12.    Smurfit-Stone  
Packaging and  
Recycling 
3678.537 250 - 5000 $692.98 (701.19) $58,210.00 84 
13.    FedEx Courier 3674.743 35.82 - 22500 
$1,385.68 
(2236.11) 
$432,331.50 312 
14.    Marathon Oil Energy 3658.962 250 - 5200 $688.58 (622.68) $286,450.00 416 
15.    Aon Finance; Insurance 3429.015 500 - 3000 
$1,166.67 
(829.16) 
$10,500.00 9 
16.    Exelon Energy 3260.573 200 - 20259 
$1,697.22 
(2381.92) 
$422,608.60 249 
17.    Northrop Grumman 
Aerospace; 
Defense 
3214.213 100 - 9000 
$1,151.67 
(1186.64) 
$202,693.00 176 
18.    General Dynamics 
Aerospace; 
Defense 
3160.564 300 - 300 $300.00  $300.00 1 
19.    United Technologies Conglomerate 3098.334 700 - 900 
$800.00  
(141.42) 
$1,600.00  2 
20.    McDonald's Service 3027.044 150 - 7800 $994.85 (870.19) $517,320.00 520 
21.  Aetna Health Care 3010.225 150 - 12500 
$1,299.13 
(1613.73) 
$336,475.00 259 
22.  Illinois Tool Works Manufacturing 3009.683 500 - 2500 $916.67 (557.32) $11,000.00 12 
23.  McGraw-Hill Financial 3007.098 100 - 900 $323.81 (221.14) $6,800.00 21 
24.  Eli Lilly Pharmaceuticals 3006.585 100 - 12500 
$1,098.05 
(1503.07) 
$1,302,285.00 1186 
25.  United Parcel Service Courier 2929.440 12.87 - 22500 
$1,739.69 
(2041.43) 
$1,089,048.00 626 
TOTAL        12-45000 
$1,225.46 
(1772.94) 
$7,414,403.86 6,051 
 
The table displays the name of the corporation, the industry (or industries) of the corporation, the 
BCS, the range of donations to legislators in the dataset (all non-zero values), the average 
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donation (and standard deviation) to state legislators, the total sum (in dollars) of donations to 
legislators in the dataset, and the number of legislators to whom each corporation donated.  
It is clear when looking at Table 5.3 that the most interlocked corporations are no longer 
all banks, as the industries of the top 25 interlocked corporations vary widely. This initial finding 
might seem to support Mizruchi’s (2013) hypothesis of a fractured elite, but we assume that 
firms from different industries have different interests. Table 5.3 also shows that corporations 
vary widely in donating to state-level legislators. While some corporations donated to no 
candidates (IBM) or very few candidates (e.g., General Dynamics, United Technologies, and 
Norther Trust Corp), other corporations donated to several hundred legislators (e.g., Boeing, 
Deere, Marathon Oil, FedEx), with Abbott Laboratories donating over one million dollars to over 
1,000 legislators. Overall, 3,562 state legislators in the 2012 session received over 7.4 million 
dollars in donations (6,051 individual donations) from the corporate elite.  
The average donation by an elite corporation to a legislator was $1,225, with donations 
ranging from just over $12 (UPS’s donation to Pennsylvania Senator Stewart Greenleaf) to 
$45,000 (Caterpillar donation to Illinois Representative Tom Cross). Although $45,000 is a lot of 
money to donate to the average citizen, these 25 corporations held over 1.2 trillion dollars in 
assets in 2012, about seven percent of the US GDP that year (see Appendix B for a description of 
reported assets by company in 2012). Figure 5.2 breaks down the corporate elite donations in 
increments. The modal contribution category (representing 841 legislators) was between $1,000 
and $2,500. Another 406 legislators received between $2,500 and $5,000 in donations from the 
corporate elite. 
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Figure 5.2: Donations from Corporate Elite 
 
Multivariate Results 
Table 5.4 provides the results from the multivariate analyses for this chapter. Each model 
regresses Anti-Labor Scores on various measures of campaign donations. All analyses in this 
table adjust for clustering within chambers and control for various measures of political climate 
and constituent characteristics.  
Model 1 examines the effect of All Business donations received on Anti-Labor Scores. I 
find that when examining all business donations together, there is no association between 
donations from business and Anti-Labor Scores. This initially supports previous research in 
political science that finds no relationship between campaign donations and legislative behavior 
(e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Chappell 1981; Grenzke 1989; Wright 1989), as well as 
Mizruchi’s (2013) argument that the capitalist class has fractured.  
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Table 5.4: OLS Regressions of Anti-Labor Scores on Campaign Donations 
 (1) 
All Business Donations 
 (2) 
Segmented 
Capital 
 (3) 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 (4) 
Corp. Elite vs.  
Non-Elite 
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE) 
Campaign Donations (logged %)          
  All Business   0.003 (0.006)          
  Segmented Capital            
    Energy      0.015 (0.010)       
    Services      0.002 (0.010)       
    Finance/Banks    - 0.008 (0.015)       
    Agriculture    - 0.008 (0.009)       
    Manufacturing       0.010 (0.013)       
    Technology    - 0.020 (0.026)       
    Defense      0.012 (0.030)       
  COC          0.043 (0.033)    
  Corporate Elite            0.035** (0.012) 
  Non-Elite Business          - 0.004 (0.007) 
  Labor  -0.049*** (0.011)  - 0.051*** (0.011)  - 0.049*** (0.011)  - 0.050*** (0.011) 
Political Climate            
  Pro-Labor Environment - 0.076** (0.028)  - 0.077** (0.026)  - 0.078** (0.027)  - 0.084** (0.027) 
  Dem. Party - 0.104*** (0.020)  - 0.101*** (0.019)  - 0.101*** (0.019)  - 0.100*** (0.019) 
  Ind. Party   0.050 (0.064)    0.059 (0.069)    0.020 (0.058)    0.060 (0.065) 
  Rep. Maj. Chamber  - 0.003 (0.025)  - 0.001 (0.025)  - 0.005 (0.024)  - 0.005 (0.025) 
  Rep. Governor   0.039* (0.019)    0.034 (0.019)    0.042* (0.019)    0.037* (0.018) 
  2010 Rep. Swing - 0.017 (0.024)  - 0.021 (0.025)  - 0.010 (0.023)  - 0.014 (0.023) 
  Agenda Setting Ability   0.025 (0.017)    0.027 (0.018)    0.024 (0.017)    0.022 (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics            
  % Black - 0.002 (0.002)  - 0.002 (0.002)  - 0.002 (0.002)  - 0.002 (0.002) 
  % Foreign Born - 0.003 (0.003)  - 0.002 (0.003)  - 0.003 (0.003)  - 0.004 (0.003) 
  % in Manuf., 1960   0.005 (0.003)    0.005 (0.003)    0.004 (0.003)    0.003 (0.003) 
  Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010   0.005 (0.004)    0.006 (0.004)    0.004 (0.004)    0.004 (0.003) 
  % in Agriculture    0.000 (0.014)    0.001 (0.012)    0.005 (0.015)  - 0.004 (0.014) 
  % in FIRE - 0.015 (0.012)  - 0.012 (0.011)  - 0.016 (0.012)  - 0.010 (0.011) 
  % Unemployed   0.033** (0.011)    0.034** (0.011)    0.032** (0.011)    0.037** (0.011) 
  Average Income   0.009 (0.012)    0.008 (0.012)    0.010 (0.012)    0.010 (0.012) 
  % < Poverty Line   0.004 (0.016)    0.003 (0.016)    0.006 (0.016)    0.005 (0.016) 
  Average Age   0.005 (0.007)    0.006 (0.006)    0.003 (0.007)    0.005 (0.006) 
  % Own Homes   0.012* (0.005)    0.012** (0.005)    0.012* (0.005)    0.012* (0.005) 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05 
 
Model 2 examines the influence of competing segments of capital on Anti-Labor Scores. 
In other words, is it specific sectors and industries that influence legislative action when it comes 
to collective bargaining bills? I find that no sector dominates others to influence Anti-Labor 
Scores. In other words, the idea that businesses unify according to their industry-wide interests is 
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not supported here. Supplemental analyses (see Appendix C) examined each segmented capital 
variable independently and found no significant relationships between any sector and the 
dependent variable. 
Model 3 examines the effect of donations from COC on anti-labor legislation. I find no 
association between donations from COC and Anti-Labor Scores. Although the US COC has 
been important in the past, it does not appear to influence state legislators through campaign 
donations. 
Finally, Model 4 separates Corporate Elite donations from Non-Elite Business donations. 
I find that while Non-Elite Business continue to have no impact on Anti-Labor Scores, there is a 
significant and positive association with Corporate Elite donations (b=0.035, p<0.01). In other 
words, legislators who receive more donations from the corporate elite (as a function of the 
percent of all donations) tend to propose more anti-labor legislation.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
I conducted sensitivity analyses of my measure for corporate elite donations, presented in 
Appendix D. Each model replicates Model 4 from Table 5.4, but removes one of the 24 (IBM did 
not donate so was not included) corporations. For example, the measure of the corporate elite in 
Model 1 of Appendix D includes all corporations except for 3M, which is instead included in the 
measure of non-elite business donations. The measure of corporate elite donations remains 
significant across all models. To discern if the effect of corporate elite donations changed across 
models, I conducted tests for the equality of coefficients using the following equation:  
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Equation 5.1: Equality of Coefficients 
   𝑧 =
𝛽1−𝛽2
√𝑠𝑒𝛽1
2−𝑠𝑒𝛽2
2
  
None of the models differed significantly from the main analyses. This suggests that the effect of 
the corporate elite is structural and not driven by donations from any particular outlier 
corporation.  
I also conducted analyses using other measures of corporate donations, presented in 
Appendix E. Model 1 of Appendix E uses the logged number of corporate donors to predict 
Anti-Labor Scores, Model 2 uses a non-logged measure of the number of corporate donors (top 
coded at 4 or more), and Model 3 uses a dummy-coded variable of any corporate elite donors 
(1=yes, 0=no). All three continue to control for donations from non-elite business and labor. I 
find that the number of corporate donors is associated with higher Anti-Labor Scores, as is 
receiving any corporate elite campaign donations. 
Finally, I conducted matched sample estimation to adjust for confounding factors and 
selection bias, a commonly used technique when assessing the effect of a treatment that may be 
biased due to selection (Aral et al. 2009; Kim, Kogut, and Yang 2015; Murray forthcoming; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In this case, it could be that certain legislators have a greater 
propensity to receive donations from the corporate elite. I estimated the propensity that each 
legislator had a corporate elite donor based on all of the other independent and control variables. 
I then matched each legislator that actually received a corporate elite donation (treated group) 
with a legislator that did not have a corporate elite donation (untreated group) but have the most 
similar propensity scores. Then I conducted a logistic regression on the matched sample to 
estimate the treatment effects of donations on Anti-Labor Scores. These results are presented in 
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Appendix F, and indicate that when comparing legislators that are by all other measures similar, 
those who received corporate elite campaign donations have higher Anti-Labor Scores.  
Taken together, these sensitivity analyses provide strong evidence that my measure of 
corporate elite involvement is a useful one, and that the association between donations and Anti-
Labor Scores is likely not due to selection bias. Campaign donations from the top 25 interlocked 
corporations has a significant and robust effect on the behavior of legislators. 
Discussion  
This chapter asked whether corporate elite donations encourage anti-labor legislative 
effort. I found that total business donations were not associated with legislative effort, nor were 
donations from the Chamber of Commerce, nor were donations from industry-specific segments 
of capital. Instead, and in support of my hypothesis, I found that when corporate elite donations 
were separated from non-elite business, campaign donations from the corporate elite were 
positively associated with anti-labor bill proposals. This supports the idea that the corporate elite 
are theoretically distinct from the rest of the business community. This also supports research 
that continues to find unity among the US elite. 
It is useful to look at some concrete examples of legislators who fit this trend, 13 
summarized in Table 5.5 below. Representative Mike Huval (R-Louisiana) received no 
donations (0%) from the corporate elite in his most recent election prior to 2012, and proposed 
no anti-labor bills (or any pro-labor bills) during the 2012 legislative session.  
                                                 
13 For comparison purposes, I chose discuss only Republicans, but this trend was significant for Democrats as well. 
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Table 5.5: Examples of Legislators and Corporate Donors 
Legislator 
Corporate 
Donors 
Donations from 
Corporate Elite 
Anti-Labor Bill 
Proposals 
Mike Huval  
(R-Louisiana) 
    None $0    none 
David Taylor 
(R-Washington) 
Boeing 
Eli-Lilly 
McDonalds 
 
$1,550 
(1.4%) 
   Two 
   WA HB 2525 
   WA HB 2526 
David Winters 
(R- Illinois) 
Caterpillar 
Deere 
Exelon 
McDonald’s 
UPS 
$5,800 
(4.5%) 
   Three 
   IL HB 1673 
   IL HB 1849 
   IL HB 5582 
 
Three of the top 25 corporations, Boeing, McDonalds, and Eli-Lilly, donated a total of 
$1,550 to Representative David Taylor (R-Washington) prior to the 2012 session, representing 
about 1.4 percent of his total donations. Taylor had an Anti-Labor score of 2, representing two 
bills he proposed that both aimed to increase the regulation of unions: House Bill 2525 increased 
regulation on union finances and required public disclosure of all public-sector unions’ spending. 
House Bill 2526 increased union regulations by requiring that all collective bargaining sessions 
of public unions to be conducted as open public meetings, which would effectively slow down 
the collective bargaining process. 
Finally, five of the top 25 corporations, Exelon, Deere, Caterpillar, McDonald’s, and 
UPS, donated a total of $5,800 to Representative David Winters (R-Illinois) prior to the 2012 
session, representing about 4.5 percent of his total donations. Winters had an Anti-Labor Score 
of 3, representing three anti-collective bargaining bills he sponsored that all proposed to amend 
Illinois’ Public Labor Relations Act: House Bills 1673, 1849, and 5582. The first bill proposed 
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an effective ban on raising taxes to pay the cost of public employees’ wages and benefits. The 
second bill proposed to limit the amount of funds available for arbitration and collective 
bargaining. Finally, the third bill proposed to redefine and limit which workers would be legally 
defined as public employees (and therefore protected under state collective bargaining laws). 
These three cases are meant to be used as illustrations of the larger pattern that finds an 
association between corporate elite campaign donations and anti-labor bill proposals. In 
accordance with my theoretical model, elite capital investment in campaigns appears to exert 
influence on legislative effort.  This chapter established the association between donations and 
bill proposals, but does not address whether this association is due to homophily (the corporate 
elite donates to legislators who are already anti-labor) or diffusion (donations from the corporate 
elite influence legislators’ anti-labor behavior). The next chapter addresses this question. 
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 THE MODERATING EFFECT OF POLITICAL CLIMATE 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I established that there is an association between elite capital 
investment (campaign donations) and legislative effort (bill proposals). In this chapter, I ask the 
following question: Is the relationship between elite capital investment and legislative effort 
strategic? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again below in Figure 6.1, 
highlighting the theoretical focus of this chapter: how political climate moderates the relationship 
between elite capital investment and legislative effort.  
Figure 6.1:Theoretical Focus of Chapter 6 
 
The question of strategy can be understood by the two models previously proposed in 
Chapter 2, the Donations-As-Votes Model and the Donations-As-Relationships model, which I 
review briefly. In the Donations-As-Votes model, the primary function of campaign donations is 
to aid in the campaign of the legislator running for office. In this way, donations act much like a 
vote from a constituent (Grossman and Helpman 1996; Magee 2002). From a network 
perspective, this is homophily: the donor-candidate connection is created on the basis of a shared 
ideology, rather than the connection leading to the shared ideology. According this model, 
Elite Capital 
Investment 
Corporate Elite 
Campaign Donations 
Legislative Effort  
Proposed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 
Political Outcomes 
Passed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 
+ + 
+ 
Political Climate 
Labor-Friendly 
Environment 
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donations are not strategic: given unlimited resources, an individual would donate the same 
amount to all politicians with whom they agree.  
In the Donations-As-Relationships model, donations from the elite represent gifts that are 
part of long-term social relationships (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993). From a network 
perspective, this is diffusion: policy preferences diffuse from donor to candidate due to the 
relationship established by donations. Campaign donations buy access, and this access leads to 
diffusion of perspective on policy. Under this model, donations are strategic. Since donations are 
about influencing the behavior of politicians, donors may seek to target their money where they 
will have the most influence. Thus, in an environment that is already friendly to the interests of 
the elite, such as states that already restrict the power of organized labor, elite donations will 
have minimal impact. In an environment that is hostile to elite interests, or where the working 
class has greater strength, elite donations can have the maximum impact.  
In this chapter, I examine how the political climate of a state moderates the influence of 
corporate elite campaign donations. I hypothesized that (a) the positive association between 
corporate elite donations and anti-labor bill proposals would be stronger in pro-labor states, (b) 
legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received money from corporate elite 
donors, (c) legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from corporate elite donors, 
and (d) legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of corporate elite donors. 
Descriptive Results 
As in Chapter 5, the legislator is the unit of the analysis (N=7,143).  Table 6.1 provides 
descriptive statistics for the data used in this chapter.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of All Study Variables, Chapter 6 
 Mean (SD)  
or % Range 
Dependent Variables     
 Anti-Labor Score -0.008  (0.63) -23.00 – 8.00 
 Any Corporate Elite Donors     38.7%   0.00 – 1.00 
 Donations from Corporate Elite (ln$) 2.734  (3.51)   0.00 – 11.58 
 Number of Corporate Elite Donors 0.813  (1.44)   0.00 – 14.00 
   
     
Campaign Donations (logged %)     
 Labor 1.227  (1.24) 0.00 – 4.62 
 Corporate Elite  0.318  (0.54) 0.00 – 3.97 
 Non-Elite Business 2.430  (1.04) 0.00 – 4.62 
     
Political Climate     
 Pro-Labor Environment 23.8% 0.00–1.00 
 Chamber Majority=Republican 61.6% 0.00–1.00 
 Governor=Republican 56.2% 0.00–1.00 
 Republican Swing in 2010 17.0% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator=Republican 52.8% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator=Democrat 46.2% 0.00–1.00 
 Legislator= Ind./ Non-Partisan  1.0% 0.00–1.00 
 Agenda Setting Ability  67.0% 0.00–1.00 
     
Constituent Characteristics      
 % Residents Black 11.322  (9.83) 0.37 – 37.21 
 % Residents Foreign Born 9.627  (6.23) 1.46 – 28.17 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 23.501  (9.68) 3.64 – 39.88 
 Δ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960) -12.853  (8.44) -28.53 – 4.34 
 % in Agriculture 2.144  (1.21) 0.93 – 6.36 
 % in FIRE 4.581  (0.97) 2.30 – 6.98 
 % Unemployed 6.270  (1.29) 2.33 – 9.43 
 % < Poverty Line 33.753  (4.89) 25.34 – 45.14 
 Average Age 17.004  (3.14) 11.05 – 25.01 
 % Own Homes 37.721  (1.47) 31.83 – 40.67 
 Average Income (thousands $) 68.522  (4.05) 55.84 – 75.59 
     Note: N=7,143 
 
The means and proportions of the study variables used in Chapter 5 are identical to those in this 
Chapter. The primary difference in this chapter is the inclusion of three more dependent 
variables: (1) whether the legislator received any corporate elite donations, (2) the total donations 
from the corporate elite, and (3) the number of corporate elite donors. Over one-third of 
legislators received any corporate elite donations in their most recent election. 
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Table 6.2 provides a detailed description of the labor climate in each state, as well as 
whether the state was coded as having a pro-labor environment. About one-quarter (23.8%) of 
legislators live in one of the twelve states coded as pro-labor. Among all legislators, the average 
total donations (in logged USD) from the corporate elite was 2.73, which translates to about 
$1,000 (as noted in Chapter 5, among the legislators who received corporate elite campaign 
donations the average total was $2,583). Finally, the total number of corporate donors ranged 
from 0 to 14, with an average number of corporate donors being just under 1 (0.81). Of those 
who received corporate elite donations, the average number of corporate donors was 2. 
Table 6.2: Labor Climate Scores by State 
State 
Has RTW  
Law? 
Uses Federal 
Minimum 
Wage? 
Unionization 
<10%? 
Labor-
Friendly 
Environment? 
Alabama Yes Yes -  
Alaska - - -  
Arizona Yes Yes Yes  
Arkansas Yes Yes Yes  
California - - -  
Colorado - Yes Yes  
Connecticut - - -  
Delaware - Yes -  
Florida Yes Yes Yes  
Georgia Yes Yes Yes  
Hawaii - Yes -  
Idaho Yes Yes Yes  
Illinois - - -  
Indiana - Yes -  
Iowa Yes Yes -  
Kansas Yes Yes Yes  
Kentucky - Yes Yes  
Louisiana Yes Yes Yes  
Maine - - -  
Maryland - Yes -  
Massachusetts - - -  
Michigan - - -  
Minnesota - Yes -  
Mississippi Yes Yes Yes  
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Missouri - Yes -  
Montana - Yes -  
Nebraska Yes Yes -  
Nevada Yes - -  
New Hampshire - Yes -  
New Jersey - Yes -  
New Mexico - - Yes  
New York - Yes -  
North Carolina Yes Yes Yes  
North Dakota Yes Yes Yes  
Ohio - - -  
Oklahoma Yes Yes Yes  
Oregon - - -  
Pennsylvania - Yes -  
Rhode Island - - -  
South Carolina Yes Yes Yes  
South Dakota Yes Yes Yes  
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes  
Texas Yes Yes Yes  
Utah Yes Yes Yes  
Vermont - - -  
Virginia Yes Yes Yes  
Washington - - -  
West Virginia - Yes -  
Wisconsin - Yes -  
Wyoming Yes Yes Yes  
 
Figure 6.2 provides a visual map of the labor environment by state. The dark blue states are the 
coded as pro-labor environment. Not surprisingly, Washington, Oregon, and California are all 
coded as pro-labor on the west coast, as are Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois in the Midwest. 
Although New York and Wisconsin have higher than average unionization rates (in 2010 they 
were 24.3% and 14.3%, respectively), they were not coded as pro-labor because both states used 
the federal minimum wage as of 2012. Alaska, a traditionally Republican-leaning state in most 
elections, was coded as pro-labor as it has a high unionization rate (23.2%). 
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Figure 6.2: Pro-Labor Climate by State 
 
Table 6.3 displays bivariate tests for differences in descriptive statistics across labor 
climate. The left column shows the means and proportions for the legislators in anti-labor states 
(Pro-Labor Environment=0), and the right column shows the means and proportions for the 
legislators in the most pro-labor states (Pro-Labor Environment=014). Results from t-tests show 
that legislators in anti-labor states have higher Anti-Labor Scores on average than legislators in 
pro-labor states (a difference of 0.073, p<0.001).  At the bivariate level, legislators received more 
donations from labor (as a percentage of their total donations) in pro-labor states (a difference of 
0.212, p<0.001). Although there was no significant difference in the amount legislators received 
                                                 
14 See Appendix G for supplemental analyses using continuous measure. 
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from the corporate elite by environment, a larger proportion of legislators in pro-labor states 
(33.8%) received a donation from the corporate elite than those in anti-labor or neutral states 
(30.9%). 
Table 6.3: Means and Percentages of Study Variables by Dichotomous Climate 
  
Labor Unfriendly 
Climate 
(N=6,169) 
 
Labor Friendly 
Climate 
(N=974) 
Dependent Variables    
 Anti-Labor Score 0.010  (0.55) *** -0.063 (0.84) 
 Any Corporate Elite Donors 38.4%   39.7%  
 Donations from Corporate Elite (ln$) 2.644 (0.05) *** 3.024 (0.09) 
 Number of Corporate Elite Donors 0.709 (0.02) *** 1.144 (0.05) 
      
Campaign Donations (logged %)   
 Labor 1.176 (0.02) *** 1.388 (0.03) 
 Corporate Elite  0.318 (0.01)  0.319 (0.01) 
 Non-Elite Business 2.540 (0.01) *** 2.078 (0.03) 
      
Political Climate     
 Majority Sets Agenda=1 68.8%  *** 61.5%  
 Chamber Maj=Republican 71.8%  *** 28.8%  
 Governor=Republican 64.2%  *** 30.8%  
 Republican Swing in 2010 20.5%  *** 5.8%  
 Legislator=Republican 56.7%  *** 40.5%  
 Legislator=Democrat 42.2%  *** 58.9%  
 Legislator= Ind. / Non-Part. 1.2%  *** 0.5%  
 Legislator= Incumbent 71.2%   71.2%  
      
Constituent Characteristics     
 % Residents Black 12.721 (0.14) *** 6.849 (0.11) 
 % Residents Foreign Born 8.995 (0.08) *** 11.649 (0.15) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 21.213 (0.12) *** 30.817 (0.19) 
 Δ % in Manufacturing (2010-1960) -10.840 (0.11) *** -19.287 (0.16) 
 % in FIRE 4.514 (0.01) *** 4.797 (0.02) 
 % in Agriculture 2.204 (0.02) *** 1.953 (0.02) 
 % Unemployed 6.039 (0.02) *** 7.008 (0.03) 
 Average Income (thousands $) 33.028 (4.71) *** 36.072 (4.76) 
 % < Poverty Line 17.333 (0.05) *** 15.951 (0.04) 
 Average Age 37.532 (1.43) *** 38.325 (1.44) 
 % Own Homes 68.767 (0.05) *** 67.737 (0.12) 
N=7,143. Asterisks indicate significant bivariate difference across labor environment: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Not surprisingly, the political climate measures are all significantly different by labor 
climate, with the exception of incumbent legislator. Agenda-setting abilities are more common in 
anti-labor climates, as are Republican legislators, governors, and chamber majorities. Chambers 
were also more likely to have swung to Republican from Democrat or split majority in 2010 in 
anti-labor states. 
All of the constituent characteristics also varied by labor climate. While there are 
significantly more Black residents in anti-labor states, there are more immigrants in pro-labor 
states. Labor-friendly states had, on average, larger manufacturing sectors in 1960, but also saw a 
larger decline in manufacturing between 1960 and 2010. Labor-friendly states have higher rates 
of residents employed in the FIRE sectors, and lower rates of employment in agriculture. Labor-
friendly states have higher unemployment rates, but also higher average incomes and lower 
poverty rates. The average age of constituents is slightly higher in pro-labor states, and the 
homeownership rate is slightly lower. 
Multivariate Results 
Table 6.4 examines the moderating effect of labor climate on the relationship between 
corporate elite donations and Anti-Labor Scores. Model 1 established that corporate elite 
donations are positively associated with Anti-Labor Scores. Model 2 includes an interaction 
between corporate elite donations and pro-labor environment. The results show a significant and 
positive interaction. These findings indicate that the association between corporate elite 
donations and Anti-Labor Scores is stronger in labor-friendly states.  
 
  
117 
 
Table 6.4: OLS Regression of Anti-Labor Score on Corporate Elite Donations 
 (1)  (2) 
 b (SE)  b (SE) 
Focal Interaction      
  Corp. Elite Donations × Pro-Labor Enviro.     0.129** (0.041) 
Campaign Donations (logged %)      
  Corporate Elite  0.035** (0.012)   0.015 (0.010) 
  Non-Elite Business -0.004 (0.007)  -0.007 (0.007) 
  Labor -0.050*** (0.011)  -0.054*** (0.011) 
Political Climate      
  Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** (0.027)  -0.127*** (0.031) 
  Party=Dem -0.101*** (0.019)  -0.091*** (0.019) 
  Party=Ind./Non-Partisan  0.061 (0.066)   0.065 (0.065) 
  Chamber = Rep. Maj. -0.005 (0.024)  -0.003 (0.024) 
  Governor=Rep.  0.037* (0.018)   0.050** (0.018) 
  2010 Rep. Swing -0.014 (0.025)  -0.018 (0.022) 
  Agenda Setting Ability  0.022 (0.016)   0.019 (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics       
  % Black -0.002 (0.002)  -0.003 (0.002) 
  % Foreign Born -0.004 (0.003)  -0.006* (0.003) 
  % in Manuf., 1960  0.003 (0.003)   0.002 (0.003) 
  Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010  0.004 (0.003)   0.003 (0.003) 
  % in FIRE  -0.004 (0.013)  -0.008 (0.013) 
  % in Agriculture  -0.010 (0.012)  -0.005 (0.011) 
  % Unemployed  0.038** (0.011)   0.036** (0.011) 
  Average Income  0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
  % < Poverty Line  0.005 (0.016)   0.009 (0.016) 
  Average Age  0.005 (0.007)   0.008 (0.006) 
  % Own Homes  0.012* (0.005)   0.011* (0.005) 
Notes: N=7,143. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in 
parentheses 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the association between corporate elite donations and Anti-Labor 
Scores by dichotomized labor climate (based on Model 2 of Table 6.4). The light grey line 
represents the focal association in anti-labor states and shows only a small slope. The black line 
represents the slope in the most labor friendly states, and shows a more dramatic positive slope. 
This indicates that the effect of corporate elite donations is much stronger in pro-labor states.  
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Figure 6.3: Anti-Labor Score by Corporate Elite Donations and Labor Climate 
 
These findings lead to the question of where donations go. Specifically, if the effect of 
corporate donations matter more in labor friendly states, do we see corporations focusing their 
money in these areas? Below I predict corporate elite campaign donations in three ways.15 First, I 
use logistic regression to predict whether legislators received any donations from the corporate 
elite in their most recent election (Table 6.5). Second, I use OLS regression to predict the amount 
of money (in logged USD) from the corporate elite donors to legislators (Table 6.6). Third, I use 
negative binomial regression to predict the number of corporate donors to legislators (Table 6.7). 
In each table, the first model predicts the outcome focusing on the main effect of pro-labor 
environment. The second model in each table includes an interaction between pro-labor 
environment and the legislator’s party. 
                                                 
15 These analyses drop a small number (N=72) of independent and non-partisan legislators to examine differences 
between Democrats and Republicans. 
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Table 6.5: Logistic Regression of Having any Corporate Elite Donors 
 (1)    (2) 
 b (SE)  b (SE) 
Pro-Labor Environment  0.950* (0.406)   1.338** (0.462) 
Party=Democrat -0.856*** (0.192)  -0.726*** (0.206) 
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat    -0.731** (0.283) 
      
Incumbent  1.083*** (0.143)   1.094*** (0.143) 
Donations from Labor (ln$)  0.094** (0.029)   0.095*** (0.029) 
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)  0.500*** (0.149)   0.503*** (0.150) 
Agenda Setting Ability  0.289 (0.266)   0.302 (0.268) 
Chamber = Rep. Maj.  0.273 (0.247)   0.283 (0.247) 
Governor=Rep.  0.304 (0.257)   0.278 (0.259) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.616 (0.344)  -0.629 (0.342) 
% Black  0.062** (0.020)   0.062** (0.020) 
% Foreign Born  0.181*** (0.041)   0.181*** (0.041) 
% in Manuf., 1960  0.215*** (0.044)   0.218*** (0.043) 
Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010  0.190** (0.059)   0.193** (0.059) 
% in Agriculture   0.565** (0.188)   0.579** (0.186) 
% in FIRE -0.727*** (0.175)  -0.725*** (0.177) 
% Unemployed -0.523*** (0.149)  -0.523*** (0.152) 
Average Income -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 
% < Poverty Line -0.167 (0.113)  -0.159 (0.113) 
Average Age  0.080 (0.094)   0.075 (0.093) 
% Own Homes  0.040 (0.046)   0.039 (0.046) 
Notes: N= 7,071. Logistic regressions predict the whether the legislator had any corporate elite donors give money to their most 
recent election campaign. Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Model 1 of Table 6.5 shows that the corporate elite are more likely to donate to 
legislators in pro-labor environments (b=0.950, p<0.05). Exponentiating the logged odds 
coefficient produces an odds ratio of 2.58, meaning that the odds of having any corporate elite 
donors are 158% higher in pro-labor states than anti-labor states.   
Model 2 interacts pro-labor environment with party and finds a significant, negative 
interaction term (b=-0.731, p<0.001). This means that while the corporate elite targets legislators 
of both parties more often in pro-labor states, this relationship is weaker for Democratic 
legislators. In other words, the corporate elite are the most likely to donate to Republicans in pro-
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labor states. Figure 6.4 uses this interaction to show the predicted probabilities16 of a legislator 
having received corporate elite campaign donations. 
Figure 6.4: Predicted Probability of Having Corporate Donors 
 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the corporate elite are more likely to donate to Republicans than 
Democrats, as the Republican Party has traditionally been considered the pro-business party, 
while the Democratic Party has historically been more aligned with labor. What is interesting, 
however, is that the probability of having a corporate donor is much higher in pro-labor states for 
both parties. In fact, the probability of a Democrat in a pro-labor state receiving corporate elite 
donations (p=0.29) is almost the same as the probability of a Republican receiving corporate 
donations in an anti-labor or neutral state (p=0.31). 
                                                 
16 This was done using the margins command in Stata 14 SE.  
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In Table 6.6, I regress the total amount (in logged USD) of money legislators receive 
from the corporate elite on political climate. Model 1 shows that legislators in pro-labor states 
received significantly more money from the corporate elite than legislators in other states (b= 
1.502, p<0.01). While Democrats report significantly less money from the corporate elite than 
Republicans, the interaction between pro-labor environment and party in Model 2 is not 
significant. In other words, in terms of the amount of money donated, the corporate elite targets 
Democrats and Republicans in pro-labor states equally. 
Table 6.6: OLS Regression of Corporate Elite Donations (logged USD) 
 (1)    (2) 
 b (SE)  b (SE) 
Pro-Labor Environment  1.502** (0.537)   1.803** (0.614) 
Party=Democrat -1.321*** (0.189)  -1.174*** (0.204) 
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat    -0.571 (0.362) 
      
Incumbent  1.233*** (0.175)   1.242*** (0.175) 
Donations from Labor (ln$)  0.152*** (0.027)   0.148*** (0.027) 
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)  0.375*** (0.061)   0.375*** (0.061) 
Agenda Setting Ability  0.268 (0.338)   0.272 (0.339) 
Chamber = Rep. Maj.  0.798* (0.368)   0.815* (0.370) 
Governor=Rep.  0.048 (0.313)   0.038 (0.315) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.707 (0.426)  -0.722 (0.425) 
% Black  0.074** (0.024)   0.072** (0.024) 
% Foreign Born  0.296*** (0.050)   0.296*** (0.049) 
% in Manuf., 1960  0.306*** (0.060)   0.308*** (0.060) 
Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010  0.280*** (0.081)   0.282*** (0.081) 
% in Agriculture   0.553* (0.226)   0.555* (0.225) 
% in FIRE -0.857*** (0.194)  -0.855*** (0.194) 
% Unemployed -0.646*** (0.168)  -0.648*** (0.169) 
Average Income -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 
% < Poverty Line -0.181 (0.134)  -0.174 (0.134) 
Average Age  0.048 (0.148)   0.048 (0.146) 
% Own Homes  0.082 (0.061)   0.080 (0.061) 
Notes: N= 7,071. OLS regressions predict the donations (in logged USD) to legislators from the corporate elite. Clustered 
standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Model 1 of Table 6.7 shows that legislators in pro-labor states have a greater number of 
corporate elite donors compared to legislators in anti-labor states (b=0.801, p<0.001). 
Exponentiating the unstandardized coefficient provides an incident rate ratio of 2.228, meaning 
that the expected count of corporate donors is nearly 123% greater in pro-labor states than in 
other states. Model 2 shows that the interaction with Democrat is negative, meaning that while 
legislators in pro-labor states are expected to have more corporate elite donors, this effect is not 
as strong for Democrats. This is similar to the finding that the corporate elite are more likely to 
target legislators in pro labor states, especially Republicans. 
Table 6.7: Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Corporate Elite Donors 
 (1)  (2) 
 b (SE)  b (SE) 
Pro-Labor Environment  0.801*** (0.194)   0.899*** (0.195) 
Party=Democrat -0.372*** (0.071)  -0.289*** (0.083) 
Pro-Labor Environment × Democrat    -0.223* (0.098) 
      
Incumbent  0.758*** (0.096)   0.763*** (0.097) 
Donations from Labor (ln$)  0.045** (0.015)   0.044** (0.015) 
Donations from Non-Elite Bus (ln$)  0.464*** (0.057)   0.465*** (0.057) 
Agenda Setting Ability  0.316* (0.124)   0.314* (0.125) 
Chamber = Rep. Maj.  0.417*** (0.123)   0.429*** (0.123) 
Governor=Rep. -0.119 (0.156)  -0.122 (0.156) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.408* (0.187)  -0.409* (0.187) 
% Black  0.053*** (0.012)   0.053*** (0.012) 
% Foreign Born  0.111*** (0.019)   0.111*** (0.019) 
% in Manuf., 1960  0.093*** (0.027)   0.093*** (0.027) 
Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010  0.070 (0.037)   0.071 (0.037) 
% in Agriculture   0.329** (0.111)   0.331** (0.111) 
% in FIRE -0.351*** (0.093)  -0.348*** (0.093) 
% Unemployed -0.333*** (0.089)  -0.332*** (0.090) 
Average Income -0.000* (0.000)  -0.000* (0.000) 
% < Poverty Line -0.175* (0.075)  -0.171* (0.075) 
Average Age  0.000 (0.046)   0.001 (0.046) 
% Own Homes  0.037 (0.025)   0.037 (0.025) 
Notes: N= 7,071. Negative binomial regressions predict the number of corporate elite donors that gave money to legislators. 
Clustered standard errors (by chamber) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Taken together, the findings presented in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 indicate that the 
corporate elite target their campaign contributions to legislators in labor-friendly states. While 
this focused donation pattern occurs for both Democrats and Republicans, the pattern is strongest 
among Republican legislators. 
 
Discussion 
This chapter asked if the corporate elite are strategic in influencing legislative behavior. I 
found evidence to suggest they are: the effect of corporate elite campaign donations is stronger in 
pro-labor states, where the corporate elite’s power is not as secure. These findings support the 
Donations-As-Relationships Model, wherein donations serve to create and maintain long-term 
social relationships between the corporate elite and politicians (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and 
Scott 1993). According to this model, because campaign donations are about influencing 
politicians’ behavior, corporate elite donors should seek to target their money where it will have 
the most influence. This is precisely what I find. In the most pro-labor environments, where the 
working class has the greatest strength and therefore elite interests are most at risk, elite 
donations have greater influence on the behavior of legislators.   
Further, this chapter finds that the corporate elite actually target legislators in labor-
friendly states. They donate more money, more often, to more legislators in pro-labor 
environments. These results suggest that the corporate elite focus on strategic targeting for 
access: money goes to candidates in states where they are in a position to help the corporate elite 
(i.e., the corporate elite do not need as much help to ensure anti-labor laws in states that are 
already hostile to labor). 
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For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to examine legislators who received a similar 
amount from the corporate elite but varied by labor climate, summarized in Table 6.8 below.17 
Consider Senator James Jackson (R) from Texas, a state that was coded as anti-labor (indeed, 
Texas actually has low union density, uses the minimum wage, and is a RTW state, so it ranked 
the lowest on the continuous measure of labor climate as well). He received $21,000 in donations 
from seven of the top 25 interlocked corporations (Allstate, Boeing, Continental Airlines, Eli-
Lilly Pharmaceuticals, Exelon, and Marathon Oil), making up 1.6 percent of his most recent 
campaign donations. Jackson had an Anti-Labor Score of 0, as he did not propose any bill related 
to collective bargaining in 2012.  
Table 6.8: Examples of Legislators with Similar Donations 
Legislator 
Labor-Friendly 
Environment? 
Corporate 
Donors 
Donations from 
Corporate Elite 
Anti-Labor 
Bill Proposals 
James 
Jackson  
(R-Texas) 
No     Allstate 
    Boeing    
    Continental   
    Eli-Lilly  
    Exelon 
    Marathon Oil 
 
$21,000 
(1.6%) 
   none 
Bob Huff 
(R-California) 
Yes      Allstate 
    Boeing 
    Eli-Lilly 
    FedEx 
    UPS 
 
$14,800  
(1.6%) 
  Two 
  CA SCA 18 
  CA SB 1059 
 
Conversely, consider Senator Bob Huff (R) from California, a state that is coded as pro-labor. 
Huff received $14,800 in donations from five corporations (Allstate, Boeing, Eli-Lilly, FedEx, 
and UPS). Although this is less in total dollars than what Jackson received, this total amounted to 
                                                 
17 I again focus on Republicans for comparison purposes, but these effects do hold for Democrats. 
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1.6 percent of Huff’s most recent campaign donations. Unlike Jackson, Huff proposed two bills 
that aimed to restrict collective bargaining in 2012: SCA 18, which placed severe restrictions on 
retirement benefits for public employees (including requiring employees to forfeit entire pension 
if ever convicted of a felony), and SB 1059, which restricted aspects of what public school 
teachers could collectively bargain over, and also removed the time frame for giving notice to an 
employee regarding action on charges. 
Table 6.9: Examples of Legislators with Similar Anti-Labor Scores 
Legislator 
Labor-Friendly 
Environment? 
Corporate 
Donors 
Donations from 
Corporate Elite 
Anti-Labor 
Bill Proposals 
Glen Casada 
(R- Tennessee) 
No    FedEx 
   Marathon Oil 
$3,250 
(2.2%) 
  Five 
  TN HB 179 
  TN HB 599 
  TN HB 3229 
  TN HB 3387 
Mark Jansen 
(R-Michigan) 
Yes    Eli-Lilly 
   McDonald’s 
$2,250 
(1.8%) 
  Five 
  MI S 7  
  MI S 8  
  MI S 9  
  MI S 11  
  MI SJR 3 
 
Alternatively, it is useful to consider two legislators who have the same Anti-Labor Score 
from different labor climates: Glen Casada (R-Tennessee) and Mark Jansen (R-Michigan). Both 
legislators received donations from two corporations (FedEx and Marathon Oil donated to 
Casada; Eli-Lilly and McDonald’s donated to Janesn), and both showed a large amount of anti-
labor legislative effort in the same year by proposing five separate anti-labor bills, listed in Table 
6.9 above. However, Casada is in Tennessee, an anti-labor state, and Jansen is in Michigan, a 
pro-labor state. In his most recent election, Casada received $3,250 from the corporate elite, 
making up 2.2 percent of his total campaign contributions. Jansen received $2,250 in donations 
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from the corporate elite, making up 1.8 percent of his total campaign donations. Casada was 
given more money by the corporate elite (both in terms of total amount as well as the percent of 
all donations) than Jansen but both proposed the same number of bills. This suggests that, dollar-
for-dollar, corporate elite money goes farther, and their influence is stronger, in pro-labor states.  
These cases are meant as illustrations of the moderating effect of labor-friendly 
environments on the association between corporate elite campaign donations and anti-labor bill 
proposals. In accordance with my theoretical model, I find that pro-labor environments increase 
the effect of corporate elite campaign donations of anti-labor legislative effort. This variation 
across climate appears to be strategic, and suggests that the association is due to diffusion rather 
than homophily. This chapter establishes that the elite exert strategic influence on legislative 
effort, but does not address whether the corporate elite’s influence extends to policy enactment. 
The next chapter addresses this question.  
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 PREDICTING LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters demonstrated that donations from the corporate elite influence 
legislative behaviors by increasing anti-labor bill proposals. In this chapter, I shift the focus to 
examine bill outcomes, that is, whether bills are signed into law. Specifically, I ask the following 
questions: Does elite capital investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? Does elite capital 
investment shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor legislative effort?  
The theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2 is presented again below in Figure 7.1, with an 
emphasis on the theoretical focus of this chapter: how elite capital investment (corporate elite 
campaign donations) shapes political outcomes (in this case, passed anti-labor legislation). 
Figure 7.1: Theoretical Focus of Chapter 7 
 
This chapter begins by examining if and how campaign donations from the corporate 
elite influence the odds of an anti-labor bill being signed into law. Previous chapters established 
that corporate elite campaign donations lead to increased anti-labor legislative effort. I argue that 
this is because donations from the corporate elite act as gifts that create and maintain social 
relationships between elites and politicians. Campaign donations leave legislators feeling 
indebted to the elite, and one way they act in reciprocation is through increased anti-labor 
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legislative effort (measured as bill proposals). However, symbolically proposing bills is only one 
way legislators may serve the interests of the elite. Labor legislation works to either strengthen or 
weaken the ability of the working class to organize (e.g., Davis and Huston 1993, 1995; Ellwood 
and Fine 1987; Hogler et al. 2004; McCammon 1990; Mishel 2001; Wallace 2007; Wallace et al. 
1998; Warren and Strauss 1979), so it is in the interest of the elite to ensure that these anti-labor 
bills are signed into law. Thus, recipients of elite donations may also act on behalf of the elite by 
voting these bills through the legislative process. I hypothesized that (a) corporate elite donations 
to bill sponsors would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage, and 
that (b) the state average of corporate elite donations to legislators would be positively associated 
with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage. In this part of the chapter, the proposed bill is the 
unit of analysis, and I examine all anti-labor bills (N=459). 
This chapter also addresses the mechanisms through which elite capital investment 
(donations) and legislative outcomes (bill passage) are related. Specifically, I hypothesized that 
(c) the positive association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill 
passage will be partially mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals. The 
argument here is that when the corporate elite donate more money to legislators, these legislators 
will propose more anti-labor bills. When more bills are proposed, there is a greater likelihood of 
bill passage. In this part of the chapter, I move to an analysis at the state-level (N=50). 
Descriptive Results: Bills Dataset 
Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics for the Bills Dataset (N=459). As described in 
Chapter 4, the majority of bills were not signed into law. The average bill had an Ordinal Scale 
score of 1.88, a trichotomized score of 0.38, and only 11.7 percent of all anti-labor bills were 
signed into law. Figure 7.2 provides the breakdown of outcomes among the anti-labor bills.   
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of All Study Variables, Chapter 7 
Variable Range 
Mean (SD) 
or % 
Bill Outcomes   
 Ordinal Outcome Scale 1.00 – 6.00 1.88 (1.69) 
 Trichotomized Outcome 0.00 – 2.00 0.38 (6.92) 
 Dichotomized Outcome 0.00 – 1.00 11.7% 
   
Campaign Donations   
  Any Donation from Corp Elite (=1) 0.00 – 1.00 44.8% 
  % From Corp Elite (ln) 0.00 – 4.62 0.50 (0.84) 
  % From Labor (ln) 0.00 – 4.62 0.94 (01.20) 
  Average State Corp. Elite Donations (ln) 0.00 – 10.05 4.93 (3.32) 
  Average State Labor Donations (ln) 0.00 – 12.53 8.53 (2.64) 
   
Political Climate   
  Pro-Labor Environment 0.00 – 1.00 35.0% 
  Governor=Republican 0.00 – 1.00 45.1% 
  Chamber = Republican Majority 0.00 – 1.00 51.5% 
  Agenda Setting Ability 0.00 – 1.00 76.7% 
   
Constituent Characteristics    
  % Black 0.37 – 31.89 8.85 (6.52) 
  % Foreign Born 1.46 – 28.17 11.15 (7.15) 
  % Employed in Manuf, 1960  4.40 – 39.88 27.98 (9.04) 
  Δ Employed in Manuf. 1960-2010 -28.53 – 4.34 -16.46 (7.75) 
  % Employed in F.I.R.E. 2.30 – 6.85 4.85 (0.78) 
  % Employed in Agriculture 0.93 – 6.36 1.86 (0.90) 
  % Unemployed 3.90 – 9.24 6.52 (1.30) 
  % < Poverty Line 11.05 – 20.94 16.01 (2.81) 
  Average Age 31.83 – 40.67 38.07 (1.08) 
  % Own Homes 55.84 – 75.59 68.26 (5.44) 
   
Bill Subject    
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.00 – 1.00 6.8% 
 Elections 0.00 – 1.00 3.1% 
 Public Employees 0.00 – 1.00 27.0% 
 Dues / RTW 0.00 – 1.00 25.4% 
 Politics 0.00 – 1.00 2.0% 
 Benefits/Wages 0.00 – 1.00 1.0% 
 Strikes 0.00 – 1.00 3.7% 
 Teachers 0.00 – 1.00 13.9% 
 Misc. / Multiple 0.00 – 1.00 17.2% 
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Figure 7.2: Anti-Labor Bill Outcomes 
 
Just under one-half (44.8%) of anti-labor bills proposed were sponsored by legislators 
who received donations from the corporate elite. The average corporate elite donation to bill 
sponsors was about 5.5 percent of total donations (logged percent=0.49), and the average labor 
donation bill sponsors was about 5.9 percent of total donations (logged percent=0.95). For these 
bills, the average donation from the corporate elite to legislators in the state is $1,660 (logged 
average is 4.93), and the average donation from labor interests to legislators in the state is 
$19,119 (logged average is 8.53). Nearly one-in-five bills (19.8%) were proposed in a pro-labor 
state. Forty-five percent of anti-labor bills were proposed in states with Republican governors, 
just over half were proposed in chambers with a Republican majority, and over three-quarters 
(76.7%) were proposed in chambers where the majority party has agenda setting abilities. 
Figure 7.3 provides a summary of these anti-labor bills analyzed by subject. The most 
common anti-labor bill was about public employees (27. %), followed by dues and RTW bills 
(25.4%). Miscellaneous bills and bills about multiple subjects made up about 17 percent of the 
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dataset. Bills about teachers made up another 13.9 percent of the bills. Less common were bills 
about arbitration and negotiation (6.8%), strikes (3.7%), elections (3.1%), politics (2%), and 
benefits and wages (1%).  
Figure 7.3: Anti-Labor Laws by Subject 
 
Multivariate Results: Bills Dataset 
Table 7.2 provides three models that examine how corporate elite campaign donations to 
the sponsor of a bill (measured in logged percent of total donations) predicts the bill’s outcome. 
Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 
uses ordered logistic regression to predict the trichotomized outcome variable (failed in 
committee, failed on chamber floor, or passed). Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict 
whether the bill passed (versus all failures). Across all three models, corporate elite campaign 
donations to bill sponsors are unrelated to the chances of anti-labor bills passing. This means that 
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the amount of money from the corporate elite donated to anti-labor bill sponsors is unrelated to 
bill passage. 
Table 7.2: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on Sponsors’ Corporate Elite Donations 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor (ln %)       
 Corporate Elite 0.157 (0.180)  0.146 (0.171)  0.180 (0.226) 
 Labor 0.151 (0.121)  0.008 (0.103)  0.059 (0.146) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.321 (0.764)  -0.066 (0.781)  1.362 (1.060) 
 Governor=Rep. -0.140 (0.404)  -0.085 (0.443)  -0.355 (1.284) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 1.143* (0.551)  1.831** (0.605)  2.945 (2.184) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.695 (0.428)  -0.175 (0.431)  0.216 (0.417) 
         
Constituent Characteristics          
 % Black -0.052 (0.032)  -0.026 (0.034)  0.076 (0.049) 
 % Foreign born -0.020 (0.064)  0.010 (0.075)  0.118 (0.158) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.070 (0.099)  0.100 (0.112)  0.102 (0.114) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.101 (0.160)  0.089 (0.180)  0.072 (0.172) 
 % in FIRE -0.699* (0.272)  -0.803* (0.333)  -1.073 (0.806) 
 % in Agriculture 0.292 (0.502)  0.718 (0.613)  0.031 (0.688) 
 % Unemployed 0.274 (0.411)  0.108 (0.422)  -0.541 (0.594) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.021 (0.109)  -0.018 (0.118)  0.091 (0.210) 
 Average Age 0.081 (0.234)  -0.077 (0.257)  0.005 (0.462) 
 % Own Home -0.089 (0.072)  -0.117 (0.079)  0.037 (0.116) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 1.085 (0.881)  0.912 (0.964)  1.524 (1.061) 
 Elections 0.085 (0.744)  -0.073 (0.753)  -1.103 (1.215) 
 Public Employees 0.527* (0.268)  0.383 (0.281)  0.486 (0.359) 
 Dues / RTW 0.195 (0.400)  0.233 (0.402)  -0.891 (0.693) 
 Politics -1.542 (0.800)  -1.471 (0.812)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.338* (0.924)  1.466** (0.513)  1.063 (0.791) 
 Strikes 0.579 (1.338)  0.500 (1.423)  1.774 (2.059) 
 Teachers -0.151 (0.401)  -0.475 (0.443)  -0.499 (0.645) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill 
outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses 
logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
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Table 7.3 reproduces the models in Table 7.2, but uses the dichotomous measure of 
corporate elite campaign donations. In Model 1, I find that an anti-labor bill whose sponsor 
received any donations from the corporate elite is significantly more likely to move through the 
legislative process (b=0.797, p<0.01). Exponentiating this coefficient produces cumulative odds 
ratio of 2.2, meaning that the odds of a bill moving to the next step in the legislative process are 
increased by 120% when a bill has a sponsor who received donations form the corporate elite.  
Model 2 uses the trichotomized outcome measure. Again, I find that an anti-labor bill 
whose sponsor received any donations from the corporate elite is significantly more likely to 
move through the legislative process (b=0.850, p<0.01). Exponentiating this coefficient produces 
a cumulative odds ratio of 2.3, indicating that when an anti-labor bill has a sponsor who is 
connected to the corporate elite, the bill is 2.3 times as likely to make it to the floor to be voted 
on than bills sponsored by legislators without corporate elite donations, and it is 2.3 times as 
likely to move from the floor to being passed than bills whose sponsors do not have corporate 
elite campaign donations.  
There is no association in Model 3, which uses a dichotomous outcome. This suggests 
that bills sponsored by legislators who received corporate elite donations are not more likely to 
pass than fail, compared to bills whose sponsors did not receive elite money. However, this could 
be due to the loss of variation that comes with dichotomizing the outcome into pass or fail. 
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Table 7.3: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on Any Corporate Elite Donations 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor        
 Any Corp Elite Donation (=1) 0.797** (0.292)  0.850** (0.295)  0.529 (0.379) 
 Labor (ln %) 0.168 (0.100)  0.018 (0.089)  0.111 (0.133) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment (=1) -0.348 (0.765)  -0.068 (0.788)  1.211 (1.007) 
 Governor=Rep. -0.092 (0.412)  -0.037 (0.426)  -0.344 (1.194) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 1.181* (0.531)  1.923*** (0.582)  2.904 (2.017) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.745 (0.410)  -0.235 (0.381)  0.120 (0.405) 
         
Constituent Characteristics          
 % Black -0.072* (0.034)  -0.043 (0.036)  0.065 (0.048) 
 % Foreign born -0.038 (0.064)  -0.009 (0.069)  0.109 (0.164) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.065 (0.089)  0.093 (0.099)  0.103 (0.106) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.106 (0.148)  0.094 (0.166)  0.062 (0.165) 
 % in FIRE -0.585* (0.252)  -0.668* (0.297)  -1.001 (0.794) 
 % in Agriculture 0.143 (0.483)  0.564 (0.576)  0.068 (0.665) 
 % Unemployed 0.257 (0.413)  0.083 (0.425)  -0.590 (0.583) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.039 (0.106)  -0.044 (0.118)  0.108 (0.201) 
 Average Age 0.084 (0.218)  -0.077 (0.228)  -0.071 (0.437) 
 % Own Home -0.103 (0.067)  -0.133 (0.075)  0.047 (0.114) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.854 (1.014)  0.662 (1.079)  1.386 (1.171) 
 Elections 0.039 (0.726)  -0.155 (0.726)  -1.099 (1.172) 
 Public Employees 0.538 (0.280)  0.391 (0.291)  0.531 (0.354) 
 Dues / RTW 0.138 (0.396)  0.176 (0.401)  -0.814 (0.699) 
 Politics -1.637* (0.825)  -1.575 (0.828)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.198* (0.960)  1.289* (0.548)  1.034 (0.806) 
 Strikes 0.435 (1.421)  0.336 (1.539)  1.663 (2.092) 
 Teachers -0.188 (0.370)  -0.532 (0.405)  -0.515 (0.615) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill 
outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses 
logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
 
 
Although any legislator can propose a bill, all legislators must vote on it if the bill 
advances to the floor. Therefore, I am also interested in how campaign donations to all 
legislators in the state may affect the chances of a bill passing. Table 7.4 displays three models  
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examining how corporate elite campaign donations to all legislators in a state (measured as the 
log of the mean donation) predicts the bill’s outcome. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to 
predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the 
trichotomized outcome variable (failed in committee, failed on chamber floor, or passed). Model 
3 uses logistic regression to predict whether the bill passed (versus all failures).  
Model 1 reveals a significant and positive relationship between the average donation 
from the corporate elite to all legislators in a state and the bill’s outcome (b=0.439, p<0.001). 
This means that when the corporate elite donate more money, on average, to legislators in the 
state, there is a significant increase in the cumulative odds of the bill moving through the 
legislative process.  
Model 2, which uses the trichotomous outcome measure, has a similar finding that 
increased donations to the legislators in a state are significantly associated with the bill moving 
forward (b=0.620, p<0.001).  
Model 3 finds no significant relationship between state-average corporate elite campaign 
donations, but again this may be due to the loss in variation when using a dichotomous variable. 
However, in general I find that when the corporate elite donate more money to legislators in a 
state, anti-labor bills have increased odds of moving through the legislative process. This 
includes moving from committees and onto the floor and also being voted for on the floor. 
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Table 7.4: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on State Average Corporate Elite Donations 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Average Campaign Donation in State (ln $)       
 Corporate Elite 0.439*** (0.130)  0.620*** (0.143)  0.360 (0.194) 
 Labor -0.420** (0.146)  -0.583*** (0.142)  -0.488** (0.185) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.158 (0.707)  0.645 (0.688)  1.237 (1.084) 
 Governor=Rep. 0.026 (0.343)  0.191 (0.389)  -0.042 (1.055) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 0.848 (0.590)  2.064*** (0.610)  2.128 (1.665) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.827 (0.460)  -0.344 (0.422)  0.329 (0.380) 
         
Constituent Characteristics          
 % Black -0.112** (0.043)  -0.075 (0.043)  0.051 (0.056) 
 % Foreign born -0.047 (0.065)  -0.054 (0.078)  0.188 (0.181) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.149* (0.076)  0.178* (0.077)  0.240 (0.161) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.308* (0.131)  0.351** (0.133)  0.263 (0.239) 
 % in FIRE -0.402 (0.259)  -0.165 (0.367)  -1.001 (0.733) 
 % in Agriculture -0.744 (0.544)  -0.476 (0.528)  -0.350 (0.972) 
 % Unemployed 0.530 (0.377)  0.462 (0.401)  -0.568 (0.601) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.190 (0.122)  -0.328* (0.155)  0.106 (0.185) 
 Average Age 0.371 (0.207)  0.300 (0.179)  0.055 (0.408) 
 % Own Home -0.181* (0.078)  -0.275** (0.101)  0.067 (0.125) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.881 (0.876)  0.551 (0.973)  1.399 (1.175) 
 Elections 0.130 (0.744)  -0.038 (0.736)  -1.078 (1.092) 
 Public Employees 0.531* (0.251)  0.358 (0.277)  0.502 (0.308) 
 Dues / RTW 0.209 (0.413)  0.181 (0.416)  -0.788 (0.709) 
 Politics -1.604 (0.860)  -1.663 (0.873)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.045* (1.019)  1.101 (0.589)  0.874 (0.801) 
 Strikes 0.601 (1.714)  0.360 (1.726)  1.746 (2.575) 
 Teachers -0.217 (0.397)  -0.564 (0.441)  -0.516 (0.620) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 uses ordered logistic regression to predict ordinal scale (1-6) of bill 
outcomes. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict trichotomized scale (0, 1, or 2) of bill outcomes. Model 3 uses 
logistic regression to predict dichotomized outcome (pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
 
Table 7.5 extends the analyses in the previous tables by combining whether the sponsor 
received any campaign donations from the corporate elite and the state’s average donations from 
the corporate elite.  
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Table 7.5: Regressions of Bill Outcomes on State Average and Individual Elite Donations 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Average Campaign Donation in State (Thousands $)       
 Corporate Elite 0.339* (0.138)  0.515*** (0.153)  0.276 (0.181) 
 Labor -0.494** (0.152)  -0.608*** (0.159)  -0.524** (0.188) 
         
Campaign Donations to Bill Sponsor       
 Any Corp Elite Donations (=1) 0.664* (0.313)  0.652* (0.310)  0.559 (0.394) 
 Labor (ln%) 0.223* (0.109)  0.092 (0.099)  0.167 (0.142) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.243 (0.728)  0.547 (0.721)  1.237 (1.197) 
 Governor=Rep. -0.017 (0.359)  0.207 (0.410)  -0.165 (1.187) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 0.550 (0.583)  1.860** (0.664)  2.176 (1.882) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.826 (0.430)  -0.348 (0.404)  0.323 (0.374) 
         
Constituent Characteristics         
 % Black -0.101* (0.042)  -0.067 (0.045)  0.058 (0.060) 
 % Foreign born -0.050 (0.064)  -0.056 (0.081)  0.145 (0.197) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.138 (0.081)  0.173* (0.081)  0.199 (0.164) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.291* (0.134)  0.339* (0.138)  0.229 (0.242) 
 % in FIRE -0.401 (0.255)  -0.159 (0.414)  -0.959 (0.912) 
 % in Agriculture -0.597 (0.521)  -0.399 (0.532)  -0.381 (1.034) 
 % Unemployed 0.517 (0.389)  0.435 (0.418)  -0.464 (0.681) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.156 (0.113)  -0.307 (0.174)  0.044 (0.207) 
 Average Age 0.335 (0.196)  0.269 (0.183)  0.090 (0.411) 
 % Own Home -0.167* (0.072)  -0.273* (0.110)  0.022 (0.134) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.597 (1.050)  0.336 (1.104)  1.022 (1.347) 
 Elections -0.086 (0.715)  -0.258 (0.697)  -1.274 (1.050) 
 Public Employees 0.491 (0.287)  0.325 (0.308)  0.529 (0.343) 
 Dues / RTW 0.078 (0.400)  0.087 (0.404)  -0.886 (0.695) 
 Politics -1.702* (0.842)  -1.727* (0.857)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.005* (0.989)  1.005 (0.584)  0.851 (0.783) 
 Strikes 0.397 (1.585)  0.215 (1.708)  1.654 (2.459) 
 Teachers -0.213 (0.381)  -0.577 (0.411)  -0.455 (0.632) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Model 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the 
ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized 
scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome 
(pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Like Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4, Model 1 of Table 7.5 uses ordered logistic regression to 
predict the six-category outcome variable. Model 2 uses ordered logistic regression to predict the 
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trichotomized outcome variable. Model 3 uses logistic regression to predict whether the bill 
passed (versus all failures).  
In Model 1, I find that the average amount of money donated from the corporate elite to 
state legislators has a significant, positive effect on the odds of the bill moving through the 
legislative process, independent of whether the sponsor of the bill received corporate elite 
campaign donations (b=0339, p<0.05). Figure 7.4 displays the predicted probabilities of each of 
the outcome categories across three values of average campaign donation: $500, $1,000, and 
$2,000. 
Figure 7.4: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Outcomes, Ordered Measure 
 
139 
 
Although the greatest probability across all donation values is failure in the first committee, a bill 
proposed in a state where the corporate elite gave an average of $250 to legislators has a greater 
probability (p=0.80) than a bill proposed in a state where the legislators gave an average of 
$2,000 per legislator (p=0.67). Further, the probability of an anti-labor bill passing is almost 
twice as high for bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 
(p=0.12) as bills proposed in states where the corporate elite only noted an average of $250 per 
legislator (p=0.07). 
In Model 2, which uses the trichotomous outcome measure, I find that increased 
donations to the legislators in a state are significantly associated with the bill moving forward, 
independent of whether the sponsor received corporate elite campaign donations (b=0.515, 
p<0.001). Figure 7.5 displays the predicted probabilities of each of the three outcome categories 
across three values of average campaign donation: $500, $1,000, and $2,000. 
Figure 7.5: Predicted Probabilities of Bill Outcomes, Trichotomized 
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As in Figure 7.4, it is clear that bills are still most likely to fail in committees rather than 
on the floor. However, anti-labor bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated little 
money to legislators on average had a higher probability of failing in a committee (p=0.85) than 
bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 per legislator 
(p=0.66). Bills proposed in states where the corporate elite donated an average of $2,000 per 
legislator had a probability of passing nearly three times as high (p=0.14) as bills proposed in 
states where the corporate elite donated very little money (p=0.05). 
In sum, these results show that corporate elite campaign donations can help influence 
legislators beyond simply proposing anti-labor bills. Corporate elite money appears to also 
influence legislative voting, as evidenced by the fact that bills proposed in states where the 
corporate elite donate more money to more legislators have a greater chance of passing. In the 
next section, I examine the three-step process of campaign donations leading to increased 
legislative effort leading to increased anti-labor political outcomes. 
Descriptive Results: Mediation Analysis 
Finally, I conduct a mediation analysis to directly model the indirect effect of corporate 
elite campaign donations on anti-labor bill passage through increased bill proposals. Previously, 
Figure 7.1 outlined a conceptual model arguing a three-way causal path: (1) elite capital 
investment in the form of campaign donations leads to (2) increased legislative effort in the form 
of increased anti-labor proposals, which in turn leads to (3) legislative outcomes, in this case, 
new anti-labor laws. I now use the Aggregated Dataset to test this conceptual model. Table 7.5 
provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the mediation analysis. Note that with 
an N of 50, the model is simplified, removing variables that have consistently been unrelated to 
outcomes in previous analyses. 
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Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics, Aggregated by State 
Variable Range 
Mean (sd)  
or % 
Anti-Labor Bills   
  Anti-Labor Bills Passed   0.00 –   6.00 0.86 (1.58) 
  Anti-Labor Bills Proposed    0.00 – 50.00 14.30 (16.44) 
   
Campaign Donations (logged thousand $)   
  Average Donations from Corp. Elite  0.00 – 2.48 0.48 (0.55) 
  Average Donations from Labor   0.01 – 4.93 1.66 (1.17) 
  Average Donations from Non-Elite Business  0.03 – 4.07 1.86 (1.04) 
   
Political Climate   
  Pro-Labor Environment 0.00 – 1.00 24% 
  Governor=Republican 0.00 – 1.00 58% 
  Chamber = Republican Majority 0.00 – 1.00 54% 
   
Constituent Characteristics    
  % Black  0.40 – 37.21   10.13 (9.56) 
  % Employed in Manufacturing   2.41 – 14.55  8.15 (2.73) 
  % Employed in Agriculture 0.93 – 6.36   2.26 (1.28) 
  % < Poverty Line  11.04 – 25.01   17.01 (3.07) 
  Average Age  31.83 – 40.67 37.59 (1.53) 
  % Own Homes 55.84 – 75.59 68.36 (4.15) 
Note: N=50   
 
Although anti-labor bills were proposed in most states (with an average of 14 proposals 
per state), 32 states did not pass any anti-labor bills into legislation. The mean of the count is 
0.86. The average campaign donation per legislator from the corporate elite was $929 (with a 
logged average of 2.5), and the average campaign donation per legislator from labor was over 
$10,912 (with a logged average of 1.66). Although organized labor donated a lot more than the 
corporate elite on average, recall that the corporate elite is a small subset of business. The 
average campaign donation per legislator from non-elite businesses was $ 9,672 (with a logged 
average of 1.86). 
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Multivariate Results: Mediation Analysis 
Table 7.7 provides the results of the counterfactual mediation analysis (see Chapter 3, 
especially Equations 3.1-3.3, for a detailed discussion of these methods). Model 1 predicts the 
mediator, which is the number of anti-labor bills proposed. The results show that the average 
corporate elite donation in the state is associated with an increase in anti-labor bill proposals in 
that state (b=15.849, p<0.01). Model 2 predicts the count of anti-labor bills passed, while 
including the mediator. Not surprisingly, the number of anti-labor bills proposed in a state is 
positively associated with the number of anti-labor bills that are passed (b=0.062, p<0.001). This 
means that for every anti-labor bill that is proposed, we can expect an increased count of anti-
labor bills passed by 0.062; put another way, we can expect an increase of one anti-labor bill 
passed for every 16 anti-labor bills proposed in a state (recall again that the average state 
proposed 14 anti-labor bills). The average corporate elite donation is not significant in Model 2, 
suggesting complete mediation.  
Table 7.7: Counterfactual Mediation Analysis 
  
(1) 
Anti-Labor Bills Proposed 
 (2) 
Anti-Labor Bills Passed 
 b (S.E.)  b (S.E.) 
Avg. Corp Elite Donation 15.849 (5.854)***  0.179 (0.55) 
Anti-Labor Bills Proposed  0.062 (0.01)*** 
Pro-Labor Environment -5.105 (5.29)  -0.043 (0.50) 
Avg. Labor Donation 5.506 (3.46)  -0.77 (0.39)** 
Avg. Non-Elite Business -9.231 (4.14)**  1.031 (4.97) 
Rep. Gov. -0.360 (4.94)  0.275 (0.58) 
Republican Majority in State 8.727 (5.47)  1.021 (0.85)** 
% Black -0.325 (0.27)  -0.034 (0.04) 
% Manufacturing 1.706 (0.86)  0.102 (0.09) 
% Agriculture -4.582 (1.90)**  -0.219 (0.34) 
% < Poverty Line -0.548 (0.75)  0.018 (0.11) 
Avg. Age 2.457 (1.40)  0.350 (0.21) 
% Own Homes -0.876 (0.62)   -0.069 (0.07) 
Notes: N=50; asterisks indicate significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Figure 7.6 provides a causal diagram of the counterfactual mediation presented above and 
includes the Natural Indirect Effect (NIE) of corporate elite donations on the number of anti-
labor bills passing (2.087, p<0.05) and the Total Effect (TE, 2.388, p<0.10). The NIE gives an 
estimate of the indirect effect of corporate elite donations on anti-labor bill passage through the 
pathway of increased bill proposals. Specifically, for every standard deviation increase in 
average donations to the legislators in a state (here it is about $1,700), there is an expected 
increase of about two more anti-labor bills passed. This is due to the increase in anti-labor bill 
proposals. 
Figure 7.6: Counterfactual Mediation Results 
 
Notes: NIE= Natural Indirect Effect; CDE= Controlled Direct Effect; TE= Total Effect 
Coefficients based on models in Table 7.7, asterisks indicate significance: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
 
 
 
 
Corporate Elite 
Donations 
Proposed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 
Passed Anti-Labor 
Legislation 0.179 (n.s.) 
15.849*** 
0.062*** 
 NIE:  2.182** 
 CDE: 1.144 (n.s.) 
 TE:    2.388 * 
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The Controlled Direct Effect (CDE) is not significant, which indicates that there is 
complete mediation. By dividing the NIE by the TE, I am able to calculate the proportion 
mediated:  
Equation 7.1: Proportion Mediated 
   
𝑁𝐼𝐸
𝑇𝐸
=
2.182
2.388
= 0.914 
The proportion mediated can be understood as the amount of the independent variable’s 
(corporate elite donations) effect on the dependent variable (number of anti-labor bills passed) 
that is due to the mediator variable (anti-labor proposals). The result is 0.914, which means that 
if we were able to eliminate the effect of elite campaign donations on anti-labor bill proposals, 
we could reduce the impact of elite donations on anti-labor bill implementation by about 91 
percent.  
Discussion 
The previous two chapters demonstrated that donations from the corporate elite influence 
legislative behaviors by increasing anti-labor bill proposals. In this chapter, I focused on 
outcomes, or where these bills ended in the legislative process. Specifically, I asked the 
following questions: Do corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes? Do 
corporate elite donations shape anti-labor legislative outcomes by encouraging anti-labor 
legislative effort?  
In the first half of this chapter, I used the bill as the unit of analysis to examine the odds 
of an anti-labor bill moving forward through the legislative process. While I found that the 
amount of money that the corporate elite donated to anti-labor bill sponsor was unrelated to bill 
outcomes, the dichotomous measure of any donation did significantly increase the odds of anti-
145 
 
labor bills moving through the legislative process. Further, I found that the state average of 
corporate elite donations to legislators was also positively associated with the likelihood of anti-
labor bill passage, even when controlling for donations to a bill’s sponsor. This means that when 
the corporate elite donate more money to the legislators in a state, anti-labor legislation is more 
likely to be signed into law. These findings support the theory of elite class dominance, and the 
Donations-As-Relationships Model. Recipients of elite donations do not just propose more anti-
labor bills; they also appear to act on behalf of the elite by ensuring these bills move through the 
legislative process. 
In the second half of the chapter, I employed a counterfactual mediation model to 
examine the three-step relationship between corporate elite campaign donations, bill proposals, 
and anti-labor bill outcomes. Here, the state (N=50) was the unit of analysis. I found that the 
positive association between corporate elite campaign donations and the likelihood of anti-labor 
bill passage is explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals in a given state. Thus, I 
found support for my theoretical model first introduced in Chapter 2: elite capital investment 
(campaign donations) leads to increased legislative effort on behalf of the elite (increased anti-
labor bill proposals), which in turn leads to political outcomes that favor the corporate elite 
(increased anti-labor bills passing). This means that when the corporate elite donate more money 
to legislators, these legislators are likely to propose more anti-labor bills. My results estimate that 
when the corporate elite increase their average donations to legislators in a state by about $1,700, 
we can expect approximately two more anti-labor bills to be passed in this state, due the increase 
in anti-labor bill proposals.  
The proportion mediated calculated from the counterfactual mediation analyses suggested 
that if we were able to eliminate the effect of corporate elite campaign donations on anti-labor 
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bill proposals, we could reduce the impact of elite donations on anti-labor bill implementation by 
about 91 percent. Therefore, if any serious reforms are going to be made to tackle the elite’s 
influence on regressive labor law, they should begin by focusing on campaign donations from 
the corporate elite. 
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 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Review of Main Findings 
This dissertation began with a simple question: Does money influence legislative actors? 
Specifically, I have examined if and how campaign contributions from the corporate elite 
influence both legislative behavior and political outcomes. Table 8.1 summarizes my hypotheses 
and the support I found for them. 
Table 8.1: Support for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H 5.1:  Corporate elite donations will be positively associated with anti-
labor bill proposals. 
Yes 
H 6.1: The positive association between corporate elite donations and anti-
labor bill proposals will be stronger in pro-labor states.  
Yes 
H 6.2: Legislators in pro-labor states will be more likely to have received 
money from corporate elite donors. 
Yes 
H 6.3: Legislators in pro-labor states will have a larger number of 
corporate elite donors. 
Yes 
H 6.4: Legislators in pro-labor states will receive more money from 
corporate elite donors. 
Yes 
H 7.1:  Corporate elite donations to bill sponsors will be positively 
associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.  
Partial 
H 7.2: The state average of corporate elite donations to legislators will be 
positively associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage.  
Partial 
H 7.3: The positive association between corporate elite donations and the 
likelihood of anti-labor bill passage will be mediated or explained by the 
frequency of anti-labor bill proposals. 
Yes 
 
In Chapter 5 I tested different theoretical relationships between business and anti-labor 
bill proposals. First, I measured business as a homogenous group, as most of the research tends 
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to do (e.g., Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Balwdin and Magee 2000; Magee 2002; 
Startmann 1991). I found no relationship between overall business donations and anti-labor bill 
proposals. Then, following research that suggests segmented capital might have industry-specific 
effects (e.g., Luke and Krauss 2004) or that the corporate elite is fractured (e.g., Mizruchi 2013), 
I examined how different industries may affect anti-labor bill proposals. Again, I found no 
significant relationships. Following research that demonstrates how powerful the Chamber of 
Commerce was in 1930’s-era policy planning (e.g., Aaron 1958; Domhoff 1996; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010), I also tested if donations from national, state, and local Chambers of Commerce 
predicted anti-labor bill proposals. Again, I found no influence. Finally, following elite class 
dominance theory (e.g., Clawson, Neustadtl, and Scott 1993; Domhoff 2014, 1990, 1996; Mills 
1959; Useem 1986), I split business donations into two groups: corporate elite and non-elite 
business.  In support of Hypothesis 5.1, I demonstrated that campaign contributions from the 
corporate elite are positively associated with legislative effort; specifically, greater corporate 
elite donations were associated with higher Anti-Labor Scores. In other words, among state 
legislators in office during 2012, those who received campaign donations from the elite 
corporations proposed more anti-labor bills and fewer pro-labor bills. 
In Chapter 6, I addressed the question of homophily and diffusion by examining how 
political climate moderates the relationships established in Chapter 5. According to the 
Donations-As-Votes model, I hypothesized that if financial relationships between the corporate 
elite and legislators were due to homphily, we would see no variation in the effect of corporate 
donors across political climate. According to the Donation-as-Relationships model, I 
hypothesized if the financial relationship was due to ideological diffusion we would find 
evidence of strategy. In support of the Donations-As-Relationships model (network diffusion) 
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and Hypothesis 6.1, I found that these relationships are much stronger in labor-friendly 
environments. In other words, corporate donors exert more influence on legislators proposing 
anti-labor bills in states that are pro-labor. In support of the idea that the corporate elite are 
strategic in donating money, Hypothesis 6.2 argued that legislators in pro-labor states would be 
more likely to have received money from corporate elite donors, Hypothesis 6.3 stated that 
legislators in pro-labor states would have a larger number of corporate elite donors, and 
Hypothesis 6.4 predicted that legislators in pro-labor states would receive more money from 
corporate elite donors. In support of these three hypotheses, I found that the corporate elite 
donate more money, more often, to more legislators in labor-friendly states. This again suggests 
that the corporate elite are being strategic: they are focusing their money and influence in states 
where they currently have less secure power. These results support power structure research by 
finding that the power elite are strategic, focusing their energy where their influence is required 
most. 
In Chapter 7, I demonstrated that the relationship between elite capital investment and 
legislative effort extends to political outcomes. 
I hypothesized that corporate elite donations to bill sponsors would be positively 
associated with the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage (H 7.1), and that the state average of 
corporate elite donations to legislators would be positively associated with the likelihood of anti-
labor bill passage (H 7.2). I found partial support for these hypotheses. Specifically, anti-labor 
bills that were (a) proposed by legislators who received any money (vs. no money) from the 
corporate elite and (b) proposed in chambers where the average legislator received more money 
from the corporate elite are more likely to be passed (however, I did not find a relationship 
between the continuous amount of corporate money donated to a bill sponsor and the bill’s 
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outcome). These findings are important because they show that corporate elite donations do not 
only influence bill proposals, but bill passage. Further, I hypothesized that the positive 
association between corporate elite donations and the likelihood of anti-labor bill passage would 
be mediated or explained by the frequency of anti-labor bill proposals (H7.3). Using the 
aggregated state-level dataset, a counterfactual mediation test supported this hypothesis by 
showing that the relationship between elite capital investment and political outcomes is entirely 
mediated by legislative effort. Although these findings seem intuitive, this is the first study to my 
knowledge that explicitly tests these links. I find that when the average donations form the 
corporate elite to legislators in a given state increases by around $1,500, we can expect about two 
anti-labor bills to be signed into law, and this is entirely due to the fact that elite capital 
investment leads to increased anti-labor legislative effort. 
Historical Context: What is Generalizable?  
Overall, these findings suggest that campaign donations are an important mechanism 
through which the corporate elite exert influence over legislative behavior and policy. Because 
all of the bills analyzed in this project were proposed in 2012, it is important to think about this 
unique historical context. Specifically, while some of these findings are likely generalizable 
across time, others are likely to be time-specific.  
I find that business as a whole has no effect on the behavior of legislators, while 
corporate elite businesses do have an effect. I argue that the role of elite businesses is 
generalizable. This can help to explain why many studies of campaign donations find no effect 
on political behavior: they do not differentiate between elite and non-elite business (e.g., 
Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Austen-Smith 1995; Bronars and Lott 1997; Chappell 1981, 1982; 
Evans 1986; Grenzke 1989; Kau & Rubin 1982; Levitt 1991; Wright 1985, 1989). This can also 
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help to explain the seemingly inconsistent findings by pluralist and institutionalist political 
scientists and elite theorists. Elite class dominance theory contends that the capitalist class has 
and will continue to work towards securing their own power and weakening the power of the 
working classes that oppose them. This theory, supported by my results, is consistent over time. 
For example, Domhoff and Webber (2011) demonstrated how the power elite worked to shape 
New Deal policies after World War II to favor the capitalist class, and other research has 
demonstrated that the corporate elite helped shape the spread of neoliberal policy in the 1970’s 
(Burris 1992; Domhoff 2014; Mizruchi 2013).   
Clawson and colleagues’ (1993) study of corporate PAC directors sheds more light on 
this trend. When asked how they would reach politicians if the PAC mechanism was abolished, 
for example, one director said that they revert to the “old system,” where companies “put a 
whole bag of money together and brought it to the member and said ‘Here.’ By the way, not a 
bad idea—I am not sure it was any better or any worse than anything else” (Clawson et al 
1993:195). In response to the same question, another director said: 
“I’d still have a job. It would take a little different avenue, a different track. Somebody 
still has to represent the company. … I would suggest that my salary would go up and I 
would make a lot more personal contributions. … There are wats around it. The system is 
dynamic. By the time they change, it’s too late” (Clawson et al. 1993:195-196). 
Clawson and colleagues’ findings support elite class dominance theory. If one avenue of exerting 
influence over politicians is shut down, members of the corporate elite admit they would simply 
find new avenues (or revert to old ones). 
In sum, while the specific mechanism of influence (campaign donations) is not 
necessarily generalizable over time, the pattern of influence is. It is not just that business always 
seeks to influence, but that the corporate elite specifically act as a leading edge of business 
political action, and they continue to wield influence over time. Thus, while the elite may have 
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used different mechanisms in the New Deal compared to today, they were influencing policy 
nonetheless. 
Historical Context: Why Now and Not Before?  
If the capitalist class always attempts to weaken labor power and exert influence over 
politics in the US, the question becomes why does the specific mechanism of campaign 
donations leading to state-level anti-labor legislation hold today? That is, why now, and not 
before? I discuss a few possibilities in this section, but it should be noted that these are simply 
speculations—they are not definitive, nor are they mutually exclusive.  
Although my dissertation examines all anti-collective bargaining bills, it his helpful to 
focus on the patterns in RTW legislation over time. Figure 8.1 depicts the number of RTW laws 
enacted by decade. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a significant number of states enacted RTW 
legislation shortly after the passage of Taft-Hartley, with 17 states having done so by the end of 
the 1950s. We then see a significant lull in RTW legislation from the 1950s until 2010, with only 
one new RTW law being enacted each decade. 
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Figure 8.1: Right to Work Laws Enacted, 1940-2016 
 
Why was there a lull in RTW legislation for over 50 years? Why has there been a recent 
resurgence in the last six years? One possibility is that the labor movement was much stronger 
from 1945 until the mid-70’s and into the 80’s, meaning that while the capitalist class was able to 
enact RTW laws immediately after Taft-Hartley (and mostly in the non-industrialized South), 
they may have been blocked by the countervailing labor forces for the next several decades. 
Once unions began to decline precipitously in the 80’s and 90’s (Clawson and Clawson 1999; 
Tope and Jacobs 2009), the corporate elite may have had no real motivation to target the labor 
movement. During this time, we see a greater focus on legislation pushing economic 
deregulation and free trade. After the 2007 economic crash and the subsequent Great Recession, 
we have seen a resurgence of mobilization among the general populace, as evidenced by popular 
movements such as Occupy Wall Street. Unions do not have the financial resources to contribute 
as much to campaigns as large corporations, and now they also do not have the structural 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
R
TW
 L
aw
s 
En
ac
te
d
Aggregate Passed That Decade
154 
 
leverage of numbers to influence politicians. In this context, the capitalist class may now be 
targeting labor-friendly states and passing RTW laws before there is a revitalized labor 
movement powerful enough to challenge them. 
Another reason that corporate elite campaign donations might be a more useful 
mechanism for the elite to exert influence today could be the fact that it is much more expensive 
to run for political office than it used to be. Although it has always cost money to win an election 
in the US—for example, many attribute George Washington’s 1755 electoral loss for Virginia’s 
House of Burgesses to his lack of gifting voters hard alcohol (Gaughan 2012; Randall 1998)— 
the cost of running a successful campaign has increased drastically over the last several decades 
(Bartels 2008; Ornstein et al. 2014). For example, after adjusting for inflation, the average cost 
of a winning an election for the US House of Representatives rose from $753,274 in 1986 to 
$1,596,953 in 2012 (Ornstein et al. 2014). Similarly, the average cost of a winning a US Senate 
election rose from about 6.4 million dollars in 1986 to 10.4 million dollars in 2012, after 
adjusting for inflation (Ornstein et al. 2014). As political campaigns become increasingly 
expensive, candidates become increasingly dependent on campaign donors. This creates an 
opportunity for wealthy individuals and corporations to contribute much needed resources to 
candidates, which may mean politicians are particularly beholden to their donors in the current 
era of politics. 
Another important and related change over time is the increasingly relaxed regulations 
surrounding campaign donations. A series of US Supreme Court rulings have allowed for more 
money from corporations to finance campaigns. For example, the 1990 ruling in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 US 652) ruled that while corporations may not use their 
own treasury to contribute to political campaigns, they may establish separate accounts in PACs 
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that can donate. The 2006 decision on Randall v. Sorrell (548 US 230) ruled that states must 
ensure that contribution limits are high enough to enable the candidate to run an effective 
campaign. Finally, the highly-politicized 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission (558 US 310) ruled that states may not place limits on the amount of money 
corporations, PACs, and other organizations use for election communications so long as the 
group does not directly align itself with a candidate. While Citizens United focused on 
independent expenditures, (i.e., it did not rule that direct contributions should be limitless) 
research suggests that some states have increased their limits on direct donations in response 
(Torchinsky and Reese 2016). 
Further, state-level elections do not always have the same rules concerning donations that 
federal elections do18. States are allowed to set their own limits, if any, to the amount individuals 
and groups can donate to politicians. Twelve states (Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia) currently 
impose no contribution limits on individual donors. Among those that do, individual donation 
caps run anywhere from $170 (Montana’s limits for State House and State Senate) to $50,000 
(New York’s limit for Governor), and some states allow for even larger amounts from PACs 
(e.g., Connecticut has a $100,000 limit for PACs). Because there is much less regulation of 
campaign contributions at the state level, it is possible that the use of campaign donations to 
exert influence over politicians is particularly strong for state politics. 
In sum, I argue that the capitalist class attempts to weaken labor power and exert 
influence over politics in the US, and this is consistent across time. What does appear to change, 
however, is the mechanism through which the corporate elite exert their influence. Currently, one 
                                                 
18 For a review, see NCSL (2016), “State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, 2015-2016 Election Cycle” 
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of the mechanisms is that of corporate elite campaign donations leading to state-level anti-labor 
legislation. When considering the unique point in history—with a weakened labor movement, a 
populace more skeptical of income inequality than previous decades, and increasingly 
deregulated campaign finance laws—it makes sense that the corporate elite use campaign 
donations to exert influence over legislators in states where their power is less secure. 
Implications  
Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation has important theoretical, methodological, and policy implications. In 
Chapter 2, I introduced a theoretical model that traces how the capitalist class dominate 
American politics. It begins, I argue, with elite capital investment, measured in terms of 
campaign donations. Donations from the elite represent gifts that are part of long-term social 
relationships, and these gifts leave legislators beholden unto their donors. I find that increased 
corporate elite campaign donations lead to more anti-labor legislative effort, by proposing more 
anti-labor bills and fewer pro-labor bills. This effort can be understood as reciprocity on the part 
of politicians to their donors. This legislative effort in turn produces more anti-labor political 
outcomes, or more regressive labor legislation that is signed into law. My theoretical model also 
shows that elite investment in legislators is strategic, as they focus their money and influence on 
legislators in labor-friendly states. This strategy supports the idea that donations are indeed about 
exerting influence over legislators.   
Methodological Implications 
There are several methodological implications as well. First, I build on previous work by 
measuring business as heterogeneous rather than homogenous. Specifically, I measure the effect 
of corporate elite campaign donations as separate from non-elite business donations. The fact 
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that I consistently find no effect for business as a whole, but find robust effects for corporate elite 
donations, speaks to the seemingly inconsistent findings among research testing the effect of 
business donations on legislative behavior. Part of this inconsistency, it seems, is how 
researchers both theorize and measure business interests.   
Second, I move the research forward by focusing on the state level rather than the federal 
level. Currently, the vast majority of research focuses on federal policy. The move to state-level 
analyses is important because this allows for comparisons across political climates and 
legislative institutions.   
Third, this comprehensive dataset of all bills proposed allows for formal statistical tests 
of significance, rather than only looking at individual cases. While previous work using case 
studies of individual laws and interviews with politicians have been informative, this dataset 
allows for me to specify the extent to which donations influence legislative behavior. 
Lastly, by examining the complete universe of proposed bills, I am able to correct for 
selection bias in previous work. Further, bill proposals are likely a better estimate of ideology 
and influence than roll-call votes, as voting is almost entirely along party lines rather than 
ideology. 
Implications for Policy  
This dissertation also has policy implications. Recent research suggests that it is the 
opinions and preferences of the corporate elite that drive policy in the US, rather than public 
opinion (Gilens and Page 2014). This is despite the fact that the public is generally distrusting of 
large corporations and frustrated with corporate influence on politics. The public’s frustration is 
especially evident in the overwhelming popular support for politicians like Bernie Sanders and 
Elizabeth Warren, as well as movements such as Occupy Wall Street. The fact that the public is 
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concerned with corporate power, yet nothing seems to be done, can be unsettling. If campaign 
finance reforms are going to be made, they require a better understanding of the exact 
mechanisms of corporate influence on legislative behavior. This work explicates these 
mechanisms. It all begins, at least in part, with corporate elite investment in legislative 
campaigns. 
Implications for Economic Inequality 
A final important implication is about economic inequality more broadly. We live in a 
time where economic inequality is the highest it has ever been since the Great Depression, and 
much of this can be attributed to a weakened labor movement (Bartels 2008; Cornfield 1991; 
Western and Rosenfeld 2011). The purpose of any labor movement is to protect the workers 
from exploitation as much as possible, for labor is, by definition, always at odds with capital 
(Perlman 1928). Labor unions act as a buffer to inequality by bringing workers together, 
ensuring fair treatment, raising wages through collective bargaining, pooling resources, and 
threatening capital with collective action (Brady et al. 2013; Cornfield and Fletcher 2001). One 
of the main consequences of a weakened labor movement is increased economic inequality 
(Bartels 2008; Wallerstein and Western 2001; Western 1994).  
Western and Rosenfeld’s (2011) research found that union decline explains roughly one-
third of the increase in economic inequality among fulltime workers, regardless of union 
affiliation. Unions, they argue, do not only work to increase union members’ wages, but unions 
also function to equalize wages for nonunion workers in two ways. First, unions create the threat 
of unionization; when there is a large union presence, employers tend to raise the wages of their 
workers to preempt any organizing. Second, unions work to increase nonunion wages by setting 
norms for equality and justice. Specifically, unions promote “a moral economy that 
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institutionalize[s] norms for fair pay, even for nonunion workers” (Western and Rosenfeld 
2011:514). Therefore, union decline contributes to rising inequality by (1) taking away the power 
of once-organized workers to gain higher wages, (2) removing the threat of unionization, which 
allowed employers to have the upper-hand in wage-setting, and (3) undermining the cultural 
norms of fairness and equality and contributing to the norms of antipathy toward unions.  
Further, Brady and colleagues (2013) found that unionization was a stronger predictor of 
working poverty status than a state’s welfare policies, GDP per capita, or unemployment rate. 
Unions not only help the unionized working poor, they also improve the conditions for women, 
the under-educated, and racial and ethnic minorities. Similar to Western and Rosenfeld (2011), 
they argue that “unionization is a key institution in shaping working poverty,” because unions 
raise wages and benefits and reorganize the distribution of resources, increase opportunity by 
protecting quality jobs, and normalize expectations of equity (Brady et al. 2013:888). The 
continued decline in unions, therefore, has huge implications for the working poor in the US.  
Taken together, this means that the corporate elite’s influence on labor legislation will not 
only diminish the strength of unions and the US labor movement, but will also serve to produce 
inequality as a whole. By limiting the power of organized labor, these enacted anti-labor laws 
will perpetuate—and perhaps exacerbate—the trend of increased economic inequality in the US, 
an era that Bartels (2008) calls the “New Gilded Age.” 
Limitations 
Cross-Sectional Data 
 
This dissertation has several limitations. First, my data are cross-sectional, which makes 
arguments about causality difficult. Although cross-sectional data may be a limitation, the 
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alternative is also problematic. In order to examine changes in corporate donations and changes 
in legislative effort, it would require only examining incumbents, and thus limiting my sample 
size, and introducing selection bias. Further, I would likely have to limit my sample to legislators 
who served during the same years, and states vary widely by their election years and term 
lengths.  
Consider the example of examining changes in donations and changes in bill proposals 
between 2010 and 2014. In 2010, 88 of the 99 state legislative chambers held elections.  The 
eleven chambers without elections were the upper and lower houses in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
New Jersey and Virginia, and the upper house (senate) in Kansas, New Mexico and South 
Carolina. Thus, longitudinal study during this time would already lose analyses of four states, 
and one chamber in three other states.  
Further, the legislators elected in 2010 would be up for re-election at different times. In 
both state senates and assemblies/houses, the term lengths vary widely across states (Ballotpedia 
2016a). For example, there are 12 states (AZ, CT, GA, ID, MA, ME, NC, NH, NY, RI, SD, and 
VT) where senators have two-year terms and therefore have elections every two years. In eight 
other states (AR, DE, FL, HI, IL, MN, NJ, and TX), senators have what is known as 2-4-4 terms 
(two four-year terms followed by one two-year term), which allows senate elections to reflect 
decennial census estimates. In the other 30 states, state senators have four year terms. Further, of 
the 38 states wherein state senators have 4-year or 2-4-4-year terms, 27 of those states stagger 
elections so only half of the senate seats would be up for re-election every two years. Returning 
to the example of examining changes between 2010 to 2014, only half of the state senators in 27 
states would be up for re-election in 2010. Similar problems of varying term lengths exist among 
state representatives.  
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Finally, in 15 states, state legislators are subject to term limits. In 2012, for example, 79 
state senators (representing 15% of the 523 senate seats up for election) and 169 state 
representatives (representing 13% of the 1,263 seats up for election in lower-houses) were unable 
to run for re-election due to term limits (Ballotpedia 2016b). Thus, term limits would increase 
the number of legislators dropped if employing a longitudinal analysis. 
Politics or Policy Development? 
 
A second limitation is that I focus on politics more than policy development. Specifically, 
this dissertation does not address policy planning networks, think tanks, or the ways in which the 
legislators who propose and sponsor bills get their policy ideas (Domhoff and Webber 2011:23). 
Although this is true, the role of donations is undertheorized and even at times taken for granted 
among power structure researchers. These findings should be considered as complementary to 
previous work that emphasizes the importance of policy-planning network, and not contradictory 
to it, nor a substitute for it. 
Results Underestimate Impact of Corporate Elite 
 
Third, the results reported here are most likely underestimates. The measures I use for 
corporate influence are only legal, documented, financial donations to legislators’ most recent 
campaigns. I do not include “dark money” contributions or gifts (e.g., fancy dinners, exclusive 
club memberships, cars, designer watches). Therefore, the results shown only capture what is 
likely a small portion of total corporate elite donations. However, the fact that I do consistently 
find significant relationships between corporate donors and legislative behavior suggests that the 
relationships are there, they might just be even stronger. 
The Question of Influence 
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A final limitation is the question of influence. What exactly do I mean by influence? In 
the historic 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo (424 US:26), the US Supreme Court ruled that 
contribution limits to campaigns were constitutional because the government has a compelling 
interest in preventing “the actuality and the appearance of corruption,” and defined corruption as 
the use of campaign donations to bribe politicians in quid pro quo deals (see also Gaughan 
2012). So, is this bribery? Are votes being bought in this sense? The US Supreme Court 
unanimously overturned the corruption conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell 
because the Court’s “concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is 
instead with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of the 
federal bribery statute” (McDonnell v. United States 579 US). Because there was no evidence of 
quid pro quo bribery, McDonnell (in the eyes of the Supreme Court) should not have been 
convicted. Similarly, there is no smoking gun proof that money has been traded for bill proposals 
or votes. 
I believe that influence does not have to be quid pro quo bribery, nor does it necessarily 
mean changing the behavior of an individual such that a once pro-labor legislator begins 
supporting anti-labor bills. Influence can be making sure anti-labor legislators get re-elected, it 
can be helping to unseat pro-labor legislators, or it can be simply pushing an anti-labor legislator 
to introduce more anti-labor bills than he/she would have. Corporate funding can be a way of 
maintaining a relationship, rather than the purchase of services. Regardless, these findings show 
that the elite are being strategic and expect to get a return on their investment. 
Future Directions 
Future research should continue to build on this work in several ways. First, researchers 
should analyze the direct network ties of state legislators to the corporate elite. Are state 
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legislators simply funded by the corporate elite, or are they actual members of this class? 
Specifically, it would be interesting to examine how being a member of the corporate elite (e.g., 
Fortune 500 board membership, Chamber of Commerce membership, elite ties through marriage, 
attending an Ivy League school) differs from ties to the corporate elite (through campaign 
funding).   
Second, future research should consider examining changes in corporate funding and 
changes in anti-labor bill proposals over time, with the caveat that these analyses would require 
selecting only certain incumbents across specific election years. Despite the setback of selection 
biases, longitudinal analyses would allow for more rigorous tests of temporality (i.e., do 
donations influence one’s legislative behavior or does legislative behavior influence the 
donations one receives?). 
Third, it would be useful to extend this work qualitatively by examining the in-depth 
content of these bills. How do legislators talk about collective bargaining? How are unions 
framed? How are corporations characterized (or is the subject absent from these bills)? For 
example, RTW bills often emphasize the liberty and freedom, rather than class conflict, unions, 
or inequality. A 2012 RTW bill proposed by Hawaiin Senator Sam Slom (R), opens by stating: 
Regardless of an individual’s determination on [union] membership, the individual’s 
right to work must be protected.  Currently, the citizens of twenty-two U.S. states enjoy a 
freedom of choice in this regard….  It is time that this freedom of choice be made 
available to the citizens of this State.  The purpose of this Act is to protect the 
employability of persons who are not members of labor organizations.     
-Hawaii Senate Bill 278 (2012, emphasis added) 
Right-to-Work laws are also sometimes framed as a First Amendment issue, arguing that 
compulsory union dues are a violation of an individuals’ right to free speech and freedom to 
associate (or not to associate). Matt Patterson’s (2016) op-ed in Forbes argues that 
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Forced dues is forced association, a clear violation of both the letter and the spirit of 
freedom of assembly [which is protected by the First Amendment]. And since American 
labor unions are nakedly political enterprises, and support almost exclusively liberal 
causes and candidates, how is forcing non-liberal teachers to support that organization 
not a gross violation of their free speech protections? 
 -Patterson (2016, emphasis added) 
 
Considering the controversial nature of such legislation, future research would benefit from in-
depth analyses of the ways that these bills are framed to both legislatures and to the public.  
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, future research should consider theorizing the 
corporate elite and organized business from a social movement perspective. Often the corporate 
elite are theorized as highly influential, powerful individuals, or at best, a group of individuals.  
Recent research (e.g., Mizruchi 2013) argues that the capitalist class is fractured, and the 
corporate elite are more self-interested. My research suggests the exact opposite, that there is a 
corporate elite that is indeed unified.  As a class for themselves (Murray 2014), the corporate 
elite are being strategic in exerting influence over legislators, and understanding organized 
business as a social movement, or a counter-movement (in direct opposition to the labor 
movement) could be a useful avenue of future research.   
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Appendix A: Dropped Legislators 
Name State 
Donations 
Total Business 
Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Accornero, Harry NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Ahlgren, Christopher J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Albano, Nelson NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Allen, Mary M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Almy, Susan W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Alting, Ron J IN 4000 64858.48 6100 450 4000 
Altobello, Emil A (Buddy) CT -2068.65 295 0 0 0 
Antosz, Jason P NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Atkins, Kenneth W VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Avard, Kevin A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Awana, Karen Leinani HI 0 0 0 0 0 
Babson Jr, David L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Banks, James E IN 450 9564.75 500 125 450 
Bardon, Jeb IN 250 9300 500 0 250 
Baroody, Benjamin C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Barry, J Gail NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Barry, Richard W (Dick) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bates, David NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bauer, B Patrick IN 151500 159300 2000 4250 151500 
Beattie, Thomas L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Becker, Vaneta G IN 7750 20272 500 0 7750 
Behning, Robert W (Bob) IN 400 4300 500 600 400 
Belanger, Ronald J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bergevin, Jerry E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Berube, Roger R NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bishop, Wesley T LA 0 0 0 0 0 
Bissonnette, Clement VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Boehm, Ralph G NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolster, Peter S NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Boots, Phillip L (Phil) IN 1750 14800 800 750 1750 
Borders, Bruce Alan IN 1300 4550 0 0 1300 
Bosma, Brian C IN 5400 520800 6000 3600 5400 
Botzow Ii, William (Bill) VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Bouchard, Bob VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Bowers, Spec NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bradley, Lester W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Bray, Richard D IN 2450 10650 0 550 2450 
Breaux, Jean IN 2500 7800 300 500 2500 
Brennan, Patrick M VT 0 0 0 0 0 
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Name State 
Donations 
Total Business 
Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Broden, John Edward IN 7600 10500 800 300 7600 
Bromell Tinubu, Gloria GA 0 0 0 0 0 
Brown, Adam M IL 0 0 0 0 0 
Brown, Charlie IN 1250 5950 600 0 1250 
Brown, Julie M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Brown, Paul NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Brown, Timothy N (Tim) IN 500 6600 800 250 500 
Browne, Brendon S NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Brownrigg, Randy NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Brunelle, Michael NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Buck, James R (Jim) IN 500 6806.33 600 0 500 
Bulis, Lyle (Rusty) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Burke, Mollie S VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Burton, Charles (Woody) IN 450 29125 0 525 450 
Butynski, William (Bill) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Buxton, Michael NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Byrnes, John J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Cali-Pitts, Jacqueline NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Caruso, Christopher L CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Casey, Ron MO 0 0 0 0 0 
Cataldo, Sam A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Champagne, Norma Greet NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Charbonneau, Ed IN 3450 34421.89 500 3750 3450 
Charron, Gene P NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Cheatham, David IN 4200 6500 0 0 4200 
Cherry, Robert W (Bob) IN 500 10564.48 0 600 500 
Chirichiello, Brian K NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Christensen, Chris NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Christiansen, Lars T NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Clark, Gregory S VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Clere, Edward D (Ed) IN 250 55449.5 100 35250 250 
Coffey, James NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Connors, Christopher J NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Cooney, Mary R NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote, David E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Coulombe, Gary M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Cox, Sean C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Crawford, William A IN 1250 11700 200 750 1250 
Crouch, Suzanne M IN 10300 20175 0 400 10300 
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Name State 
Donations 
Total Business 
Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Culver, Wesley IN 500 3750 500 250 500 
Current Sr, William A NC 1100 2000 0 0 0 
Cusson-Cail, Kathleen NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Daniels, Gary L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Daugherty, Duffy NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Davenport, Joshua NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Davis, Bill J IN 500 9640 500 200 500 
Day, Russell C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Deberry Jr, John J TN 21200 2900 4000 0 450 
Deen, David L VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Delph, Mike IN 1125 58578.15 1100 500 1125 
Dermody, Tom IN 5750 12780 500 0 5750 
Desimone, Debra L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Devine, James E (Jim) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Dicicco, Domenick NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Dipentima, Rich NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Dodge, Richard A (Dick) IN 250 32188.5 0 20000 250 
Domingo, Baldwin (Dom) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Dowling, Patricia A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Drenner, Karla Lea GA 0 0 0 0 0 
Drisko, Richard B (Dick) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Dwinell, Richard J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Eaton, Stephanie NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Eberhart, Sean R IN 800 5950 500 0 800 
Edwards, Sarah R VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Emerson, Susan NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Emerton, Larry NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Erickson, Duane NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Espich, Jeffrey Keller IN 900 39400 900 500 900 
Evans, Debbie VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Ferrante, Beverly Ann NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Fesh, Robert (Bob) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Fields, Dennis H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Flanagan, Jack B NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Flanders, Donald H (Don) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Fleck, Joseph W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Floren, Olivia R (Livvy) CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Fredette, Robert A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Friend, William C IN 500 9431.07 500 250 500 
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Name State 
Donations 
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Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Frizzell, David N IN 400 12128.59 1200 600 400 
Fry, Craig Raymond IN 12100 13645.87 1400 0 12100 
Frye, Randy IN 1000 1076 200 0 1000 
Gagne, Larry NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gagnon, Raymond NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Garcia, Marilinda NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gard, Beverly J IN 1400 19658.34 1600 1450 1400 
Gargasz, Carolyn M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Garrity, Patrick NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Giaquinta, Phil IN 3250 24900 900 250 3250 
Gidge, Kenneth N (Ken) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gile, Mary Stuart NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Ginsburg, Phil NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gionet, Edmond NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gonzalez, Carlos E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gorman, Mary J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gould, Franklin NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gould, Kenneth H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gove, Dianne NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Gove, Dianne NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Grassie, Anne C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Greazzo, Phil NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Greemore, Bob NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Greshin, Adam VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Grubb, Floyd Dale IN 11050 15150 500 350 11050 
Gutwein, Douglas L IN 250 4350 200 0 250 
Hagan, Joseph M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hamm, Christine C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen, Peter T NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Harris, Earl L IN 250 1000 0 0 250 
Harshman, Steve WY 0 0 0 0 0 
Harty, Martin NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hatch, William A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawkins, Ken NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Head, Randall IN 550 7665 500 0 550 
Headd, James (Jim) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Helm, Robert (Bob) VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Hensgens, Bob LA 0 0 0 0 0 
Hershman, Brandt IN 1850 28250 3900 250 1850 
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Name State 
Donations 
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Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Hikel, John A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hill, Gregory NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hinch, Richard (Dick) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hines, John J WY 0 0 0 0 0 
Hinkle, Phillip D (Phil) IN 750 4550 500 600 750 
Hoelzel, Kathleen M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hofemann, Roland P NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hogan, Timothy NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Holdman, Travis IN 550 30475 1600 525 550 
Hooper, Dorothea NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hopper, Gary S NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Howard, Thomas J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Hume, Lindel O IN 2750 8708 900 0 2750 
Hutchinson, Winfred (Win) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Huval, Mike (Pete) LA 0 0 0 0 0 
Huxley, Robert NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Ingbretson, Paul C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Introne, Robert (Bob) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Itse, Daniel C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Jabour, Paul V RI 0 0 0 0 0 
Jeudy, Jean Leniol NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Johnsen, Gladys NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Johnson, Jane B NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Johnson, Mitzi VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Johnson, William (Bill) VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Kaen, Naida NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Kappler, Lawrence (Mike) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Katsakiores, Phyllis M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Katsiantonis, Thomas NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Keans, Sandra Balomenos NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Keegan-Hutchinson, Karen NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenley, Howard (Luke) IN 2500 112050 1800 6950 2500 
Kidder, David H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Kilmartin, Duncan F VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Kingsbury, Robert NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Kitzmiller, Warren F VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Knollman, Tom IN 200 3500 0 250 200 
Knox, J David NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Koch, Eric Allan IN 1700 6750 200 0 1700 
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Name State 
Donations 
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Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Koch, Thomas F (Tom) VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Kolodziej, Walter NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Kruse, Dennis K IN 1750 15000 600 250 1750 
Lacasse Sr, Paul NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Ladd Jr, Roderick M (Rick) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lambert, George NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lanane, Tim IN 10350 17370 1200 500 10350 
Landske, Dorothy Suzanne (Sue) IN 1050 8992.83 1900 0 1050 
Larson, Timothy D CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Lasater, Brent T MO 0 0 0 0 0 
Laware, Thomas W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lawson, Connie IN 4750 38771.2 1800 7600 4750 
Lefebvre, Benjamin NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lehe, Donald J IN 350 6350 600 0 350 
Lehman, Matthew S IN 250 18690 800 500 250 
Leising, Jean IN 250 49276.46 0 38401.46 250 
Leonard, Daniel J (Dan) IN 750 10875 0 750 750 
Leonard, Fred NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lerandeau, Alfred (Gus) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Linares, Guillermo NY 0 0 0 0 0 
Lindsey, Steven W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lockwood, Priscilla Parmenter NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Long, David C IN 8250 164750 4100 3800 8250 
Long, Patrick T NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lovett, Charlene Marcotte NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Lundgren, David C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Luther, Robert NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Malone, Robert J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Manwaring, Ann P VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Marcus, Bruce NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Marek, Richard J VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Marriott, Jim ID -3745.48 750 0 0 0 
Masland, James VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Mcallister, Norman H VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Mccarthy, Frank H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mcclain, Richard W (Rich) IN 200 5550 0 0 200 
Mcconkey, Mark E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mcguinness, Sean NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mckinney, Betsy NH 0 0 0 0 0 
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Corp. 
Elite COC Labor 
Mcneil, James L VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Meader, David R NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mecheski, Holly L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Megna, Robert W CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Merrick, Evalyn S NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Merritt Jr, James W IN 2600 121188.6 2800 26800 2600 
Merrow, Harry C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Messier, Irene M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Messmer, Mark B IN 16150 17107.5 400 0 16150 
Milam, Matthew NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Milam, Matthew NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Miller, Patricia IN 1875 20911 700 1375 1875 
Millham, Alida I NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mills Jr, Fred H (T-Fred) LA 0 0 0 0 0 
Mirski, Paul M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Mishler, Ryan D IN 1175 23710.8 300 300 1175 
Monsour, Alex MS -6125 2000 0 0 0 
Mook, Anne Lamy VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Moore Jr, Robert W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Moore, Charlie NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Moran Jr, Edward P NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Moukawsher, Edward CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrowicki, Mike VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Mrvan Jr, Frank IN 4850 8700 600 0 4850 
Munck, Philip NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Neese, Timothy IN 250 3700 0 250 250 
Newton, Clifford (Cliff) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodland, George ND 9501 0 1000 0 0 
Noe, Cynthia Jean IN 250 3950 500 250 250 
Nugent, Johnny IN 6636.5 23479.6 250 0 6636.5 
Obrien, Anne Theresa VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Oconnor, John T NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohara, Jesse MT 0 0 0 0 0 
Okerman, Richard NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Osgood, Philip (Joe) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Owen, Derek NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Packard, Sherman A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Palfrey, David J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Palmer, Barry J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
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Palmer, Stephen J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Panek, William NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pantelakos, Laura C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Parkhurst, Henry A L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Parsons, Robbie NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pastor-Bodmer, Beatriz NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Patten, Betsey NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Patten, Dick NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Paul, Allen E IN 750 67154.93 1150 300 750 
Pearce, Albert (Chuck) VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Peasley, Frank WY 0 0 0 0 0 
Pelath, Scott Douglas IN 6100 22050 700 0 6100 
Pellegrino, Anthony (Tony) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pelletier, Marsha L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Peltz, Peter VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Pena, Aaron TX 28646.76 29850 0 0 3350 
Perry, Jonathan LA 0 0 0 0 0 
Pierce, David Maxey NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pierce, Matt IN 900 1800 500 0 900 
Pilliod, James (Doc) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pilotte, Maurice L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pitre, Joseph A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pond, Phyllis J IN 250 2000 0 0 250 
Porter, Gregory W IN 6300 12000 0 750 6300 
Potter, Frances D NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pratt, Calvin Dean NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Pryor, Cherrish S IN 625 4950 700 750 625 
Quigley, Thomas J PA 158696.3 6725 9000 0 550 
Ramsey, Peter NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Randolph, Lonnie Marcus IN 250 700 0 0 250 
Rappaport, Laurence M NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Reardon, Mara Candelaria IN 3300 5000 0 0 3300 
Rebimbas, Rosa C CT 0 0 0 0 0 
Reed, Michael T NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Reichard, Kevin E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhodes, Brian D NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Rice, Harold L (Chip) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Richardson, Herbert D (Herb) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Richardson, Kathy Kreag IN 1050 7500 900 550 1050 
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Ritter, Glenn F NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Roberts, Kris Edward NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Rogers, Earline S IN 1750 4350 0 0 1750 
Rowe, Robert NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Rumpf, Brian E NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Rumpf, Brian E NJ 0 0 0 0 0 
Sad, Tara NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Sanders, Elisabeth N NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Sapienza, Marie N NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Saunders, Thomas E (Tom) IN 1709 7368 0 250 1709 
Scala, Dino A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Schmidt, Peter B NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Schmidt, Stephen (Steve) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Schroadter, Adam Robert NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Schuring, J Kirk Ohio 0 0 0 0 0 
Scontsas, Lisa NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Seaworth, Brian NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Seidel, Carl W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Semlek, Mark A WY 0 0 0 0 0 
Serlin, Christopher NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Shackett, Jeff NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaw, Barbara E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Shurtleff, Steve NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Siddoway, Jeff C ID 0 0 0 0 0 
Simard, Paul H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Simmons, Tammy NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Simpson, Tyler NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Simpson, Vi IN 27010 49300 1900 500 27010 
Smith, Edwin (Smokey) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Smith, Steven NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Smith, Vernon G IN 650 1200 0 0 650 
Soltani, Tony F NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Soucy, Connie NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Souza, Kathleen NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Sova, Charles E NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Spainhower, Dale NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Spang, Judith NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Spengler, Kristy Kurt VT 0 0 0 0 0 
St Cyr, Jeffrey L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
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Elite COC Labor 
Starr, Robert A VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Steele, Brent IN 1100 49400 800 300 1100 
Steuerwald, Gregory E IN 600 9610 500 900 600 
Stevens, Richard NC 52463.07 53450 5350 1000 500 
Sullivan, Daniel J NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Sullivan, Mary Ann IN 7025 11364.7 750 1400 7025 
Summers, Vanessa J IN 550 7100 0 0 550 
Swank, Matthew NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Swinford, Elaine B NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Sytek, John NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Tamburello, Daniel NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Tatro, Bruce L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor, Greg IN 3550 4250 300 500 3550 
Terrio, Ross W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Theberge, Robert L NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Thomas, Joseph NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Thomas, Yvonne NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Tilton, Franklin T (Frank) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Torr, Gerald R (Jerry) IN 300 26500 1600 1300 300 
Townsend, Chuck NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Tregenza, Norman A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Tremblay, Marc D NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Triplett, Constance (Connie) ND 7925 0 1000 0 1325 
Truitt, Randy IN 3000 15647 400 0 3000 
Turner Jr, Donald H (Don) VT 1975 2900 0 0 0 
Turner, Paul Eric IN 1000 29900 800 500 1000 
Umberger, Karen C NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Vaillancourt, Steve NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Villeneuve, Moe NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Walker, Greggory F IN 1000 10206.33 0 250 1000 
Wall, Janet G NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Waltz, Brent IN 12400 89959.52 0 5654.4 12400 
Waterhouse, Kevin K NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Waterman, John IN 7500 14500 0 0 7500 
Watrous, Rick NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Watters, David H NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Webb, James C (Jim) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Weber, Lucy Mcvitty NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Weeden, Michael W NH 0 0 0 0 0 
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Welch, David A NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Welch, Peggy M IN 10230.2 12950 400 0 10230.2 
Wesco, Timothy IN 250 2230 200 0 250 
Weston, Rachel VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Weyler, Kenneth NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Wheaton, Gary NH 0 0 0 0 0 
White, Andrew NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Willette, Robert (Bob) NH 0 0 0 0 0 
Wilson, Jeff VT -2130.96 0 0 0 0 
Wolkins, David Alan IN 450 5970 450 400 450 
Wright, Kurt VT 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyss, Thomas J (Tom) IN 6100 44439.84 2400 13100 6100 
Yarde Ii, David IN 250 3000 0 250 250 
Yoder, Carlin J IN 250 3900 200 0 250 
Young, R Michael IN 3505 32190 2900 650 3505 
Zakas, Joseph C (Joe) IN 650 31300 600 15250 650 
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Appendix B:Reported Annual Assets of Corporate Elite 
Company 2012 Revenue 
(Millions USD) 
Source 
3M 33,876.00 http://investors.3m.com/financials/annual-reports-and-proxy-
statements/default.aspx  
Allstate 126,947.00 https://www.allstate.com/about/annual-report-archive.aspx  
Abbott Laboratories 31,322.00 http://www.abbottinvestor.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=94004&p=irol-
proxy  
IBM 119,213.00 http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/  
Continental / United 
Airlines 
38,083.00 http://ir.united.com/financial-performance/sec-filings  
Northern Trust Corp. 92,975.50 https://www.northerntrust.com/documents/annual-
reports/northern-trust-annual-report-2012.pdf  
Caterpillar 89,356.00 http://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/Caterpillar/C10005383  
Deere 56,265.80 https://investor.deere.com/our-company/investors-
relations/financial-information/annual-reports-and-
proxy/default.aspx  
Boeing 88,896.00 http://s2.q4cdn.com/661678649/files/doc_financials/annual/2012/
2012_annual_report.pdf   
Corning 29,375.00 http://investor.shareholder.com/corning/annuals-proxies.cfm  
Smurfit-Stone / RockTenn 10,687.10 http://ir.westrock.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=254016&p=irol-rkt  
FedEx 29,903.00 http://fedexannualreport2012.hwaxis.com  
Marathon Oil 35,306.00 http://www.marathonoil.com/Investor_Center/Annual_Review/A
nnual_Reports/  
Aon 30,486.00 http://ir.aon.com/about-aon/investor-relations/financial-
reports/sec-filings/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=9109157  
Exelon 78,554.00 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/9466/00011931251306
9749/d474199d10k.htm  
Northrop Grumman 26,543.00 http://www.northropgrumman.com/AboutUs/AnnualReports/Pag
es/default.aspx  
General Dynamics 28,373.00 http://investorrelations.gd.com/financial-reports/annual-reports  
United Technologies 89,409.00 http://2012ar.utc.com/  
McDonald's 30,521.00 http://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/AboutMcDonalds/I
nvestors/Investor%202013/2012%20Annual%20Report%20Final
.pdf  
Aetna 41,494.50 http://www.aetna.com/investor/annualrept.htm  
Illinois Tool Works 19,309.00 http://investor.itw.com/investor-information/financial-
reports/annual-reports  
McGraw-Hill/S&P Global 7,052.00 http://investor.spglobal.com/Annual-
Reports/Index?KeyGenPage=1073751495  
Eli Lilly 34,398.90 https://investor.lilly.com/annuals.cfm  
United Parcel Service 38,863.00 http://www.investors.ups.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62900&p=irol-
reportsannual  
Total 1,207,208.80   
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Appendix C: Individual Industry Regressions 
 Energy Services Finance Agri. Manuf. Tech. Defense 
Donations        
  Energy 0.012       
 (0.008)       
  Services  0.004      
  (0.009)      
  Finance/Banks   -0.002     
   (0.010)     
  Agriculture    -0.003    
    (0.010)    
  Manufacturing     0.012   
     (0.013)   
  Technology      -0.014  
      (0.026)  
  Defense       0.013 
       (0.029) 
  Labor -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate        
Pro-Labor Environment -0.076** -0.077** -0.078** -0.078** -0.079** -0.078** -0.078** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Dem. Party -0.099*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ind. Party 0.058 0.053 0.052 0.050 0.052 0.051 0.051 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Rep. Governor 0.036 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.038* 0.039* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.025 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constituent Characteristics       
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
% In Agriculture -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
% In FIRE -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.034** 0.033** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.033** 0.034** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% < Poverty Line 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
R2 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Without 3M Without Abbott Without Aetna Without Allstate 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.036** 0.042** 0.035** 0.036** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-Elite -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate     
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.083** -0.084** -0.084** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ind. Party 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.062 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
% In FIRE -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued  
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Without Aon Without Boeing Without Caterpillar Without Continental 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.035** 0.037** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-Elite -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate     
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.083** -0.083** -0.084** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Ind. Party 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.061 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
% In FIRE -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
 N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Without Corning Without Deere Without Eli-Lilly Without Exelon 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.035** 0.037** 0.035** 0.034** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-Elite -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate     
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** -0.083** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.102*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ind. Party 0.061 0.058 0.061 0.060 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.037* 0.038* 0.037* 0.037* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
% In FIRE -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES Without FedEx Without Gen Dyn Without ITW Without Marathon 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.030* 0.035** 0.035** 0.043** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Non-Elite -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate     
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** -0.083** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.102*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Ind. Party 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.053 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.038* 0.037* 0.037* 0.040* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
% In FIRE -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.037** 0.038** 0.038** 0.036** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.044 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued 
  (17) (18) (19) (20) 
VARIABLES 
Without 
McDonald's 
Without McGraw-
Hill 
Without 
NTC 
Without 
Northrop 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.032* 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-Elite -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate     
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ind. Party 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.062 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-
2010 
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
% In FIRE -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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APPENDIX D: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Continued 
  (21) (22) (23) (24) 
VARIABLES Without Smurfit Without United Without United Tech Without UPS 
Donations     
Corporate Elite 0.036** 0.036** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-Elite -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Labor -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Climate . 
 
   
Pro-Labor Environment -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** -0.084** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Dem. Party -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ind. Party 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Rep. Maj. Chamber -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rep. Governor 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 0.037* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
2010 Rep. Swing -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Agenda Setting Ability 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics    
% Black -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% Foreign Born -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Manuf., 1960 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ in % Manuf., 1960-2010 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
% In Agriculture -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
% In FIRE -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% Unemployed 0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.038** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Average Income 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
% < Poverty Line 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Own Homes 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix E: Sensitivity Measures of Corporate Elite Donations, Alternate Measures 
 (1) 
# of Corp. Donors 
(logged)  
(2) 
# of Corp. Donors (top-
coded)  
(3) 
Any Corp. 
 Donors (=1) 
 b (SE)  b (SE)  b (SE) 
Corporate Elite Donations        
 # of Donors (ln) 0.029* (0.014)       
 # of Donors (top-coded)    0.014* (0.007)    
 Any Donations (=1)        0.034* (0.014) 
Campaign Donations (logged %)        
 Non-Elite Business -0.005 (0.008)  -0.005 (0.008)  -0.005 (0.007) 
 Labor -0.050*** (0.011)  -0.050*** (0.011)  -0.050*** (0.011) 
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.089** (0.029)  -0.089** (0.029)  -0.084** (0.027) 
 Party=Dem -0.101*** (0.020)  -0.101*** (0.020)  -0.101*** (0.020) 
 Party=Ind./Non-Part. 0.054 (0.065)  0.054 (0.065)  0.056 (0.066) 
 Chamber = Rep. Maj. -0.008 (0.024)  -0.008 (0.024)  -0.005 (0.024) 
 Governor=Rep. 0.040* (0.018)  0.040* (0.018)  0.036* (0.018) 
 2010 Rep. Swing -0.017 (0.023)  -0.017 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.023) 
 Agenda Setting Ability 0.022 (0.016)  0.022 (0.016)  0.023 (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics         
 % Black -0.002 (0.002)  -0.002 (0.002)  -0.002 (0.002) 
 % Foreign Born -0.005 (0.003)  -0.005 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.003) 
 % in Manuf., 1960 0.003 (0.003)  0.003 (0.003)  0.003 (0.003) 
 Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010 0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003) 
 % in FIRE  -0.001 (0.014)  -0.001 (0.014)  -0.001 (0.014) 
 % in Agriculture  -0.011 (0.011)  -0.012 (0.011)  -0.011 (0.011) 
 % Unemployed 0.038** (0.012)  0.038** (0.012)  0.037** (0.011) 
 Average Income 0.009 (0.011)  0.009 (0.011)  0.009 (0.011) 
 % < Poverty Line 0.004 (0.016)  0.004 (0.016)  0.004 (0.016) 
 Average Age 0.005 (0.006)  0.005 (0.006)  0.004 (0.007) 
 % Own Homes 0.011* (0.005)  0.011* (0.005)  0.012* (0.005) 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix F: Treatment Effects Estimates Using Propensity Score Matching 
 Anti-Labor Score 
Corporate Elite Donations 
Dummy 
0.037 * 
(0.015) 
Notes:  N=7,143. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance: * p < .05, ***p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Appendix G: Supplemental Analyses Using Continuous Labor Climate Measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 b (SE)  b (SE) 
Focal Interaction      
  Corp. Elite Donations × Pro-Labor Enviro.    0.043** (0.013) 
Campaign Donations (logged %)      
  Corporate Elite 0.032** (0.011)  -0.042 (0.022) 
  Non-Elite Business -0.001 (0.007)  -0.005 (0.007) 
  Labor -0.050*** (0.011)  -0.054*** (0.012) 
Political Climate      
  Pro-Labor Environment 0.002 (0.012)  -0.012 (0.011) 
  Party=Dem -0.102*** (0.019)  -0.096*** (0.019) 
  Party=Ind./Non-Partisan 0.044 (0.065)  0.044 (0.064) 
  Chamber = Rep. Maj. -0.003 (0.027)  -0.005 (0.027) 
  Governor=Rep. 0.036 (0.021)  0.043* (0.021) 
  2010 Rep. Swing 0.015 (0.025)  0.014 (0.024) 
  Agenda Setting Ability 0.028 (0.017)  0.028 (0.016) 
Constituent Characteristics       
  % Black -0.000 (0.002)  -0.000 (0.002) 
  % Foreign Born -0.003 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.003) 
  % in Manuf., 1960 0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003) 
  Δ in Manuf. 1960-2010 0.004 (0.004)  0.002 (0.003) 
  % in FIRE  -0.013 (0.013)  -0.016 (0.013) 
  % in Agriculture  0.001 (0.011)  0.005 (0.011) 
  % Unemployed 0.024* (0.011)  0.021 (0.011) 
  Average Income 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
  % < Poverty Line 0.000 (0.016)  0.001 (0.016) 
  Average Age 0.004 (0.007)  0.005 (0.007) 
  % Own Homes 0.013* (0.005)  0.011* (0.005) 
N=7,143 Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Appendix H:  Bill Outcomes Using Total Donations in State 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Total Campaign Donation in State (ln$)       
 Corporate Elite 0.415*** (0.126)  0.603*** (0.136)  0.377* (0.192) 
 Labor -0.425** (0.147)  -0.576*** (0.145)  -0.490** (0.185) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.120 (0.713)  0.715 (0.694)  1.266 (1.075) 
 Governor=Rep. 0.021 (0.350)  0.186 (0.391)  -0.101 (1.055) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 0.829 (0.591)  2.114*** (0.612)  2.240 (1.724) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.810 (0.456)  -0.339 (0.418)  0.313 (0.376) 
         
Constituent Characteristics          
 % Black -0.107* (0.042)  -0.071 (0.043)  0.052 (0.056) 
 % Foreign born -0.040 (0.064)  -0.051 (0.076)  0.188 (0.179) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.159* (0.072)  0.183* (0.075)  0.234 (0.151) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.318* (0.128)  0.361** (0.131)  0.257 (0.224) 
 % in FIRE -0.409 (0.250)  -0.160 (0.353)  -0.967 (0.711) 
 % in Agriculture -0.750 (0.538)  -0.486 (0.527)  -0.352 (0.935) 
 % Unemployed 0.510 (0.374)  0.446 (0.394)  -0.579 (0.604) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.186 (0.120)  -0.332* (0.151)  0.093 (0.182) 
 Average Age 0.368 (0.205)  0.306 (0.178)  0.064 (0.392) 
 % Own Home -0.179* (0.079)  -0.276** (0.100)  0.070 (0.129) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.880 (0.876)  0.547 (0.973)  1.394 (1.174) 
 Elections 0.122 (0.745)  -0.033 (0.736)  -1.061 (1.102) 
 Public Employees 0.529* (0.251)  0.355 (0.278)  0.505 (0.310) 
 Dues / RTW 0.222 (0.416)  0.186 (0.416)  -0.784 (0.709) 
 Politics -1.598 (0.859)  -1.662 (0.871)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.031* (1.012)  1.089 (0.588)  0.868 (0.795) 
 Strikes 0.652 (1.770)  0.383 (1.737)  1.767 (2.646) 
 Teachers -0.216 (0.397)  -0.560 (0.441)  -0.517 (0.620) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Models 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the 
ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized 
scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome 
(pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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APPENDIX H, Continued 
 (1) 
Ordinal 
 Outcome 
 
(2) 
Trichotomized  
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Dichotomized 
 Outcome 
 b SE  b SE  b SE 
Total Campaign Donation in State (ln$)       
 Corporate Elite 0.422*** (0.125)  0.597*** (0.135)  0.378* (0.177) 
 Labor -0.495** (0.153)  -0.596*** (0.157)  -0.524** (0.191) 
         
Contributions to Bill Sponsor (ln%)         
 Corporate Elite 0.042 (0.195)  0.066 (0.216)  0.059 (0.254) 
 Labor 0.229 (0.130)  0.096 (0.105)  0.157 (0.158) 
         
Political Climate         
 Pro-Labor Environment -0.044 (0.720)  0.811 (0.790)  1.377 (1.067) 
 Governor=Rep. -0.115 (0.356)  0.144 (0.421)  -0.224 (1.165) 
 Chamber Maj. = Rep 0.710 (0.588)  2.118** (0.815)  2.332 (1.807) 
 Agenda Setting Abilities -0.830 (0.431)  -0.367 (0.428)  0.326 (0.392) 
         
Constituent Characteristics          
 % Black -0.096* (0.040)  -0.062 (0.047)  0.058 (0.061) 
 % Foreign born -0.054 (0.063)  -0.066 (0.092)  0.132 (0.197) 
 % in Manufacturing, 1960 0.136 (0.085)  0.163 (0.091)  0.184 (0.165) 
 Δ in % Manufacturing 0.301* (0.138)  0.349* (0.140)  0.228 (0.226) 
 % in FIRE -0.384 (0.275)  -0.111 (0.522)  -0.907 (0.874) 
 % in Agriculture -0.632 (0.519)  -0.441 (0.543)  -0.390 (0.911) 
 % Unemployed 0.548 (0.371)  0.483 (0.410)  -0.400 (0.679) 
 % < Poverty Line -0.182 (0.112)  -0.352 (0.203)  -0.007 (0.225) 
 Average Age 0.386* (0.187)  0.338 (0.182)  0.167 (0.390) 
 % Own Home -0.167* (0.075)  -0.284* (0.132)  0.017 (0.148) 
         
Bill Subject (ref=Misc.)         
 Arbitration/Negotiation 0.752 (0.918)  0.494 (0.993)  1.172 (1.192) 
 Elections 0.116 (0.725)  -0.052 (0.712)  -1.078 (1.105) 
 Public Employees 0.515 (0.283)  0.342 (0.310)  0.525 (0.352) 
 Dues / RTW 0.179 (0.411)  0.151 (0.415)  -0.867 (0.697) 
 Politics -1.617* (0.816)  -1.666* (0.847)    
 Benefits/Wages 2.040* (0.936)  1.081 (0.554)  0.864 (0.758) 
 Strikes 0.573 (1.553)  0.366 (1.624)  1.789 (2.495) 
 Teachers -0.185 (0.418)  -0.531 (0.458)  -0.474 (0.659) 
Notes: N=459. Sample consists of anti-labor bills. Models 1 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the 
ordinal scale (1-6) of bill outcome. Model 2 presents an ordered logistic regression predicting the trichotomized 
scale (0, 1, or 2) of the bill outcome. Model 3 presents a logistic regression, predicting the dichotomized outcome 
(pass, fail). Asterisks indicate significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
